Hot Shot Express, Inc. v. Brooks
| Decision Date | 07 June 2002 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 011952. |
| Citation | 264 Va. 126,563 S.E.2d 764 |
| Parties | HOT SHOT EXPRESS, INC., et al. v. Hattie E. BROOKS. |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Gregory S. Hooe (Brenner, Evans & Yoffy, on briefs), Richmond, for appellants.
Martin R. Johnson, Montpelier, (Parker, Pollard & Brown, on brief), for appellee.
Present: All the Justices.
Opinion by Justice LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR.
In this appeal, we consider various issues arising out of a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in a personal injury action.
On September 22, 1998, Thomas A. Bell was driving a tractor-trailer for Hot Shot Express, Inc. from Pennsylvania to Stuarts Draft, Virginia. Bell arrived in Stuarts Draft at approximately 9:00 p.m. Bell planned to drop the trailer at the intended delivery site on highway U.S. 340 and to return the next morning to complete the delivery. Bell was unfamiliar with Stuarts Draft and did not know the precise location of the delivery site.
As Bell turned the tractor-trailer onto U.S. 340 in Stuarts Draft, he drove to the right northbound travel lane and slowed his vehicle to between 15 to 20 miles per hour. Bell subsequently maintained that he had activated the tractor-trailer's four-way hazard lights at that time. After traveling approximately one-half mile, Bell realized that he had gone past the delivery site and stopped the tractor-trailer. At the point where Bell stopped his vehicle, U.S. 340, which runs north and south, has two travel lanes in each direction and a center turn lane, but no shoulders. Thus, when Bell stopped his vehicle, it completely blocked the right northbound travel lane. The speed limit on this portion of the highway is 45 miles per hour.
Bell determined that he could not back his vehicle to the delivery site and decided to proceed down U.S. 340 to find a place to turn around. Before driving forward, Bell observed from his rearview mirror two vehicles traveling in the right northbound lane. Bell observed one of the vehicles move to the left northbound lane. Bell was "not positive" which vehicle moved to the left lane, but "believe[d] it was the vehicle in front." Bell then turned his attention ahead and began to drive the tractor-trailer forward at a speed of approximately five miles per hour. After proceeding fifteen to twenty-five feet, Bell felt the impact of a collision at the rear of his vehicle. Bell did not see the collision from his rearview mirror and did not know whether his vehicle had been struck by one of the vehicles that he had observed earlier or by some other vehicle.
Bell's tractor-trailer had been struck by a compact sedan driven by Hattie E. Brooks. Brooks' vehicle was wedged under the rear of the tractor-trailer. The roof of her vehicle had to be removed by rescue workers in order to remove Brooks from the vehicle's interior. Brooks was severely injured as a result of the collision, including injuries to her neck, back, and both wrists.
On February 2, 1999, Brooks filed a motion for judgment against Hot Shot Express and Bell (hereinafter collectively "Hot Shot Express") seeking $3,000,000 in damages for injuries she sustained in the September 22, 1998 collision.1 Thereafter, Hot Shot Express filed grounds of defense denying negligence and asserting that Brooks' own negligence was the cause of the collision. Prior to trial, Brooks stipulated that she had no memory of the events that led to the collision, but further stipulated that she would not assert her memory loss as an element of her damages resulting from the injuries she sustained in the collision.
Beginning on May 10, 2001, a two-day jury trial was held in the Circuit Court of Augusta County. In addition to the facts recounted above, the trial court received evidence from Brooks, who was 78 years of age at that time. She testified that on the night of the accident she had driven her car along U.S. 340 from her place of employment and that her car was in good condition prior to the accident. However, she testified that she had no recollection of how the accident occurred and very little recollection of her subsequent treatment in the hospital for several weeks.
Also, Pamela J. Coffman testified that she had driven by the accident scene in her vehicle immediately after the accident occurred. Coffman described the road conditions as "very dark" and testified that she could not see lights illuminated on either the tractor-trailer or Brooks' vehicle as she approached the accident scene in the right northbound lane of U.S. 340. Coffman further testified that she had avoided striking Brooks' vehicle only by braking suddenly and moving sharply into the left northbound lane. One of the police officers responding to the accident testified that he observed the fourway hazard lights on Bell's vehicle activated at some point, but that he did not recall whether those hazard lights were burning when he first arrived at the scene.
At the conclusion of Brooks' case-in-chief, Hot Shot Express moved to strike her evidence on the grounds that it failed to show that Bell was negligent or that his negligence was a proximate cause of the collision. Hot Shot Express contended that the evidence showed that Bell's actions had comported with Code § 46.2-1040, requiring drivers to activate all four turn signals simultaneously when stopped on a highway and, thus, that he was not negligent as a matter of law. Brooks responded that Bell's actions were in violation of Code § 46.2-888, requiring drivers not to stop on a highway so as to impede traffic except in the case of an emergency. The trial court denied the motion to strike.
Hot Shot Express then moved to strike the evidence on the ground that Brooks was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Hot Shot Express contended that Brooks' evidence plainly showed that she failed to maintain a proper lookout. Brooks responded that she was entitled to a presumption of using ordinary care and that Coffman's testimony established that the tractor-trailer was difficult to see. The trial court denied the motion to strike, stating that contributory negligence was an issue for the jury to determine on the evidence so far adduced.
At the conclusion of all the evidence, Hot Shot Express renewed its motions to strike Brooks' evidence on the same grounds that it had previously asserted. The trial court again denied these motions. Brooks then moved to strike Hot Shot Express' evidence regarding the issue of primary negligence. The trial court, over Hot Shot Express' objection, ruled that Bell had violated Code § 46.2-888 by stopping his vehicle on the highway under the existing circumstances and, therefore, was negligent as a matter of law. The trial court further ruled that the questions whether Bell's negligence was a proximate cause of the collision and whether Brooks was contributorily negligent would be submitted to the jury.
Thereafter, the trial court, over Hot Shot Express' objection, refused its proffered instruction A concerning the duty of a driver of a vehicle not to "follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent." Hot Shot Express contended that Brooks' theory of the case required the jury to accept that she was the driver of the second vehicle observed by Bell from his rearview mirror and that the jury could find that she had been following the first vehicle too closely. Brooks responded that her theory was only that the first vehicle may have obscured her view of the tractor-trailer.
Hot Shot Express also objected to the trial court's granting of Brooks' instruction P, which provided:
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it must be presumed that [Brooks] exercised ordinary care for her own safety and did only what an ordinarily prudent person would have done under the circumstances of this case.
Hot Shot Express contended that because Brooks' memory loss prevented her from presenting evidence regarding her actions prior to the collision, she should not be entitled to a presumption that those actions were proper. Brooks asserted that the instruction was a proper statement of the law. Brooks further asserted that her stipulation regarding her memory loss was only that her memory loss was not an element of her damages, and not that it was unrelated to the accident. Hot Shot Express contended that the stipulation contained no such limitation. The trial court stated that it was "concerned about giving ... instruction [P]," because the court had already resolved to instruct the jury on contributory negligence. However, relying on Petress v. Seay, 219 Va. 1053, 1059-60, 254 S.E.2d 91, 95 (1979), the trial court determined that the presumption of ordinary care instruction was not conclusive and could be given along with instructions on contributory negligence.
The jury returned its, verdict for Brooks, awarding her damages in the amount of $340,000. Hot Shot Express moved to set aside the jury's verdict on the ground that it was contrary to the evidence and the law. The trial court denied this motion and entered judgment on the jury's verdict in a final order dated May 30, 2001. We awarded Hot Shot Express this appeal.
Hot Shot Express first contends that the trial court erred in failing to strike Brooks' evidence on the ground that it failed to establish that Bell's actions were negligent or a proximate cause of the collision. As it did in the trial court, Hot Shot Express relies upon Code § 46.2-4040, contending that Bell's actions comported with the requirements of that statute and that no other evidence would permit the jury to determine that he was otherwise negligent. Brooks, also adopting her argument from the trial court, contends that Bell's actions were clearly in violation of Code § 46.2-888 and, thus, the trial court correctly ruled that Bell was negligent as a matter of law. We agree with Brooks.
In relevant part, Code § 46.2-888, which permits certain emergency stopping of vehicles on highways,...
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