Hoteles Condado Beach v. Union De Tronquistas

• Citation: 588 F. Supp. 679
• Decision Date: 25 April 1984
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 82-2328 (JP).
• Parties: HOTELES CONDADO BEACH, La Concha and Convention Center, Plaintiff(s), v. UNION DE TRONQUISTAS DE PUERTO RICO, LOCAL 901, Defendant(s).
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

588 F. Supp. 679

HOTELES CONDADO BEACH, La Concha and Convention Center, Plaintiff(s), v. UNION DE TRONQUISTAS DE PUERTO RICO, LOCAL 901, Defendant(s).

Civ. No. 82-2328 (JP).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

April 25, 1984.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Amelia Fortuño, Lespier, Muñoz & Ramírez, San Juan, P.R., for plaintiffs.

Pedro Varela, Luis F. Abreu Elias, Hato Rey, P.R., for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

PIERAS, District Judge.

This is an action brought by Hoteles Condado Beach-La Concha and Convention Center (Plaintiff), pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 185, seeking to set aside an Arbitration Award issued on July 2, 1982, by Juan T. Rodriguez, Arbitrator of the Bureau of Conciliation and Arbitration, of the Department of Labor and Human Resources of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

On April 6, 1983, Union de Tronquistas de Puerto Rico, Local 910, (defendant) filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum. On May 10, 1983, plaintiff filed its Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment and its own Motion for Summary Judgment, which was replied to by Defendant on May 19, 1983. On the basis of the Motions for Summary Judgment filed by the parties, together with the accompanying affidavits and documents submitted, this Court reaches the following determinations of fact and law:

A. FACTS:

The essential facts in this case are not in dispute.

1. The Condado Beach-La Concha Hotels and Convention Center comprise a cluster of two hotels and a large convention area located in the heart of the tourist sector in Condado, Puerto Rico.

2. Plaintiff discharged employee Santiago Figueroa, a lifeguard employed at the tourism cluster, because he allegedly engaged in immoral conduct consisting of fondling his genitals and masturbating before Mrs. Kimberly Flores, a female guest staying at the Hotel. (P. 11-12 Transcript, The People of Puerto Rico v. Santiago Figueroa, Criminal case 81-995).

3. At the behest of the Union, an arbitration hearing was held on June 23, 1982, before a duly selected arbitrator of the Bureau of Conciliation and Arbitration of the Department of Labor and Human Resources of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, in order to determine whether the discharge of the employee was justified or not. Both parties appeared represented by counsel.

4. On said date, Mrs. Kimberly Flores, Plaintiff's main witness, appeared in order to testify at the arbitration hearing. She was accompanied by her husband.

5. The Union objected to the presence of the witness's husband while she testified, alleging that the arbitration hearing was a private proceeding at which the witness' husband had no right to be present, and that the Union might call the witness' husband as an adverse witness.

6. The arbitrator determined that Mr. Flores could not be present while his wife testified and requested him to leave the room. Under these circumstances, Mrs. Flores refused to testify.

7. Plaintiff then presented into evidence, in substitution of her testimony, the judgment and transcript of the trial in criminal case # 81-995 (Obscene Exposure) heard on August 24, 1981, before the Hon. Luis Totti of the District Court of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (San Juan Part). In said case, the discharged employee had been found guilty of violating Article 106 of the Penal Code of Puerto Rico (Obscene Exposure), 33 L.P.R.A. Sec. 4068.

8. Although the Arbitrator in substitution of Mrs. Flores' testimony, admitted the judgment and transcript into evidence stating that he would grant to it whateer probatory weight it had; the Arbitrator retracted its admission and refused to grant it any weight in light of his alleged inability to evaluate the credibility of Mrs. Flores, who testified during the course of the criminal trial.

9. The discharged employee, Mr. Santiago Figueroa, did not testify at the criminal trial, nor was he present at the arbitration hearing to present his side of the case (Transcript, affidavit of Attorney Ruperto Robles).

10. The Arbitrator concluded that the disciplinary regulations which granted the plaintiff authority to discharge Mr. Figueroa only applied to Casino employees; therefore, the discharge of the non-casino employee accused of obscene exposure, according to the arbitrator, could not be upheld under the collective bargaining agreement.

B. STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Since the enactment of the Labor Management Relations Act in 1947, and particularly since the Steelworkers Trilogy of 1960, arbitration has played an increasingly crucial role as the preferred method for adjusting disputes arising over the interpretation or application of collective bargaining. United Steel Workers v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1960); United Steel Workers v. Warrior and Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960); United Steel Workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960). The reason for this prominence has been variously expressed: the arbitration process is more flexible, efficient, expedient, and less expensive than litigation; the arbitrator has more expertise in resolving controversies that arise under the industrial law of the shop than does a court of law; the parties have voluntarily agreed to submit its dispute to final and binding impartial adjudication; and arbitration is a favored alternative to other non-peaceful methods of conflict resolution, such as strikes, boycotts, etc. Timken Co. v. United Steel Workers, 492 F.2d 1178, 1180 (6th Cir. 1974); Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local 195 v. Crass Brothers Meat Packers, Inc., 518 F.2d 1113, 1120 (3rd Cir.1975); R.I. Abrams, "The Integrity of the Arbitral Award", 76 Mich.L.Rev. 231 (1977). For the above reasons, judicial restraint has characterized the review of arbitration awards.

Nevertheless, judicial deference to arbitration does not grant carte blanche approval to any decision that an arbitrator might make. Local 1139, IERMW v. Litton Microwave Cooking Products, 704 F.2d 393, 113 LRRM 2015 (8th Cir.1983). Thus, courts have recognized that there exist situations where the conduct or result of an arbitration proceeding is so distant from the mutual expectations embodied in the collective bargaining agreement between the parties, or so alien to the impartiality and fairness envisioned in an arbitration proceeding as a whole, that an award resulting from said proceeding must be set aside, since it is unfaithful to the obligation of the arbitrator. Newark Stereotypers Union v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 397 F.2d 594, 599 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 954, 89 S.Ct. 378, 21 L.Ed.2d 365 (1958); Graham Service, Inc. v. Teamsters, Local 975, 700 F.2d 420 (8th Cir. 1982). The seminal case in this area is U.S. Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel, supra 363 U.S. at 597, 80 S.Ct. at 1361, where the Supreme Court stated:

"... an arbitrator is confined to the interpretation or application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice. He may, of course, look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award."

In accord with the above, the First Circuit, has established two factors permitting an arbitration award to be vacated. The first factor is when the award is unfounded in reason or fact, and so unconnected with the wording and purpose of the contract as to manifest an infidelity to the obligation of the arbitrator. Bettencourt v. Boston Edison, 560 F.2d 1045 (1st Cir.1977). The second factor is when the award is outside the collective bargaining agreement itself because it is based on reasoning so palpably faulty that no judge could ever conceivably have made such a ruling. Bettencourt, at 1050. The First Circuit has also established that the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sections 1-14, applies to collective bargaining agreements. Electronics Corporation of America v. International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, Local 272, 492 F.2d 1255, 1256 (1st Cir.1974). Particular attention must be focused on Section 10 of the Arbitration Act, which provides that, upon being petitioned by a party, the United States District Court in and for the District where the award was made, may issue an order vacating an award:

"(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to pospone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown or refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudice.

(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and indefinite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made."

The United States Arbitration Act provides that the United States District Court may issue an order vacating an arbitration award where an arbitrator has been guilty of misconduct in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced. The provisions of the Act, read in conjunction with the case law under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, supplies this Court with the legal guidelines for determining whether the award should be vacated. It is the arbitrator's construction which was bargained for, U.S. Steel Workers v. Enterprise Wheel, supra, 363 U.S. at 598-599, 80 S.Ct. at 1361-1362, but a labor arbitration's award must "draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement if the interpretation can in any rational way be derived from the agreement, viewed in the light of its language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties' intention."...