Hott v. Hennepin County

Decision Date14 June 2001
Docket NumberI-,APPELLEES,No. 00-3595,00-3595
Citation260 F.3d 901
Parties(8th Cir. 2001) JOYCE HOTT, AS TRUSTEE OF THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT PHILIP E. HOTT, FOR HERSELF INDIVIDUALLY, AND FOR ALL HEIRS, APPELLANT, v. HENNEPIN COUNTY, MINNESOTA; DAVID FAHLAND; GERHARD RIEDER; DOES, Submitted:
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] Before Wollman, Chief Judge, Heaney, and Murphy, Circuit Judges.

Wollman, Chief Judge

Joyce Hott, plaintiff, appeals from the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment in her suit for damages stemming from the suicide of her son during his pre-trial detention at the Hennepin County Adult Detention Center (ADC). We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

I.

The body of Philip Edward Hott (Hott) was discovered by a deputy in his cell at the ADC shortly after 5:30 a.m. on January 21, 1996. Hott had constructed a noose from torn bed sheets and hanged himself from the guard rail on the unoccupied top bunk. A second broken bed-sheet noose was found in the toilet in his cell. At the time of the suicide, Hott was eighteen years old and had been detained in the ADC for approximately forty-five days while awaiting trial on charges stemming from a theft.

During the ADC's routine intake procedures on December 6, 1995, a deputy screened Hott for medical and psychiatric problems. The screening form indicates that Hott denied having suicidal inclinations or indicators, but complained of back and neck pain from a recent car accident. The injuries were treated with Advil and Tylenol throughout his detention. Because of his slight build--he stood five feet eleven inches and weighed one hundred twenty pounds--Hott indicated on intake that he had been bullied by other inmates in the past, and he was thus classified as vulnerable. Because of this classification, Hott was housed without a cellmate in the special needs portion of the ADC.

An ADC nurse conducted a detailed health assessment on December 28, 1995. The assessment, which relied entirely on Hott's self-reporting and the nurse's immediate observations, once again did not indicate that Hott had an increased risk for suicide. In fact, two years earlier, medical personnel at a county hospital had documented that Hott had attempted suicide and was at an increased risk for subsequent attempts, and that he suffered from hypomania and bipolar personality disorder. Hott did not advise the ADC about the existence of the medical records or authorize ADC personnel to obtain any of his medical records, and the ADC did not attempt to determine whether any county facility was in possession of any of Hott's medical records.

Hott did little to attract attention to himself during his stay at the ADC. According to the affidavit of a former inmate, Hott occasionally discussed suicide with other inmates and from time to time circled his hands around his neck at such length and with sufficient force so as to leave red marks, this not only in his cell but also in the presence of the guards. In the week preceding his death, additional criminal charges were filed against Hott. On January 20, Hott played cards and talked with other prisoners during the day. Around 10:30 p.m., he obtained special permission to telephone his girlfriend, Christine Dick, and check on the health of their infant son, who was suffering from an ear infection. Around 11:15 p.m., other inmates observed Hott moving around in his cell, possibly doing push-ups.

Deputy Gerhard Rieder was responsible for the special needs section of the ADC that night, and his log reflects that he complied with the ADC policy of conducting checks on the inmates at approximately half-hour intervals. The last check is logged at 5:48 a.m. and states that "all appears ok."1 Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the evidence reveals that at 5:37 a.m. Rieder turned on the lights, discovered Hott's body, sounded an alarm, and summoned assistance.

The medical examiner concluded that Hott had likely been dead for a period of hours before his body was discovered. Accordingly, Hott was lying dead in a seated position at the foot of his bed during a period when Rieder repeatedly noted in the ADC's logs that he had performed health and well-being checks and seen nothing amiss. Notwithstanding Rieder's notations in the logs, several ADC inmates maintain that the checks were not regularly conducted.

Plaintiff, as trustee of Hott's estate, brought an action against Hennepin County, Rieder, and Rieder's supervisor David Fahland (collectively, the defendants). She asserted claims of negligence under Minnesota state law and for violations of Hott's Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all of the claims.

II.

On appeal, the plaintiff raises three arguments. First, she argues that Hennepin County violated Hott's constitutional rights when it failed to ascertain that Hott posed an increased risk of suicide. Second, she contends that Rieder's failure to conduct required cell checks intervals amounted to deliberate indifference in violation of Hott's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Third, she argues that the defendants are liable under Minnesota tort law for negligent failure to protect the safety of its inmates.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court: whether the record, viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rabushka v Crane Co., 122 F.3d 559, 562 (8th Cir. 1997). In this case, the plaintiff, as the non-moving party, is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the record. See Vette Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 612 F.2d 1076, 1077 (8th Cir. 1980).

A. Section 1983 Claims

A claim under § 1983 must allege that conduct of a defendant acting under color of state law deprived a plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the constitution or the laws of the United States. Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986). The plaintiff's complaint asserted constitutional claims for deprivation of Hott's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments based both on the ADC's failure to ascertain that Hott posed an increased suicide risk and on Rieder's failure to perform checks at staggered thirty-minute intervals as required by ADC policy.

Hott's status as a pre-trial detainee placed him outside the protections of the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment, which applies only to convicted prisoners. Bell v. Stigers, 937 F.2d 1340, 1342 n.4 (8th Cir. 1991). The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees pre-trial detainees at least as many protections as does the Eighth Amendment, however, and extends to them as well protection from deprivations that are intended to punish. Id. (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979)).

1. The ADC's Failure to Identify Hott as a Suicide Risk

We have generally treated allegations that officials failed to prevent jail suicides as claims for failure to provide adequate medical treatment. See, e.g., Williams v. Kelso, 201 F.3d 1060, 1065 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming summary judgment because plaintiff failed to show that prison officials deliberately disregarded serious medical needs of which they were aware); Liebe v. Norton, 157 F.3d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 1998) ("[O]nce one is classified as a suicide risk, the right to be protected from that risk would seem to fall under the ambit of the right to have medical needs addressed."); Stigers, 937 F.2d at 1343 (inmate suicides analyzed as the jailer's failure to provide appropriate medical care). In such cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to show that (1) he suffered from a serious medical need and (2) the prison officials actually knew of his need, but deliberately failed to meet it. Williams, 201 F.3d at 1064. The inadequate medical care analysis focuses on the particular risk of suicide posed by the specific prisoner, rather than on the generalized threat of suicide among the population of prisoners as a whole. See, e.g., id. at 1064-66.

The plaintiff contends that the ADC violated Hott's Eighth Amendment rights when it failed to identify him as being at an increased suicide risk. She argues that because medical records reflecting Hott's suicidal tendencies were in the possession of a county facility, the ADC denied Hott access to necessary medical care by not obtaining the records and classifying him accordingly.2 She contends that the ADC had an obligation to investigate Hott's mental condition because of his habit of making strangling gestures. Further, she contends that the additional charges brought against him just before his suicide, his request for a late-night phone call to Christine Dick, and his "glum" demeanor on the night of his suicide should have put the prison on notice that Hott was at an increased risk for suicide.

The district court rejected this argument, and we have little to add to its analysis. The plaintiff has offered no authority for the proposition that prisons have a constitutional duty to obtain personal medical records from outside the prison. Nor do we find persuasive plaintiff's argument that a county jail has an Eighth Amendment obligation to obtain medical records from any county hospital in which its inmates have received past medical treatment. Assuming, for summary judgment purposes, that Hott was placing his hands around his neck as an allusion to hanging himself rather than because he was experiencing continuing neck pain from his auto accident, there is no evidence that any ADC personnel interpreted his gestures as a suicide threat. Hott's request for a late-night phone call was...

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