Hott v. State, 2-878A297

Decision Date19 February 1980
Docket NumberNo. 2-878A297,2-878A297
Citation400 N.E.2d 206
PartiesDon HOTT, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Max E. Hobbs, Fort Wayne, for defendant-appellant.

Theo. L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Terry G. Duga, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for plaintiff-appellee.

NEAL, Judge.

This is an appeal by defendant-appellant Don Hott from the Huntington County Court from a conviction of making an indecent telephone call.

We affirm.

On December 21, 1976, defendant, at 11:00 p. m., made a telephone call to the chief of police of Huntington, which call awakened the chief from his slumber. Defendant, in an irritated and aggravated way, requested the chief to go and arrest the duty sergeant for some grievance. The chief refused, and thereupon defendant called him names in vile gutter language, impugning canine ancestry with tendencies en fellatio, the exactitude of which is unnecessary for this opinion. Minutes later defendant called the prosecuting attorney at his home, also awakening him from his sleep. This conversation was similar to the one with the chief, but here, the words used simply impugned canine ancestry.

The defendant was charged in two counts, one for each telephone call, with committing offenses under Ind.Code 35-30-9-1(a), since repealed, which provides, in part, as follows:

"Whoever, by means of a telephone, (a) makes any comment, request, suggestion or proposal which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy or indecent;

shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500) or imprisoned for any term not exceeding six (6) months, or both . . . ." (Emphasis added.)

In a trial before the court the defendant was convicted on both counts.

The questions presented for review are constitutional arguments involving the definition of "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy or indecent" language, and whether the conduct is protected under the free speech provisions of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Defendant argues that when a series of words begins with a particularly defined word, all of those words which follow are included in the definition of the original word, and that under this basic rule, the terms "lewd, lascivious, filthy or indecent" are combined into the word "obscene" in the statute under consideration. Defendant proceeds from that point to develop his argument by citing the case of United States v. Simpson, 561 F.2d 53 (7th Cir. 1977). There the court held that the terms indecent, filthy, vile, obscene, lewd, and lascivious, all have common meaning, that is obscene. Defendant further advances his argument by noting that Simpson holds that obscene refers to matters of sex and connotes prurient appeal.

Defendant cites Roth v. United States (1957) 354 U.S. 476, 489, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1311, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, as the standard to determine obscenity, that test being "whether, to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest."

In summary, defendant argues that there was nothing in the evidence to show defendant's conduct was erotic in nature, and it did not sexually arouse the prosecuting attorney or the chief, nor did it appeal to the prurient interest, and therefore it was not obscene.

Authority exists as to examples of conduct that were determined by the Supreme Court not to be obscene within this definition. In Cohen v. California (1971) 403 U.S. 15, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284, wearing a jacket with a vulgar expression opposing the draft in the corridors of a courthouse was not obscene. In Hess v. Indiana, (1973) 414 U.S. 105, 94 S.Ct. 326, 38 L.Ed.2d 303, vulgar language in a group in an anti-war rally was not obscene. In Simpson, supra, a broadcast on a C.B. radio with explicit reference to sexual activities, sexual organs, and abusive epithets directed at other ham...

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4 cases
  • Commonwealth v. Bigelow
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • September 27, 2016
    ...letter written to State police trooper to protest speeding ticket where no “fighting words” were included). Contrast Hott v. State, 400 N.E.2d 206, 208 (Ind.Ct.App.1980) (upholding defendant's conviction of making indecent telephone call based on vulgar calls made to police chief and prosec......
  • McGuire v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • August 27, 2019
    ...indecent telephone call statute, determined that it "refers to nonconformance with accepted standards of morality." Hott v. State , 400 N.E.2d 206, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (offending communication made was via a telephone call to the chief of police at his home at 11:00 p.m.). However, McG......
  • State v. Koetting
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • April 2, 1985
    ...words is increased. See, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 1786, 29 L.Ed.2d 284, 291[11, 12] (1971); Hott v. State, 400 N.E.2d 206, 208 (Ind.App.1980). Defendant, relying on Tollett v. United States, 485 F.2d 1087, 1093 (8th Cir.1973), argues that "some persons might be o......
  • Hott v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • September 4, 1980
    ...Gen., Terry G. Duga, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee. Petition to Transfer Denied. (For opinion of Court of Appeals see 400 N.E.2d 206.) DeBRULER, Justice, Appellant was charged and convicted of making two obscene telephone calls in violation of Ind. Code § 35-30-9-1(a) (repea......

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