Hottinger v. Trugreen Corp., 18A02-9509-CV-545

Decision Date08 May 1996
Docket NumberNo. 18A02-9509-CV-545,18A02-9509-CV-545
Citation665 N.E.2d 593
CourtIndiana Appellate Court
PartiesProd.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,607 Carla HOTTINGER and Gregory Hottinger, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. TRUGREEN CORPORATION and PBI/Gordon Corporation, Appellees-Defendants.
OPINION

ROBERTSON, Judge.

Plaintiffs-Appellants, Carla and Gregory Hottinger [Hottinger] appeal the adverse summary judgment entered against them in their negligence and product liability action against Defendants-Appellees Trugreen Corporation and PBI/Gordon Corporation [Trugreen] for injuries that Carla had allegedly suffered from exposure to a broadleaf herbicide known as Trimec 2-4-D. In the establishment of her prima facie case, Hottinger relied on the expert opinion of Dr. Heuser to the effect that Trimec 2-4-D had been the proximate cause of Carla's permanent and continuing injuries. The trial court ruled that Heuser's opinion would be excluded for its failure to satisfy the requirements of Ind.Evidence Rule 702 and entered summary judgment accordingly.

Hottinger raises two issues, but we address only one of them because it requires reversal. Restated, it is whether Dr. Heuser's opinion is admissible under Evid.R. 702.

Trugreen asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment on the alternative basis that Hottinger's common law claims for the failure to warn are preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act [FIFRA]. We agree and therefore affirm partial summary judgment with respect to Hottinger's claims based on the failure to warn.

FACTS

The facts in the light most favorable to nonmovant Hottinger reveal that on April 18, 1990, Trugreen Corporation, a lawn care company, sprayed Trimec 2-4-D herbicide outside of Carla Hottinger's office and permitted the herbicide to pass through the open windows. Hottinger and several of her co-workers were exposed to the herbicide and became ill, complaining of nausea and lightheadedness. After being exposed to the herbicide, Hottinger developed continuing symptoms of headaches, nausea, dizziness, muscle aches, blackouts, and respiratory difficulty.

Gunnar Heuser, M.D., Ph.D., examined Hottinger and conducted a battery of diagnostic tests upon her. Dr. Heuser concluded that Hottinger had brain, peripheral nerve, and immune function deficits which had been caused by her exposure to Trimec 2-4-D on April 18, 1990. Additional facts are supplied as necessary.

DECISION

Summary judgment is appropriate only if no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind.Trial Rule 56(C); Great Lakes Chemical Corp. v. International Surplus Lines Insurance Co., 638 N.E.2d 847, 849 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, this court must determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the law has been correctly applied by the trial court. Cloverleaf Apartments, Inc. v. Town of Eaton, 641 N.E.2d 665, 667 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). A trial court's grant of summary judgment is "clothed with a presumption of validity," and the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the trial court erred. Rosi v. Business Furniture Corp., 615 N.E.2d 431, 434 (Ind.1993). Nevertheless, the appellate court must carefully scrutinize the trial court's decision to ensure that the losing party is not improperly denied her day in court. Oelling v. Rao, 593 N.E.2d 189, 190 (Ind.1992).

I. Evidence Rule 702

The defendant is entitled to summary judgment where the plaintiff cannot establish that her injuries were proximately caused by the defendant's conduct. Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 995, 997-998 (Ind.1991); Porter v. Whitehall Laboratories, Inc., 9 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. (Ind.) 1993). Where expert testimony is advanced to establish the element of proximate cause, summary judgment is properly entered in favor of the defendant where that expert testimony fails to meet the Evid.R. 702 requirements for admissibility. Porter, 9 F.3d at 614-617 (Federal Rules of Evidence).

Indiana Evidence Rule 702 reads as follows:

(a) If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

(b) Expert scientific testimony is admissible only if the court is satisfied that the scientific principles upon which the expert testimony rests are reliable.

The Indiana Supreme Court has held that the federal evidence law of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., (1993), 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469, and its progeny are helpful in applying Indiana's Evid.R. 702. Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 498 (Ind.1995) (Evidence of child sexual abuse syndrome would not be admissible to prove that child abuse had occurred). Evidence Rule 702 assigns to the trial court a "gatekeeping function" of ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, 597, 113 S.Ct. at 2798, 2799. When faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, the court must make a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue. Porter, 9 F.3d at 613. The trial court's determination regarding the admissibility of expert testimony under Evid.R. 702 is a matter within its broad discretion which will not be disturbed unless the trial court's application of the Daubert framework is manifestly erroneous. Bradley v. Brown, 42 F.3d 434, 437 (7th Cir. (Ind.) 1994).

There are important differences between the quest for truth in the courtroom and the quest for truth in the laboratory. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, 113 S.Ct. at 2798. Pseudoscientific conjectures that are probably wrong are of little use in the project of reaching a quick, final, and binding legal judgment. Id. Scientific knowledge admissible under Evid.R. 702 connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation. Porter, 9 F.3d at 614. As such, under Evid.R. 702, expert testimony must be supported by appropriate validation or "good grounds" based on what is known establishing a standard of evidentiary reliability. Steward, 652 N.E.2d at 498. Expert testimony requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility. Id. Although the testimony need not be known to a certainty, any inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific method. Porter, 9 F.3d at 613.

Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be empirically tested. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593, 113 S.Ct. at 2796. Another pertinent consideration is whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication. Id. at 593, 113 S.Ct. at 2797. While publication is not a sine qua non of admissibility, submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a component of 'good science.' Id. Finally, widespread acceptance can be an important factor in ruling whether particular evidence is admissible under Evid.R. 702 and a technique which has attracted only minimal support may properly be viewed with skepticism. Id. The Daubert court noted:

The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible one. Its overarching subject is the scientific validity--and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability--of the principles that underlie a proposed submission. The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.

Id.

The Daubert court noted further that in keeping with the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules and their general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to opinion testimony, Evid.R. 702 was more liberal with respect to the admission of evidence than the traditional "general acceptance" standard established by Frye v. United States, 54 App.D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (1923). Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588, 113 S.Ct. at 2794. In responding to the contention that the abandonment of the Frye "general acceptance" standard would result in a "free-for-all" approach in which befuddled juries would be confounded by absurd and irrational pseudoscientific assertions, the Daubert court noted:

In this regard respondent seems to us to be overly pessimistic about the capabilities of the jury, and of the adversary system generally. Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence. Additionally, in the event the trial court concludes that the scintilla of evidence presented supporting a position is insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the position more likely than not is true, the court remains free to direct a judgment.... These conventional devices, rather than wholesale exclusion under an uncompromising 'general acceptance' test, are the appropriate safeguards where the basis of scientific testimony meets the standards of Rule 702.

Id. at 596, 113 S.Ct. at 2798 (Citations omitted).

In the present case, Dr. Heuser established that he was a medical doctor, as well as a Ph.D., specializing in internal medicine with an emphasis on movement disorders, recurrent headaches, chronic pain, endocrine problems, and toxic exposure. Dr. Heuser conducted a literature search to determine...

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