Hough v. Cartledge
Decision Date | 27 February 2017 |
Docket Number | Case No. 8:16-cv-00259-RMG |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Parties | Michael A. Hough, Petitioner, v. Leroy Cartledge, Respondent. |
Michael A. Hough ("Petitioner") is a state prisoner confined at McCormick Correctional Institution in South Carolina, Petitioner is proceeding pro se and seeks habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation () of the Magistrate Judge to grant Respondent's motion for summary judgment and deny the habeas petition. (Dkt. No. 17.) Petitioner filed objections to the R. & R. in October 2016. (Dkt. No. 23.) This Court has reviewed the record in this matter, the decisions of the state courts, the briefs of the parties, the Magistrate's R. & R., Petitioner's objections to the R. & R., and the relevant case law. For the reasons below, this Court GRANTS Respondent's motion for summary judgment and DENIES the habeas petition.
Petitioner was indicted on one count of murder in October 2008, and he proceeded to trial by jury on June 22, 2009. (Dkt. No. 11-1 at 179-80.) Cornelius J. Riley and Jason D. Kirincich represented Petitioner at trial. The trial court dissolved the jury when one juror discovered information about Petitioner's criminal history and shared it with the other jurors. On July 28, 2009, represented by Mr. Riley, Petitioner pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and waived his right to a jury trial. (Id. at 88-109.) The court sentenced Petitioner to twenty-three (23) years in prison. (Id. at 108.) There were no direct appeals.
On November 20, 2009, Petitioner filed a pro se application for post-conviction relief (PCR) based on ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id. at 110.) Petitioner alleged that Mr. Riley coerced him to plead guilty when he incorrectly told Petitioner that he could not receive an involuntary manslaughter jury instruction at trial. Petitioner argued that because there was evidence of a struggle over a weapon between himself and the victim, he may have been able to obtain an involuntary manslaughter instruction at trial. (Id. at 118.) The State filed a return to the petition on March 19, 2010 and requested an evidentiary hearing. (Id. at 119-22.) Jeremy Thompson represented Petitioner at his PCR hearing on June 7, 2011.
In its July 22, 2011 order granting Petitioner's PCR application, the PCR court made the following findings of fact from the record and that hearing:
(Id. at 171-72.) Relying on these facts and the decisions of two South Carolina courts which had found that evidence of a struggle over a weapon supports submission of an involuntary manslaughter charge to the jury, the PCR court found that "counsel's advice was incorrect as a matter of law." (Dkt. No. 11-1 at 174); see Tisdale v. State, 662 S.E.2d 410, 412 (S.C. 2008) (); see also Casey v. State, 409 S.E.2d 391,392 (S.C. 1991) () Respondent argued that the struggle over the gun alone was not sufficient to support a charge of involuntary manslaughter when Petitioner's conduct did not otherwise meet either definition of involuntary manslaughter. The PCR court disagreed with Respondent's position on this point, but it nonetheless found that Petitioner might have been entitled to an involuntary manslaughter charge at trial based on the first definition1 of involuntary manslaughter: the unintentional killing of another without malice but while engaged in an unlawful activity not tending to cause death or great bodily harm.2
Notably, the PCR court found that to the extent there was any dispute at the PCR hearing about whether Petitioner had given counsel the full version of events prior to pleading guilty, "Counsel's failure to sufficiently communicate with the Applicant led to a breakdown in the attorney/client relationship that resulted in the Applicant holding back information from defense counsel." (Dkt. No. 11-1 at 175.) Defense counsel met with Petitioner for only three to four hours in advance of Petitioner's scheduled trial for murder. (Id.)
At his PCR hearing, Petitioner testified that he was prejudiced by his counsel's deficient performance because he would have proceeded to trial instead of pleading guilty had he received correct legal advice. The PCR court found Petitioner credible on this point: "[P]roper adviceabout the possible results at trial, instead of the improper advice which was given, would have resulted in this case ending at trial, not at a plea." (Id. at 176)
On September 26, 2011, the state filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of South Carolina on the following two issues:
(Dkt. No. 11-3 at 3.) The Supreme Court of South Carolina transferred the case to the South Carolina Court of Appeals. Robert Dudek represented Petitioner at this stage. On February 11, 2015, the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the PCR court in a one-and-a-half page opinion. The Court of Appeals said the PCR court erred when it failed to consider that Petitioner was a felon in possession of a weapon at the time of the incident. (Dkt. No. 11-9 at 4-5.) The Court of Appeals said Petitioner's felonious possession of a weapon disqualified him from an involuntary manslaughter jury instruction under the first definition of involuntary manslaughter which excludes those engaged in a felony. See State v. Sams, 764 S.E.2d at 514. The Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for a rehearing on March 19, 2015. (Id. at 14.) Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the South Carolina Supreme Court. (Dkt. No. 11-10.) On November 19, 2015, the South Carolina Supreme...
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