Hough v. Dickinson

• Decision Date: 29 September 1885
• Citation: 58 Mich. 89,24 N.W. 809
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: HOUGH and others v. DICKINSON and others.

24 N.W. 809

58 Mich. 89

HOUGH and others v. DICKINSON and others.

Supreme Court of Michigan

September 29, 1885

Error to Emmet.

A.J Southard, James J. Brown, and B.T. Halstead for plaintiffs.

Pailthrop & George and Taggart & Walcott, for appellants.

SHERWOOD, J.

The plaintiffs in this case are merchants doing business in Cross village, in the county of Emmet, and the defendants were the sheriff and two of his deputies in said county in January 1882, at the time the grievances complained of are alleged to have been committed. The suit is trespass, brought by the plaintiffs to recover of the defendants the value of a stock of goods levied upon by the sheriff while in the hands of the plaintiffs, upon an attachment issued out of this court against the goods and property of Pier & Wagley, another firm of the same village. Plaintiffs claim that they bought the stock of goods of Pier & Wagley in good faith and for a fair consideration, without any intent on their part, or any knowledge of any intent on the part of Pier & Wagley, to hinder, delay, or defraud any of the creditors of Pier &amp Wagley, and that while they were peaceably in the possession of the stock of goods the defendants came and took forcible possession of them, and converted them to their own use. The defendants admit that they took forcible possession of the goods; but assert that they were the goods and stock of Pier & Wagley, and subject to levy under the attachments; that they were not purchased in good faith by Hough & Wagley, or for a fair consideration, but that the plaintiffs took them knowing, or having good reason to believe, that Pier & Wagley were selling for the purpose of hindering, delaying, or defrauding their creditors.

Three trials of the case have taken place at the circuit, two resulting in disagreement of the jury, and upon the last a verdict was obtained for the plaintiff for $2,453.23. The defendants bring error. The record contains all the proceedings had upon the last trial. The first assignment of error relates to testimony offered to prove the value of the use of the store in which the goods were kept and the plaintiff's business carried on, while the defendants occupied it under their levy. This was part of the damage necessarily sustained by the plaintiffs after their expulsion therefrom. The testimony was properly admitted. For the purposes for which the court admitted the testimony objected to, contained in the second assignment of error, it was competent and no error was committed in overruling the objection thereto. The remaining 23 assignments of error all relate to the charge given by the court, or to his refusal to charge as requested. At the request of counsel for the plaintiffs the circuit judge charged the jury as follows:

"(6) Pier & Wagley might as lawfully sell their goods to Hough & Wagley as to other parties, and if made in good faith, and without intent to defraud the creditors of Pier & Wagley, then the title of Hough & Wagley is perfect, and the jury should find for the plaintiffs.

"(7) The law presumes that all persons transact their business honestly and in good faith until the contrary appears from a preponderance of the evidence, and the burden of proving fraud in this case is on the defendants.

"(8) All persons are presumed to be innocent of intentional wrong until they are proved guilty, and all persons are presumed to transact their business in good faith and for a lawful purpose until the contrary is shown; and when an act can as well be attributed to an honest intent and purpose as to a corrupt or unlawful one, then the jury are bound to attribute the act to an honest intent and to a lawful purpose.

"(9) A fraudulent intent cannot be inferred by the jury without proof, but it must be proved, like any other act, to the satisfaction of the jury; and unless such fraudulent intent is proved on the part of both Pier & Wagley and Hough & Wagley by a preponderance of evidence, the verdict of the jury should be for the plaintiffs.

"(10) The goods being in the possession of Hough & Wagley when the sheriff came with his writ, the title is presumptively in Hough & Wagley, and cannot be overthrown except by satisfactory evidence.

"(11) The law will not presume fraud from the relationship of the parties. A sale from a husband to a wife, or from a brother to a brother, when there is an actual change of possession, is presumed to be valid until the contrary appears by a preponderance of evidence.

"(12) To establish fraud in this case on the part of Hough & Wagley, it is not enough for the jury to find that Pier & Wagley sold with intent to defraud their creditors, but defendants must also show that Hough & Wagley participated in that fraudulent intent.

"(13) The jury are instructed, even if they believe from the evidence that Pier & Wagley sold the property in controversy to Hough & Wagley for the purpose of defrauding, hindering, or delaying their creditors, still, if the jury further believe from the evidence that Hough & Wagley, at the time of the purchase, had no notice or knowledge of such purpose, then the sale would not be fraudulent or void as to Hough & Wagley by reason of the fraudulent intent of Pier & Wagley, and the verdict should be for the plaintiffs.

"(14) If Hough & Wagley purchased in good faith, the payment of $400 debt due from James E. Wagley to John Wagley, Jr., said debt being so applied with the consent of all the parties, and gave to Pier & Wagley, for the difference between the debt, $400, and the price of the goods, $1,800, five hundred dollars in cash, and their three negotiable promissory notes for $900, making a total of $1,800, the price of the goods as alleged, Hough & Wagley got a good title as against creditors of Pier & Wagley, even though Pier & Wagley sold the property with intent to defraud their creditors.

"(15) When property goes to pay an honest debt, that use of it is lawful, although it may cut off the redress of all others, and although intended so to do; and all the qualifications of delay and hindrance in such a case will not make the act fraudulent.

"(16) The title of this property in Hough & Wagley is not in any manner impaired or affected, unless it shall...