Houghton v. Cardone

• Decision Date: 02 December 2003
• Docket Number: No. 03-CV-6381L.,03-CV-6381L.
• Parties: James R. HOUGHTON, Plaintiff, v. Joseph v. CARDONE, District Attorney, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

295 F.Supp.2d 268

James R. HOUGHTON, Plaintiff, v. Joseph v. CARDONE, District Attorney, et al., Defendants.

No. 03-CV-6381L.

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

December 2, 2003.

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Louis P. Pilato, Rochester, NY, for Plaintiff.

Michael P. McClaren, Webster Szanyi, LLP, Buffalo, NY, for Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

LARIMER, District Judge.

Plaintiff, James R. Houghton, commenced this action in New York State Supreme Court, Orleans County, on July 22, 2003, asserting claims under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. Defendants removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint.

BACKGROUND

The complaint (the factual allegations of which are taken as true for purposes of this Decision and Order) alleges that early in the evening of September 1, 2000, defendants Lieutenant Daniel Culver, Deputy Erin Fuller, and Deputy Ken Strickland ("the officers"), all of whom are employed by the Orleans County Sheriff's Department ("the Sheriff's Department"), arrived at plaintiff's home in Medina, New York, and told plaintiff that the Sheriff's Department had received a complaint about an open fire on plaintiff's property. Plaintiff denied any wrongdoing, and allowed the officers to inspect his property. The officers agreed that no violation was occurring. They then left, but warned plaintiff that they would be back if they received any more complaints.

At around 8:30 that night, the officers returned, stating that they had received another complaint about plaintiff from one of his neighbors. Plaintiff does not allege the nature of that complaint, but presumably it was again about an open fire on plaintiff's property. Plaintiff again denied that he had done anything wrong, and told the officers to leave. The officers then arrested plaintiff and placed him in their police vehicle. Plaintiff alleges that the officers used excessive force in arresting him and putting him in the vehicle.

Plaintiff was arraigned in town court on charges of second-degree assault, resisting arrest, obstructing governmental administration, and harassment. Plaintiff remained in jail for three days before he was able to post bail.

The complaint alleges, in short, that various communications took place between plaintiff's then-attorney and defendant Orleans County District Attorney Joseph V. Cardone, but that little of substance occurred for nineteen months, until April 30, 2002, when plaintiff received a notice from Cardone that the case had been presented to a grand jury, and that the grand jury had returned a "no bill" dismissing all the charges.

In addition to the above-named defendants, plaintiff has sued the County of Orleans ("the County") and Orleans County Sheriff Merle Fredericks. The complaint sets forth five causes of action. The first alleges trespass and excessive force by the officers. The precise nature of the second cause of action is somewhat vague, but it appears to allege false arrest and false imprisonment, as well as defamation based on the allegation that defendants informed the local news media about plaintiff's arrest, with the result that a newspaper article was published about the arrest.

The third "cause of action" simply alleges that as a result of defendants' actions, plaintiff had to hire an attorney, and that he incurred legal fees. This does not appear, then, to be a separate claim so much as an allegation concerning plaintiff's damages.

The legal basis for the fourth cause of action is also unclear, although it could be read as asserting a claim for malicious prosecution. It alleges in part that Cardone "engaged in an improper and an unduly prolonged prosecution of the Plaintiff for over 600 days ...," and that as a result, "the Plaintiff was forced to continue his suffering, his indignity, his legal expenses, for more than 20 months." Complaint (Notice of Removal, Ex. A) ¶¶ 33, 34. The fifth cause of action alleges a claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. Plaintiff seeks $2.5 million in damages.

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff's Federal Claims

A. Compliance with Pleading Requirements

Defendants assert that plaintiff has failed to state a claim under § 1983, for a number of reasons. First, defendants contend that the allegations of the complaint are too vague and conclusory to state a claim.

It is true that "complaints alleging § 1983 violations `must contain specific allegations of fact ....; allegations which are nothing more than broad, simple, and conclusory statements are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.'" Humpherys v. Nager, 962 F.Supp. 347 (E.D.N.Y.1997) (quoting Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 887 (2d Cir.1987)) (citations omitted). See, e.g., Bliss v. Rochester City Sch. Dist. 196 F.Supp.2d 314, 336 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Because plaintiffs have offered nothing other than conclusory allegations, their claims premised upon § 1983 must be dismissed"). "As the Second Circuit has `repeatedly held', complaints relying on the civil rights statutes are insufficient unless they contain some specific allegations of fact indicating a deprivation of rights, instead of a litany of general conclusions that shock but have no meaning." Dewick v. Village of Penn Yan, 972 F.Supp. 166, 169 (W.D.N.Y.1997) (quoting Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d 358, 363 (2d Cir.1987)). See also Rodriguez v. Avita, 871 F.2d 552, 554 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 854, 110 S.Ct. 156, 107 L.Ed.2d 114 (1989) ("In `cases invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983 we consistently require the claimant to state specific facts, not merely conclusory allegations'"); Daniels v. City of Binghamton, 947 F.Supp. 590, 596 (N.D.N.Y.1996) (although plaintiffs' allegations "may state a ... [constitutional] violation in form, they fail to do so in substance, since they `consist[ ] of nothing more than naked assertions, and set[ ] forth no facts upon which a court could find a violation of ... Civil Rights ....'") (quoting Martin v. New York State Dep't of Mental Hygiene, 588 F.2d 371, 372 (2d Cir.1978) (per curiam)).

Defendants contend that the § 1983 claim is insufficiently pleaded because it fails to identify which of plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated, who violated them, or when they were violated. I agree that it is somewhat difficult to discern these matters. Nevertheless, although the Court need not construe the complaint as liberally as if plaintiff were appearing pro se, it is possible to glean the gist of at least some of plaintiff's claims. For instance, plaintiff alleges that the officers used excessive force when they arrested him. See Complaint ¶¶ 17, 18. The complaint also alleges that plaintiff was falsely arrested. See Complaint ¶¶ 7, 13. Likewise, the fourth cause of action, though pleaded in a rambling fashion, appears to allege that plaintiff was maliciously prosecuted.

Defendants point out that the complaint does not identify which defendant falsely arrested him, used excessive force, or committed the other alleged torts. The complaint appears to allege that the officers acted jointly, however, and that Cardone was responsible for plaintiff's prosecution. At any rate, under the Federal Rules, "a complaint need only meet the requirements of our `simplified notice pleading standard [which] relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.'" Courtenay Communications Corp. v. Hall, 334 F.3d 210, 213 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002)).

I find that, at least with respect to the specificity of the claims, the complaint here meets the liberal notice-pleading standard. That does not mean, however, that the complaint states a viable claim. I find that most of plaintiff's federal claims must be dismissed for other reasons.

B. Defamation Claim

Although, as stated above, it is difficult to tell exactly what claims plaintiff intends to assert, it appears that he is asserting a claim for defamation. The complaint alleges that defendants¹ "called the local media making it a point to report their confrontation with the Plaintiff which resulted in a newspaper article being written reflecting the Plaintiff's alleged misconduct and his arrest." Complaint ¶ 23. It also states that "[a]s a direct result of said conduct, the Plaintiff suffered the indignity of ... having his name publicized in the local press." Complaint ¶ 24.

It is debatable whether this even states a defamation claim under state law, since plaintiff does not expressly allege that defendants made a false statement about him; if all that defendants did was report the fact of plaintiff's arrest, and that he was alleged to have committed a crime, that would not be defamatory. See Town of Massena v. Healthcare Underwriters Mut. Ins. Co., 98 N.Y.2d 435, 444, 749 N.Y.S.2d 456, 779 N.E.2d 167 (2002) ("Defamation is defined as a false statement that exposes a person to public contempt, ridicule, aversion or disgrace") (emphasis added).

Even if these allegations would suffice to make out a defamation claim under New York law, however, they are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983. In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976), the Supreme Court held that damage to one's reputation is not "by itself sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process Clause" so as to give rise to a § 1983 claim. Id. at 701, 96 S.Ct. 1155. Rather, the Court held, loss of reputation must be coupled with some other tangible element in order to rise to the level of a protectable liberty interest. Id. The Second Circuit has "interpreted this holding to mean that `stigma plus' is required to establish a constitutional deprivation." Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 999 (2d Cir.1994) (citing Neu v. Corcoran, ...