Houlihan v. Saussy

• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Citation: Houlihan v. Saussy, 206 Ga. 1, 55 S.E.2d 557 (Ga. 1949)
• Decision Date: 10 October 1949
• Docket Number: 16738.
• Parties: HOULIHAN et al. v. SAUSSY et al.

55 S.E.2d 557

206 Ga. 1

HOULIHAN et al. v. SAUSSY et al.

No. 16738.

Supreme Court of Georgia

October 10, 1949

Syllabus by the Court.

The Act (Ga.L.1949, p. 440) fixing the salaries of the Ordinary the Clerk of the Superior Court, the Sheriff, the Tax Receiver and Tax Collector of Chatham County, is not unconstitutional as being violative of article 3, section 11 paragraph 1 (Code Ann., § 2-2301) or article 1, section 4 paragraph 1 (Code Ann., § 2-401), and the trial court did not err in so holding, and in directing the commissioners to pay the defendants' salaries in accordance with the terms of said act.

J. P Houlihan and others, as Commissioners of Chatham County, filed in Chatham Superior Court against Gordon Saussy, Ordinary, and other named county officers, a petition seeking a declaratory judgment to determine the validity and constitutionality of an act, Ga.L.1949, p. 440, raising the salaries of such county officials. It was alleged that a controversy had arisen as to whether or not the petitioners were constitutionally authorized and directed to expend the taxpayers' money in accordance with said act.

The answer of the defendants averred among other things that they were county officers, that their salaries were fixed by the act in question in compliance with a designated provision of the Georgia Constitution of 1945; and prayed that the act be declared to be of full force and effect, and that the petitioners be ordered and directed to pay to the defendants all sums fixed as compensation by the said act 'which have become due or might hereafter become due.'

Robert E. Armstrong and twenty-four named persons, alleging themselves to be citizens and taxpayers interested in the controversy, were allowed to file an intervention, which alleged that the act in question was violative of stated provisions of the Constitution of 1945.

On the trial of the case the parties entered into a stipulation setting forth the salary of each of the defendants and specifying the authority under which said salaries had been fixed and were existing prior to and at the time of the passage of the act of 1949. After hearing evidence, the trial court held the act in question to be constitutional, and directed the Commissioners to pay the defendants' salaries in accordance with the terms of said act. To this judgment the Commissioners assigned error in a direct bill of exceptions.

Jno. J. Bouhan, Savannah, for plaintiffs in error.

Spence M. Grayson, Savannah, Owen H. Page, Savannah, Albert L. Cobb, Savannah, Eugene Cook, Atty. Gen., for defendants in error.

ATKINSON, Presiding Justice (after stating the foregoing facts).

It is insisted by counsel for the intervenors that the Act of 1949, Ga.L.1949, p. 440, is violative of article 3, section 11, paragraph 1, of the Constitution of 1945, Code Ann. § 2-2301, which provides that 'the General Assembly may, at any time, by a majority vote of both branches prescribe other and different salaries for all of the elective officers provided for in this Constitution, but no such change shall affect the officers then in commission.'

Article 11, section 2, paragraph 1, of the Constitution of 1945, Code Ann. § 2-7901, declares: 'The county officers shall be elected by the qualified voters, of their respective counties or districts, and shall hold their office for four years. They shall be removed upon conviction for malpractice in office; and no person shall be eligible for any of the offices referred to in this paragraph unless he shall have been a resident of the county for two years and is a qualified voter.' The next paragraph of this section and article refers exclusively to the compensation of county officers, and reads as follows: 'County officers may be on a fee basis, salary basis, or fee basis supplemented by salary, in such manner as may be directed by law.' Code Ann. § 2-7902.

In determining the meaning of a provision of the Constitution, due consideration should be given to the intention of its framers. An inspection of Volume 2 of the Records of the Constitutional Commission, 1943-1944, pp. 269-271, discloses that the members thereof fully realized the problem that confronted them in providing for the compensation of county officers, due to the fact that many were being forced to resign because of inadequate compensation, while others were being overpaid. The discussion of this problem shows without question that it was the intention of the framers of the Constitution to authorize the fiscal authorities of the respective counties to increase or diminish the salary of all county officers, at any time on the recommendation of two successive grand juries, whenever the circumstances required such change, and to authorize such charge without respect to their terms of office. Subsequently, the General Assembly amended the provision of the proposed Constitution dealing with salaries of county officers by taking away the power of recommendation from two successive grand juries and placing the same power squarely and exclusively within its control. See Georgia House Journal, Regular Session, 1945, p. 485. It is apparent from the foregoing that the General Assembly, while recognizing the desirability of providing for either increasing or diminishing the salary of county officers without regard to their terms of office, deemed it wise not to subject the compensation of such officers to the recommendation of the grand juries, and instead took upon itself the right to prescribe compensation for county officers when it declared in its recommendation, which was ratified by the people of this State, that 'county officers may be on a fee basis, salary basis, or fee basis supplemented by salary, in such manner as may be directed by law.' This final provision, as hereinabove indicated, is now contained in article 11, section 2, paragraph 2, of the Constitution of 1945. Code Ann. § 2-7902. From what has been said it is evident that the General Assembly intended for the compensation of county officers to be fixed from time to time by legislative enactment as circumstances might in its discretion require.

In further illustrating the intention of the framers of the Constitution and of the General Assembly, it is well to note the provision of the Constitution requring notice of intention to apply for local legislation. The Constitution of 1877, Code, § 2-1816, provided that no local or special bill should be passed unless notice of intention to apply therefor had been published in the locality where the matter or thing to be affected was situated, which notice had to be given at least thirty days prior to the introduction of the bill. That section as amended and as now codified as Code Ann., § 2-1915, includes the following language: 'No office to which a person has been elected shall be abolished, nor the term of the office shortened or lengthened by local or special bill during the term for which such person was elected unless the same be approved by the people of the jurisdiction affected in a referendum on the question.' Prior to the amendments to the Constitution adopted in 1945, county officers' salaries were subject to change in the discretion of the General Assembly, and it was clearly the intent of the amendments to the Constitution, adopted in 1945--since they did not require a referendum of the people of the locality to change the compensation of county officers, and because the amendment of 1945 stated that the compensation of county officers may be fixed as may be directed by law--that the compensation of county officers would be left solely to the discretion of legislative control and enactment without restriction, except that they would be placed on a fee basis, salary basis, or fee basis supplemented by salary as in the discretion of the General Assembly was deemed proper. Along this line of thought it was said in Collins v. Russell, 107 Ga. 423, 426, 33 S.E....