Hoult v. Hoult
| Decision Date | 07 April 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-2000,97-2000 |
| Parties | David P. HOULT, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Jennifer HOULT, Defendant, Appellee. . Heard |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Edward J. Collins for appellant.
Kevin P. O'Flaherty with whom Adrienne M. Markham and Goulston & Storrs, P.C. were on brief for appellee.
Before TORRUELLA, Chief Judge, ALDRICH, Senior Circuit Judge, and BOUDIN, Circuit Judge.
In July 1988, when she was 27 years old, Jennifer Hoult brought suit in the district court against her father, David Hoult, alleging assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of fiduciary duty. To support these claims, she alleged that her father had sexually abused, raped and threatened her from the time that she was about four years old until she was about sixteen years old.
The statute of limitations presented an obvious obstacle. Jennifer Hoult sought to overcome it by showing that the alleged abuse caused her to repress her memory of the events until she began to recapture those memories during therapy sessions in October 1985. See M.G.L. 260 § 4C. The claim of repressed memory was supported at trial by testimony from a psychiatrist, Dr. Renee Brandt, who appeared as an expert witness on repression caused by traumatic abuse.
In June 1993, the district court conducted an eight day jury trial in which Jennifer Hoult testified at length, giving detailed descriptions of extensive alleged abuse by her father; in addition to other forms of abuse, she testified to five specific episodes of rape. Supporting testimony was provided by her former therapist and by Dr. Brandt. In defense, David Hoult testified on his own behalf, flatly denying the allegations, but presented no other witnesses.
On July 1, 1993, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Jennifer Hoult and ordered damages in the amount of $500,000. This verdict was preceded by a separate finding by the jury rejecting the statute of limitations defense; in effect the jury found that Jennifer Hoult had repressed memory of the abuse until it was rediscovered within the limitations period. David Hoult appealed both from the judgment against him and the denial of a motion for a new trial, but both appeals were ultimately dismissed for lack of prosecution. 1
Later, Jennifer Hoult wrote letters to several professional associations in which she repeated the charge that her father had raped her. David Hoult then brought the present action in the district court against Jennifer Hoult, claiming that her charge of rape against him was defamatory. Jennifer Hoult moved to dismiss on the ground that the jury verdict in her earlier assault action had determined that David Hoult had raped her and that David Hoult was barred by collateral estoppel from relitigating this finding.
Initially, the district court denied the motion to dismiss, saying that the evidence adduced at the trial could have led the jury to impose liability because David Hoult had sexually abused Jennifer Hoult "in ways that did not amount to rape" or could even have done so on the basis of Jennifer Hoult's testimony that David Hoult had "threatened her with murder, chased her around the house with a knife, and fondled her in a sexual manner, among other incidents of violence and assault."
By motion for reconsideration, Jennifer Hoult argued that the jury's finding of repression, in rejecting the statute of limitations defense, was necessarily based on Dr. Brandt's expert opinion that the repression required "repeated acts" of sexual abuse; and the only repeated acts of sexual abuse (Jennifer Hoult argued) were her descriptions of five separate incidents of rape. Accepting this argument, the district court allowed Jennifer Hoult's motion to dismiss the action, and David Hoult now appeals.
The governing legal doctrine of collateral estoppel, which we briefly summarize, is largely undisputed; the problem is one of applying the doctrine to this case. Because the prior judgment was a federal court judgment, we look to federal law for its preclusive effect. See Johnson v. SCA Disposal Servs., 931 F.2d 970, 974 (1st Cir.1991). Subject to certain exceptions, the general rule on "issue preclusion" is as follows:
When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.
Restatement (Second) Judgements § 27 (1982). Neither side disputes that this formulation sets forth the governing law.
David Hoult does not invoke any of the various exceptions, see Restatement (Second), supra, § 28, but instead says--as did the district judge in his original order refusing to dismiss--that there is no proof that the jury ever determined that David Hoult had committed the alleged rapes. The burden is upon Jennifer Hoult, as the party invoking collateral estoppel, to establish that the jury did so determine in the original action. See Commercial Associates v. Tilcon Gammino, Inc., 998 F.2d 1092, 1098 (1st Cir.1993).
Admittedly, the jury made no explicit finding that rapes occurred. Nevertheless, "[a]n issue may be 'actually' decided [for collateral estoppel purposes] even if it is not explicitly decided, for it may have constituted, logically or practically, a necessary component of the decision reached." Dennis v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank, 744 F.2d 893, 899 (1st Cir.1984). The court in the second case may examine the full record in the earlier one to decide "whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the [moving party] seeks to foreclose from consideration." Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970).
Whether the jury did find, or must have found, rape in the earlier trial is perhaps a question of fact. But where (as here) the question is answered by looking only at the paper record of the earlier trial, appeals courts tend to review the district court ruling de novo. 2 The more difficult threshold issue is how clear it must be that the jury found the fact in question. The maxim of Lord Coke which is sometimes quoted by courts is that "an estoppel must 'be certain to every intent.' " Russell v. Place, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 606, 610, 24 L.Ed. 214 (1876).
This is more demanding than the "more likely than not" standard commonly applied in civil matters, but sensibly so. Telling a party that it cannot prove or contest a fact of...
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