Hous. Auth. of New London v. Stevens
| Decision Date | 04 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | AC 43471 |
| Citation | 209 Conn.App. 569,267 A.3d 927 |
| Parties | HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF NEW LONDON v. Bruce STEVENS |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
John L. Giulietti, Vernon, for the appellant (defendant).
Lloyd L. Langhammer, Norwich, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Alvord, Clark and Norcott, Js.
In this summary process action, the defendant, Bruce Stevens, appeals from the trial court's judgment of possession rendered in favor of the plaintiff, the Housing Authority of the City of New London. The defendant claims that the court (1) lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to deliver to the defendant a pretermination, or Kapa ,1 notice prior to commencing its summary process action against him, (2) improperly found that his conduct constituted a serious nuisance within the meaning of General Statutes § 47a-15 (C), and (3) made certain factual findings that are not supported by the evidentiary record. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The record reveals the following facts and procedural history that are relevant to our resolution of the defendant's appeal. In 2013, the defendant entered into a written lease with the plaintiff for an apartment in a public housing complex for persons with disabilities and the elderly. In 2019, the defendant, an individual with psychiatric disabilities, was hospitalized on several occasions. On March 26, 2019, the police escorted the defendant from his apartment to an ambulance that took him to the Pond House, which is a behavioral health unit located within the Lawrence and Memorial Hospital. An officer involved in that incident subsequently informed Avalon LeBlanc, the plaintiff's property manager, that, given what the officer had observed while escorting the defendant from the apartment, the apartment should be condemned. Later that day, LeBlanc and a maintenance worker entered the defendant's apartment. LeBlanc took photographs of the hallway adjacent to the defendant's apartment door and the interior of his apartment.
The next day, March 27, 2019, the plaintiff served on the defendant a notice to quit possession. The notice to quit indicated, among other things, that the defendant wilfully caused substantial destruction to his dwelling unit by ripping up tiles from the floor, rendering appliances inoperable, clogging the sink and toilet, and filling the apartment with trash and other debris that had left the unit uninhabitable, constituting a serious nuisance in violation of § 47a-15 (B). The notice to quit also alleged that the defendant's conduct presented an immediate and serious danger to the safety of other tenants, constituting a serious nuisance in violation of § 47a-15 (C), because the defendant had harassed another resident and dragged bags of trash down the stairs and through common areas, leaving behind a trail of food and other refuse.2
On April 17, 2019, the plaintiff commenced this summary process action by serving on the defendant a summons and complaint. The complaint alleged two claims sounding in serious nuisance, which were identical to the allegations in the notice to quit.3 Thereafter, the defendant filed an answer and special defenses and a motion to dismiss. The motion to dismiss asserted, inter alia, that the acts alleged in the notice to quit did not constitute a serious nuisance and that the trial court consequently lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff had failed to issue the pretermination notice required in summary process actions when an eviction is based upon grounds other than serious nuisance or another exception set forth in § 47a-15. The plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the defendant's motion to dismiss. All matters, including the defendant's motion to dismiss challenging the court's subject matter jurisdiction, were consolidated for trial, which commenced on October 1, 2019.
At trial, Virginia Watrous, a resident in the building and the head of the tenants association, testified that she was sitting in her apartment at approximately 8 o'clock one evening when she heard an "ungodly noise by [her] door." When she got up to investigate the noise, she noticed that someone had slipped a floor tile under her apartment door. About forty-five minutes later, she observed that another tile was being pushed under her door. When she opened the door, she saw the defendant standing against the wall across from her apartment. She subsequently filed with the property manager a written complaint in which she claimed that the defendant had scared her during that incident.
LeBlanc, the plaintiff's property manager, testified about what she observed when she inspected the defendant's apartment. She also described thirteen photographs of the defendant's apartment, which were entered into evidence. LeBlanc stated that the defendant had thrown garbage in the hallway outside of his apartment. The trash was strewn about, the floor was wet, and bags of garbage impeded an exit, which presented a safety concern. According to LeBlanc, the interior of the apartment was filthy and had a very bad odor; something had been smeared all over the walls; dishes containing spoiled food were scattered throughout the apartment; there were piles of soggy bags of trash; rotting food and grease covered the oven, stove and kitchen walls, which presented a fire hazard; the kitchen sink was clogged and full of greasy, dirty water and dishes; the toilet was unusable because multiple household items had been stuffed into the bowl; and there was standing water on the bathroom floor. LeBlanc further testified that she had to step over bags of garbage and there was no clear pathway through the apartment. The defendant's personal belongings were in disarray and were stacked four feet high in some places, "similar to ... a hoarding situation." Additionally, the smoke alarms were inoperable because the batteries had been removed, floor tiles had been ripped up from the entryway to the kitchen, and the refrigerator was not working because the circuit breaker had been tripped. LeBlanc also testified that the defendant never submitted maintenance requests to report any of these issues.
The defendant testified at length about his physical and mental health issues. He claimed that he had picked up tiles that had come loose from his floor because he is diabetic and did not want to cut his feet. He only placed the tiles under Watrous’ door to make a maintenance complaint.
On October 4, 2019, following the close of evidence, the court issued its memorandum of decision. With respect to count one of the plaintiff's complaint alleging a serious nuisance in violation of § 47a-15 (B), the court found that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant substantially or wilfully had destroyed part of his apartment and rendered judgment in favor of the defendant. With respect to the second count alleging a serious nuisance in violation of § 47a-15 (C), the court found that the condition of the apartment presented "an immediate and serious danger to the safety of other tenants of the building." Accordingly, the court rendered judgment of possession in favor of the plaintiff. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
The defendant's first claim is that, because his conduct did not constitute a serious nuisance within the meaning of § 47a-15 (C), the plaintiff's failure to serve him with a pretermination notice deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff counters that no pretermination notice was required because the plaintiff had alleged that the defendant had created a serious nuisance within the meaning of § 47a-15 (C).4 We agree with the plaintiff.
We begin by setting forth our standard of review and a brief overview of the statutory scheme that governs summary process actions. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bayer v. Showmotion, Inc ., 292 Conn. 381, 388, 973 A.2d 1229 (2009).
"Pursuant to § 47a-15, before a landlord may proceed with a summary process action, except in those situations specifically excluded , the landlord must first deliver a [pretermination] notice to the tenant specifying the alleged violations ...." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Josephine Towers, L.P. v. Kelly , 199 Conn. App. 829, 836, 238 A.3d 732, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 966, 240 A.3d 281 (2020). A pretermination notice provides the tenant with an opportunity to remedy the violations and avoid a summary eviction. St. Paul's Flax Hill Co-operative v. Johnson , 124 Conn. App. 728, 734–35, 6 A.3d 1168 (2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 906, 12 A.3d 1002 (2011). When a "landlord elects to proceed under sections 47a-23 to 47a-23b, inclusive, to evict based on ... conduct by the tenant which constitutes a serious nuisance"; General Statutes § 47a-15 ; however, a pretermination notice is not required. Section 47a-15 defines " ‘serious nuisance’ " in relevant part as "(B) substantial and wilful destruction of part of the dwelling unit or premises [or] (C) conduct which presents an immediate and serious danger to the safety of other tenants ...."
In the present case, the notice to quit alleged that the plaintiff was terminating the defendant's tenancy because his conduct constituted a serious nuisance under § 47a-15 (B) and (C). The plain and unambiguous language of § 47a-15 makes clear that the plaintiff was therefore not required to...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Downing v. Dragone
...court is to review, and not retry, the proceedings of the trial court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Housing Authority v. Stevens , 209 Conn. App. 569, 580–81, 267 A.3d 927, cert. denied, 343 Conn. 907, 273 A.3d 234 (2022). As this court has explained, "[c]redibility must be assessed......
- State v. Rosario
-
Hous. Auth. of New London v. Stevens
...L. Langhammer, Norwich, in opposition.The defendant's petition for certification to appeal from the Appellate Court, 209 Conn. App. 569, 267 A.3d 927, is ...