House v. Stokes

Decision Date21 February 1984
Docket NumberNo. 839SC180,839SC180
Citation311 S.E.2d 671,66 N.C.App. 636
PartiesBobby W. HOUSE v. Mable Lee STOKES and wife, Lillie Mae Stokes.
CourtNorth Carolina Court of Appeals

Davis, Sturges & Tomlinson by Charles M. Davis, Louisburg, for plaintiff-appellee.

Frank W. Ballance, Jr., Warrenton, for defendants-appellants.

VAUGHN, Chief Judge.

Defendants contend that the trial court erred in denying their motions for summary judgment and dismissal and in granting judgment for plaintiff since the contract between the parties was void under the statute of frauds, G.S. 22-2. We find no error.

Pursuant to G.S. 22-2, a contract to convey land is void unless the contract, or some memorandum or note thereof, is put in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith. The writing must contain a description of the land to be conveyed, certain in itself, or capable of being rendered certain by reference to an external source referred to therein. Kidd v. Early, 289 N.C. 343, 222 S.E.2d 392 (1976); Lane v. Coe, 262 N.C. 8, 136 S.E.2d 269 (1964).

There is no question that the contract in this case was in writing and signed by all the parties. The question is whether the contract was patently ambiguous, and, therefore, void under the statute of frauds. A description is patently ambiguous when it leaves the subject of the contract, the land, in a state of absolute uncertainty and refers to nothing extrinsic by which the land might be identified with certainty. Parol evidence is inadmissible and the contract in such case is void. Bradshaw v. McElroy, 62 N.C.App. 515, 302 S.E.2d 908 (1983). The question of patent ambiguity is one of law for the court. Kidd v. Early, supra. Had the contract in this case contained no reference to an extrinsic document, we would agree with defendants that the contract was patently ambiguous. The contract provided that defendants, sellers, received payment from plaintiff, purchaser, as an option "on 11 acres of land, more or less, in Franklin County." Under this provision, the location of the land was undeterminable and nowhere within the contract itself was the land described more accurately. The contract, however, also provided that plaintiff "agree[s] to pay for deed land surveys and maps to the eleven acres, more or less." The contract, through this provision, incorporated by reference an external document by which identification of the land could be made certain. This internal reference rendered the contract latently, rather than patently ambiguous.

A description is latently ambiguous if it is insufficient, by itself, to identify the land, but refers to something external by which identification might be made. Bradshaw v. McElroy, supra. The reference must be to another document; that two documents refer to the same subject matter does not make them part of the same contract. Fuller v. Southland Corp., 57 N.C.App. 1, 290 S.E.2d 754, review denied, 306 N.C. 556, 294 S.E.2d 223 (1982). The connection between documents must be clear and cannot be shown by extrinsic evidence. Smith v. Joyce, 214 N.C. 602, 200 S.E. 431 (1939).

It is not ground for objection that the survey was prepared subsequent to the execution of the contract. Kidd v. Early, supra. The facts in this case are not unlike those in the Kidd case, wherein, an option contract contained the following description of the land: "a certain tract or parcel of land located in Monroe Township, Guilford County, North Carolina, and described as follows: 200 acres more or less of the C.F. Early farm. To be determined by a new survey furnished by sellers." Id. at 353, 222 S.E.2d at 400. The court found that this description was latently ambiguous, but that, had there been no reference to the survey, it would have been patently ambiguous. Id. The description of the land in the case sub judice, which referred only to eleven acres, more or less, in Franklin County, was ambiguous, but like the description in the Kidd case, was capable of being rendered certain by the survey to which it referred.

We are aware that the Restatement of Contracts and several other jurisdictions have adopted a more liberal interpretation regarding the proof necessary to show the connection between documents allegedly comprising a single contract. See Restatement (Second) Contracts § 132, comment a (1979); Crabtree v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 305 N.Y. 48, 110 N.E.2d 551 (1953); Young v. Independent Publishing Co., 273 S.C. 107, 254 S.E.2d 681 (1979); Williston on Contracts, §§ 581-584 (3d ed. 1961) (and cases cited therein). Under the more liberal interpretation, explicit incorporation by reference is unnecessary and extrinsic evidence may be used to show the connection between writings referring to the same transaction or subject matter. Our holding does not go this far. Since the contract in this case explicitly referred to the land survey plaintiff thereafter furnished, we need not rely on extrinsic evidence to show the connection.

Although, generally, extrinsic evidence is not allowed in this state to show the connection between two documents, once the connection is shown to exist, extrinsic evidence is admissible to explain or refute identification of the land therein described. Bradshaw v. McElroy, supra. The evidence in this case shows that in 1981, defendants owned a thirteen acre tract of land in Franklin County. On or about 1 November 1981, defendants came to plaintiff's residence in Franklin County and asked plaintiff if he wanted to purchase said thirteen acre tract, which...

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13 cases
  • Wolfe v. Villines
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • April 5, 2005
    ...of absolute uncertainty and refers to nothing extrinsic by which the land might be identified with certainty." House v. Stokes, 66 N.C.App. 636, 638, 311 S.E.2d 671, 673 (1984). However a description is latently ambiguous if "it is insufficient, by itself, to identify the land, but refers t......
  • Powell v. City of Newton
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • October 20, 2009
    ...it was not meant to be used by defendants to evade an obligation based on a contract fairly and admittedly made." House v. Stokes, 66 N.C.App. 636, 641, 311 S.E.2d 671, 675, cert. denied, 311 N.C. 755, 321 S.E.2d 133 (1984). The statute of frauds requires "that all essential elements of the......
  • Nesbit v. Cribbs, No. COA09-886 (N.C. App. 3/16/2010)
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • March 16, 2010
    ...to therein.'" Electronic World, Inc. v. Barefoot, 153 N.C. App. 387, 392, 570 S.E.2d 225, 229 (2002) (quoting House v. Stokes, 66 N.C. App. 636, 638, 311 S.E.2d 671, 673 (1984)). "`If the description is sufficiently definite for the court, with the aid of extrinsic evidence, to apply the de......
  • Smith Debnam Narron Drake Saintsing & Myers, LLP v. Muntjan
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • January 16, 2024
    ...fraudulent claims supported by perjured testimony; it was not meant to be used by defendants to evade an obligation[.]" House v. Stokes, 66 N.C.App. 636, 641, denied, 311 N.C. 755 (1984). " 'In order to constitute an enforceable contract within the statute of frauds, the written memorandum,......
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