Householder v. Town of Clayton

Decision Date28 August 1974
Docket NumberNo. 56229,56229
Citation221 N.W.2d 488
PartiesLarry HOUSEHOLDER and Hartford Accident and Indemnity Insurance Co., Appellants, v. TOWN OF CLAYTON, Iowa, Appellee.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Winkel, Nitchals & Winkel, Algona, for appellants.

Fuerste & Carew, Dubuque, for appellee.

Heard by REYNOLDSON, Acting C.J., and MASON, RAWLINGS, REES and UHLENHOPP, JJ.

REES, Justice.

This is an appeal by the plaintiff Householder, a trucker, and his cargo insurer, from the order of trial court sustaining the motion of the defendant Town of Clayton for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Plaintiffs instituted the action for damages and injuries arising out of the accident which allegedly resulted from the failure of defendant Town of Clayton to place warning signs on the hill leading into town indicating the road ended in a 'T' intersection. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $8000 which both parties to this appeal concede is considerably less than the special damages which plaintiff allegedly incurred. Following the jury verdict, plaintiffs moved for a new trial on the issue of damages alone, or alternatively for a complete new trial because the damages were inadequate. Both of plaintiffs' motions were overruled. Trial court then sustained defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict on the grounds that (1) plaintiffs had failed to prove any negligence of defendant was the proximate cause of the accident, and (2) as a matter of law the contributory negligence of the driver was a proximate cause of the accident.

At about 3:30 a.m. on August 21, 1970 the trucker Householder was delivering a semi-truck load of corn to an elevator at Clayton which is situated on the banks of the Mississippi, and access to which is by a paved highway designated as County Road C--17 west of Clayton, which highway runs north and south before turning approximately one-half mile from the corporate limits of Clayton to follow a curved but direct easterly course down a steep hill of 1.1 or 1.2 miles through the Town of Clayton to where it intersects with Front Street. Highway C--17 is also the main street in Clayton, and ends at Front Street which runs northerly and southerly through the town. The record indicates the distance from the east edge of Front Street to the edge of the Mississippi River is 225 feet. Immediately east of the pavement is an earthen dike three or four feet high and eight feet wide, and between the dike and the river are two sets of railroad tracks. East of the tracks is an expanse of beach which runs to the water's edge.

Householder, proceeding southerly on highway C--17, stopped at the corner where the highway turns sharply to the left and begins its descent down the hill into the Town of Clayton, at which point he observed the sign which read 'HILL, TRUCKS USE LOW GEAR'. He also there observed a sign indicating a curve to the left and bearing the legend '35 MPH'. Householder's truck was equipped with 15 transmission and rear-end gears, and when he made the turn and began his descent down the hill he had the vehicle in the fourth lowest of the 15 gears, in which gear the vehicle had a maximum speed of from five to seven miles per hour. After making the turn and beginning his descent down the hill, Householder shifted from fourth gear through the range of gears until he reached tenth gear and kept the truck in said gear the rest of the way down the hill to the point where the accident occurred. In tenth gear the vehicle had a maximum speed of 25 miles per hour.

After passing through the left-hand curve above referred to, Householder testified he saw another sign indicating a right curve which he negotiated and proceeded through a less abrupt second left-hand curve, at which point he observed the sign designating a speed limit of 25 miles per hour. He next observed a diamond-shaped sign with the legend 'SLOW' several hundred feet from the river, but he failed to slow his vehicle by down shifting or applying his brakes and maintained his then speed of 25 miles per hour down the hill. Further on, he observed a second diamond-shaped sign with the word 'SLOW', but again did nothing to reduce his speed as he went past the sign. In addition to the 'SLOW' signs there were three signs reading 'REMAIN IN LOW GEAR', the first located six-tenths of a mile from the top of the hill, a second located eight-tenths of a mile, and a third nine-tenths of a mile from the top of the hill.

Householder saw the dike which loomed ahead of him and then, realizing that the road made an abrupt turn, and that he was going too fast to stop or to make the turn with safety, he opened the door of the cab and jumped out, landing on the westerly side of the dike above referred to, sustaining two broken bones in his left ankle and a dislocated shoulder.

The sheriff of Clayton County investigated the accident and found no skidmarks or other evidence of the vehicle's brakes having been applied on the pavement, and found indications that the truck proceeded over the dike and was airborne for a distance of about 22 feet on the easterly side of the dike before it apparently touched the ground on the beach east of the railroad tracks and proceeded into the river.

The undisputed facts indicate the minimum out-of-pocket loss to Householder was the amount of $9805.22; that he had suffered the injuries above mentioned and lost two and one-half months of work. As mentioned above, the verdict of the jury in favor of plaintiffs was in the amount of $8000.

The issues stated by plaintiffs for review are:

(1) Trial court erred in sustaining defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict.

(2) Trial court erred in overruling plaintiffs' motion for a new trial because of the inadequacy of the verdict.

(3) Trial court erred in not granting a new trial on the issue of damages only.

The only negligence specified by plaintiffs against the defendant Town of Clayton was that the Town was negligent in failing to warn travelers of the dead-end street and the right-angle turn at the bottom of Clayton Hill.

The motion of defendant Town of Clayton for judgment notwithstanding verdict was based upon three grounds:

(1) Plaintiffs failed to prove any violation of their single pleaded specification of negligence in that the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs failed to show any breach of duty owed by the Town of Clayton to plaintiffs within the purview of such specified negligence.

(2) Plaintiffs failed to prove that any violation of plaintiffs' single pleaded specification of negligence was, or could have been, proximately causal as to plaintiffs' damages in that the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs showed and established as a matter of law that even if such a duty existed and was violated it was not the proximate cause of the accident for that the plaintiff Householder's own testimony showed his complete lack of control and willed decision to be in a state of lack of control or inability to stop.

(3) The evidence showed as a matter of law that plaintiff Householder, and through him his co-defendant insurance company, were guilty of proximately causal contributory negligence as a matter of law in that Householder had put his vehicle into a state of gear and speed which made it impossible for him to control or stop same at any time material to the happening of the accident.

The motion of the defendant for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was sustained by trial court on the latter two grounds. From such ruling and the court's overruling plaintiffs' motions for new trial this appeal was taken.

I. However stated, the trial court's ruling on defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was based on a finding by the trial court that plaintiff Householder was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.

'Generally questions of negligence, contributory negligence, and proximate cause are for the jury; it is only in exceptional cases that they may be decided as matters of law.' Rule 344(f)(10), Rules of Civil Procedure; Meade v. Roller, 212 N.W.2d 426, 429 (Iowa 1973); Kaus v. Scott, 174 N.W.2d 446, 448 (Iowa 1970); Naxera v. Wathan, 159 N.W.2d 513, 521 (Iowa 1968); Clubb v. Osborn, 256 Iowa 1154, 1160--1161, 130 N.W.2d 648, 652.

'Exceptional cases' in which a trial court is justified in finding contributory negligence as a matter of law have been said to exist where:

'* * * (a) person is so careless or his conduct so violative of all rational standards of conduct applicable to persons in a like situation. * * *' Mangan v. Des Moines City R. Co., 200 Iowa 597, 605, 203 N.W. 705, 709.

'* * * (t)he facts are clear and undisputed, and the cause and effect so apparent to every candid mind that but one conclusion may be fairly drawn * * *.' Weber v. Hansen, 241 Iowa 904, 909, 43 N.W.2d 766, 769.

'* * * (t)he lack of reasonable care is so manifest, flagrant, palpable, that reasonable minds may fairly reach no other conclusion * * *.' Helland v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 204 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 1973); Leinen v. Boettger, 241 Iowa 910, 926, 44 N.W.2d 73, 82.

We are therefore primarily concerned with the question as to whether we have here an 'exceptional' case justifying the trial court in its finding and conclusion the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. In sustaining the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, trial court expressly predicated its decision that plaintiff-driver was contributorily negligent as a matter of law on its finding that he approached the scene of the accident on a dark night in a strange town, without knowledge of the road before him, that he was traveling at an excessive speed under the circumstances as is manifested by the distance and course the truck traversed after he leaped from it, and finally, that at the time of the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
40 cases
  • Cowan v. Flannery, 89-1083
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • September 19, 1990
    ...and the award was nearly equal or less than the special damages. Witte v. Vogt, 443 N.W.2d 715 (Iowa 1989); Householder v. Town of Clayton, 221 N.W.2d 488 (Iowa 1974); Shewry v. Heuer, 255 Iowa 147, 121 N.W.2d 529 (1963); Allbee v. Berry, 254 Iowa 712, 119 N.W.2d 230 (1963); Feldhahn v. Van......
  • Papenheim v. Lovell
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • March 29, 1995
    ...damages to be adequate, they must "fairly and reasonably compensate an injured party for the injury sustained." Householder v. Town of Clayton, 221 N.W.2d 488, 493 (Iowa 1974); Jackson v. Roger, 507 N.W.2d 585, 589 (Iowa App.1993). A damage award "need only bear a 'reasonable relationship t......
  • Foggia v. Des Moines Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • February 14, 1996
    ...apply is "whether the verdict fairly and reasonably compensates the injury the party sustained." Id.; see also Householder v. Town of Clayton, 221 N.W.2d 488, 493 (Iowa 1974). Although evidence presented at trial may justify a higher damage award, this alone does not control. The key questi......
  • Rubel v. Hoffman, 2--56204
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • May 21, 1975
    ...of the fact. See Ruan Transport Corporation v. Jacobs, Supra; Code § 619.17; Iowa R.Civ.P. 344(f)(2). See also Householder v. Town of Clayton, 221 N.W.2d 488, 491--492 (Iowa 1974); Helland v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 204 N.W.2d 601, 605--606 (Iowa Under these conditions the aforesaid fi......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT