Houseman v. U.S. Aviation Underwriters

Decision Date26 April 1999
Docket NumberNo. 98-1637,98-1637
Citation171 F.3d 1117
PartiesSteven HOUSEMAN, Mary C. Houseman and Steven Houseman Jr., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES AVIATION UNDERWRITERS, Robert Timm, Brackett Aircraft Co., Associated Aviation Underwriters, Inc., and Spirit of St. Louis, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Michael S. Rosofsky (argued), Durkee & Rosofsky, Reistertown, MD, for Steven Houseman, Mary C. Houseman and Steven Houseman, Jr.

William J. Kant (argued), Leib & Katt, Milwaukee, WI, for U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Robert Timm and Spirit of St. Louis, Inc.

Lori L. Kaczynski (argued), Eric J. Van Vugt, Quarles & Brady, Milwaukee, WI, for Bracket Aircraft Co., Inc. and Association Aviation Underwriters, Inc.

Before POSNER, Chief Judge, and FLAUM, and MANION, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge.

Following the crash of a small airplane in 1995, a passenger sued the pilot for negligence. During discovery, the passenger attempted to add as a defendant the manufacturer of an air filter used in the airplane based on theories of negligence and products liability. Instead of staying the entire case so the manufacturer could prepare, the court ordered separate trials, first of the passenger's claim against the pilot followed by his claims against the manufacturer. Arguing that this bifurcation order severely prejudiced his suit and violated the Seventh Amendment, the passenger challenges the propriety of the district court's decision. Because the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion in ordering separate trials, we now affirm its decision.

Background

On the night of December 11, 1995, a six seat Piper Aztec E airplane (the "Aztec" or the "airplane") piloted by Robert Timm took off from Wausau, Wisconsin bound for Tulsa, Oklahoma. About thirty minutes into the flight, Timm noticed that the plane's left engine was losing power. Despite the pilot's efforts to restore power, it eventually quit. Soon the right engine quit as well, and the pilot tried to glide the airplane to the nearest airport in Boscobel, Wisconsin. This attempt, however, was unsuccessful and the plane crashed into the woods well short of the runway.

Investigations following the crash determined that both engines failed because ice built up inside the air induction system blocking the flow of air into the engines. Normally, air flows to each of the Aztec's engines from holes behind the propellers. Before reaching the engines, the air passes through an air filter. If this air induction system is blocked by ice build up, and air pressure around the engines drops, an automatic spring door is designed to open creating an alternate air flow channel. This alternate air system provides hot, unfiltered air from inside the airplane which should melt any ice that forms inside the primary air induction system. The alternate channel can also be manually triggered by the pilot before or during the flight by flipping a switch in the cockpit. Timm apparently never employed the alternate channel in his attempt to restart the engine.

On February 18, 1997, Steven Houseman, a passenger who suffered serious and permanent injuries in the accident filed suit against the pilot, Robert Timm, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. 1 The complaint alleged that Timm had negligently failed to recognize the icing conditions soon enough and had failed to place the manual alternate air controls in the full "ON" position either before or after the ice formed in the primary air induction system. This carelessness, claimed Houseman, directly caused the accident. 2

At an initial conference, Judge Shabaz scheduled trial for November 12, 1997. During discovery, the plaintiff learned that Timm's expert witness, Douglas Stimpson, was prepared to testify that the Aztec's air filter, manufactured by Brackett Aircraft Company ("Brackett"), was defective because it allowed excess moisture to pass into the air induction system and turn to ice. 3 Based on this information, Houseman sought leave to amend his complaint by adding Brackett as a defendant, claiming manufacturer negligence in the design and testing of the filter. Over the objections of Timm, the court granted Houseman's motion to amend on August 29, 1997. Brackett then moved for a continuance or a separate trial. On October 2, 1997, the court denied a separate trial but pushed back the trial date from November 11 to December 1, 1997.

On October 15, 1997, Houseman again sought leave to amend his complaint, this time adding a products liability claim against Brackett based on its air filters. Brackett argued that this claim should have been raised when Houseman's complaint was first amended and explained that it would be prejudiced by having to counter the strict liability theory on such short notice. Despite these objections, and the court's own concern that the plaintiff had been dilatory in advancing this theory, the court granted Houseman's motion on October 29, 1997. However, because it concluded that Brackett would have been unable to fully prepare for the new claim in the time remaining before trial, and that Timm should not have to wait until Brackett was prepared, the court bifurcated the claims against each defendant pursuant to Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 Timm's trial remained set for December 1, 1997, followed by Brackett's in mid-February, 1998. In the final pre-trial conference, Judge Shabaz explained that the first jury would be asked to deliver a special verdict on whether Timm had been negligent and a cause of the accident. The second jury would then determine whether the filter was defective and, if so, whether it played any causal role.

The trial against Timm began on December 1, 1997 and ended the next day. The plaintiff argued that the accident was a result of pilot error and not the filter. Timm called expert Douglas Stimpson who testified that the accident was caused by the filter, and that Timm had not acted negligently. The plaintiffs offered no rebuttal testimony. Although the jury found that Timm had been negligent with respect to the operation of the airplane, it determined that his negligence was not a cause of the crash.

Before the second trial started, the plaintiff moved for judgment as a matter of law against Timm or, in the alternative, a new trial and to vacate the bifurcation order. Houseman argued that separating the question of causation between the two proceedings violated the Seventh Amendment because it allowed two juries to try the same issue. Also, by splitting the defendants, bifurcation denied Houseman the chance to take advantage of an "alternative liability" theory which, under certain circumstances, shifts the burden of proof on causation to the defendants. The court rejected the motion, finding ample support for the jury's special verdict, and concluded that the plaintiff had, to that point, been given a fair trial. As to Houseman's claim that he was unfairly prejudiced, the court stated that the argument was premature because the issues relating to Brackett had not yet been tried.

In order to pursue this appeal, Houseman agreed to judgment in favor of Timm, and to dismiss with prejudice his claims against Brackett.

Discussion

The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court's decision to bifurcate the liability claims was an appropriate use of Rule 42(b). This rule permits the separation of claims or issues for trial if certain conditions are met. First, the trial judge must determine whether separate trials would avoid prejudice to a party or promote judicial economy. DeWitt, Porter, Huggett, Schumacher & Morgan v. Kovalic, 991 F.2d 1243, 1245 (7th Cir.1993). Only one of these criteria--avoidance of prejudice or judicial economy--need be met before a court can order separation. MCI Communications v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1166 (7th Cir.1983). Next, the court must be satisfied that the decision to bifurcate does not unfairly prejudice the non-moving party. See Angelo v. Armstrong World Industries, 11 F.3d 957, 964 (10th Cir.1993). Finally, separate trials must not be granted if doing so would violate the Seventh Amendment. See Hydrite Chemical Company v. Calumet Lubricants Co., 47 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir.1995). The ultimate decision to bifurcate under Rule 42(b) is at the court's discretion and will be overturned only upon a clear showing of abuse. McLaughlin v. State Farm, 30 F.3d 861, 870 (7th Cir.1994). Applying this deferential standard, we must determine whether there was a sufficient basis for the court's decision and, if so, whether the decision unfairly prejudiced Houseman or violated the Seventh Amendment.

Basis for Bifurcation

When Houseman moved to amend his complaint for a second time just prior to trial, the judge was faced with having to balance the interests of the three parties involved. As the court explained:

[I]t would be unduly prejudicial to require defendant Brackett to adhere to the amended trial schedule previously announced. The additional claims for strict liability would have severely prejudiced Brackett requiring a prolonged trial without sufficient preparation. Instead of denying the motion to amend, which based on plaintiffs' dilatory tactics would also have been an appropriate exercise of authority, the Court preserved for the plaintiff the opportunity to proceed against Brackett on negligence and strict liability at a later date. Defendant Timm was prepared to proceed on December 1, 1997 and should not have been prejudiced by plaintiff's further delay. Accordingly, it would have been a violation of the spirit of Rule 1 to adjourn the entire trial.

* * * * * *

Based on the plaintiff's delay in readying the matter for trial and the late filed motion to amend their complaint for the second time, the...

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