Housing Authority for LaSalle County v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Ottawa, Nos. 82-161

• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: ALLOY; HEIPLE; HEIPLE
• Citation: 67 Ill.Dec. 654,444 N.E.2d 1138,112 Ill.App.3d 65
• Docket Number: 82-127,Nos. 82-161
• Decision Date: 13 January 1983
• Parties: , 67 Ill.Dec. 654 HOUSING AUTHORITY FOR LaSALLE COUNTY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF OTTAWA, Illinois, Defendant-Appellee. v. Robert ALLEN, Intervening Defendant-Appellee, v. The CITY OF OTTAWA, Illinois, an Illinois Municipal Corporation, Intervening Petitioner-Appellee, v. HOUSING AUTHORITY FOR LaSALLE COUNTY and Young Men's Christian Association of Ottawa, Illinois, Respondents-Appellants.

Page 1138

444 N.E.2d 1138 112 Ill.App.3d 65, 67 Ill.Dec. 654 HOUSING AUTHORITY FOR LaSALLE COUNTY, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF OTTAWA, Illinois,
Defendant-Appellee.
v.
Robert ALLEN, Intervening Defendant-Appellee,
v.
The CITY OF OTTAWA, Illinois, an Illinois Municipal
Corporation, Intervening Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
HOUSING AUTHORITY FOR LaSALLE COUNTY and Young Men's
Christian Association of Ottawa, Illinois,
Respondents-Appellants. Nos. 82-161, 82-127. Appellate Court of Illinois,
Third District. Jan. 13, 1983.

[112 Ill.App.3d 66]

Page 1139

[67 Ill.Dec. 655] George Mueller, Hoffman, Mueller & Creedon, Ottawa, for plaintiff-appellant.

James Lanuti and Paul V. Martin, Lanuti, Martin & Lanuti, Warren, Hayner & Baxter, Ottawa, Barton & Sorokas, Marseilles, for defendant-appellee.

ALLOY, Justice:

Plaintiff Housing Authority for LaSalle County (hereinafter Housing Authority) appeals from the entry of summary judgment against it, and for the defendant Young Men's Christian Association of Ottawa (hereinafter YMCA) in this title dispute case. The court determined that the plaintiff's action was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, based upon a prior suit in federal district court involving the Housing Authority's and the YMCA's predecessors in title and the property in dispute in the case. The Housing Authority appeals from the entry of summary judgment and argues (1) that the issues involved in the prior suit were not sufficiently similar so as to support a bar by collateral estoppel in this suit; (2) that collateral estoppel does not apply because the judgment in the prior suit was based upon a consent agreement; and (3) that equitable principles outweigh the technical requirements of the doctrine and the interests of justice dictate that the doctrine not be applied, and the parties be given a full opportunity to litigate their dispute.

The record reveals that the Housing Authority filed the instant suit against the YMCA in 1981, alleging that the YMCA had commenced construction of a parking lot, a

Page 1140

[67 Ill.Dec. 656] portion of which encroached upon the property of the Housing Authority. A temporary restraining order was entered and further construction halted, pending resolution of the case. An amended complaint asked the court to quiet title to the disputed real property. Both counts of the amended complaint at issue herein alleged ownership of the property by the Housing Authority, pursuant to previous deeds and chain of title. The YMCA filed an affirmative defense, alleging that ownership to the disputed property had been previously determined by the District Court of the United States, Northern District of Illinois, in Case N.40531, United States v. Elizabeth Wirtz, et al., a decision handed down on November 21, 1932. The YMCA also filed a counterclaim in the instant action, to [112 Ill.App.3d 67] quiet title. Attached to the pleadings filed by the YMCA was a copy of the United States v. Wirtz decision. Wirtz was an action brought by the United States against a number of landowners along the Fox River, for the condemnation of flood plain easements, and for the fixing of compensation for the condemnation.

The petition by the government in Wirtz set forth the United States' powers of condemnation, the fact that the Attorney General had been unable to satisfactorily approve title due to its confused state, and the existence of outstanding and adverse claims to the real estate. It was specifically set forth in the petition that the First Trust Company of Ottawa, Illinois, the YMCA's predecessor in title, claimed legal title to part of the real estate designated as Tract No. 0-20 to 0-25, under a specified warranty deed, duly recorded. Also specifically set forth was that Charles and Ella Deenis, the Housing Authority's predecessors in title, claimed legal title to part of the real estate designated as Tract No. 0-20 to 0-25, under a different specified warranty deed. In addition, the petition sets forth the fact that this property, claimed by both predecessors in title, was encumbered by a lien for the 1931 general taxes. A map showing the property was also attached. In the Wirtz suit, the Deenises were personally served with summons in the action, but they made no appearance and a default judgment was entered against them. The First Trust Company, YMCA's predecessor in the action, appeared. The judgment order reveals that the First Trust Company filed a stipulation, waiving its right to trial by the jury, and submitted the matter to the trial court judge. In the judgment order, the trial court made a specific finding, "upon the record herein and the evidence presented, * * * that the First Trust Company of Ottawa, Illinois, is seized with fee simple title to the real estate," being the property again in dispute in the instant case. Compensation was set at $600 by the court in Wirtz, as the value for the flood plain easement. There is no dispute between the parties in the instant case that the property covered in the Wirtz order is the same as is now claimed by them, as successors in title to the First Trust Company and the Deenises.

The decision by the court in Wirtz was thereafter recorded at the LaSalle County Recorder's Office, indicating the judicial determination that title to the property was held by the First Trust Company. The YMCA took title to the property in 1956, by warranty deed, and the Housing Authority took title to their property in 1962.

The trial court, on defendant YMCA's motion for summary judgment,[112 Ill.App.3d 68] supported by affidavit and certified copies of the petition and order in the Wirtz case, entered judgment for the YMCA, based upon application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. An appeal was taken by the Housing Authority.

The basic rules with respect to the doctrine of collateral estoppel were ably set forth in Kramer v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. (1st Dist.1979), 69 Ill.App.3d 1015, 1018, 26 Ill.Dec. 275, 387 N.E.2d 1105:

"Estoppel by verdict or collateral estoppel is an extension of the doctrine of res judicata. It is based on the principle that a question once adjudicated by a proper court is to be considered as finally settled and conclusive on the unsuccessful parties. Estoppel by verdict or collateral

Page 1141

[67 Ill.Dec. 657] estoppel is applicable even where the parties are not arrayed on opposite sides in prior litigation or formal issues have not been drawn up between them." (Citations omitted.) See also Creeco v. Northern Illinois Gas (2d Dist.1966), 73 Ill.App.2d 218, 222, 219 N.E.2d 257.

The doctrine operates as a bar, to parties and their privies, and is applied if the party against whom it is raised actually litigated the matter or had the opportunity to litigate...