Housing Authority of City of Prichard v. Malloy
| Decision Date | 14 January 1977 |
| Citation | 341 So.2d 708 |
| Parties | The HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF PRICHARD, a body organized as a body corporate and politic in accordance with the provisions of the laws of the State of Alabama v. George F. MALLOY. SC 1794. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Donald M. Briskman, of Perloff, Reid & Briskman, Mobile, for appellant.
Irvin J. Langford, of Howell, Johnston, Langford, Finkbohner & Lawler, Mobile, for appellee.
George Malloy brought an action against The Housing Authority of the City of Prichard for breach of an employment contract. Damages sought were:
1) $3,662.26 for transitional expenses incurred in moving from Massachusetts to Alabama; and
2) $14,555.31 for the balance remaining on the one-year employment contract.
The Housing Authority admitted in its closing argument liability for part of the moving expenses. Thus, on this portion of the claim, the amount of damages was the only question submitted to the jury. The jury returned a verdict setting damages at $15,826.62.
At the end of Malloy's presentation of testimony and at the end of all the testimony, The Housing Authority moved for a directed verdict, which was denied by the trial Court. After the verdict was returned, appellant moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, which the trial Court also denied. The only issues raised on appeal are the trial Court's denial of these motions.
The Housing Authority states the issues here presented:
'1. The trial court erred in denying the Appellant's Motion for Directed Verdict at the conclusion of the Plaintiff's case.
'2. The trial court erred in denying the Appellant's Motion for Directed Verdict at the conclusion of all the evidence.
Because the pivotal point on which our holding turns is the procedural posture of the case, we review in some detail the context in which The Housing Authority's motions were made and overruled by the trial Court. As previously noted, Malloy's claim was twofold:
1) He sought damages for moving and transitional expenses; and
2) He claimed the balance remaining on an alleged one-year employment contract. At the close of the plaintiff's case, and again at the close of all the evidence, The Housing Authority moved in writing for a directed verdict. While the motion contained several grounds, it was a general motion in that it was directed to the case in its entirety and did not move for directed instructions on each of the individual issues.
During oral argument to the jury, counsel for The Housing Authority conceded that his client owed Malloy the reasonable transitional expenses incurred in moving from Massachusetts to Alabama. Thus, one of Malloy's two claims (though not the amount of the claim) was confessed. Thereupon, as part of the trial Judge's oral charge, he directed the jury to return a verdict for Malloy in an amount which it found to be reasonable under the evidence for moving expenses and left discretionary with the jury, under appropriate instruction, any additional damages for breach of the alleged contract of employment. No additional written instructions were requested separating the two claims for damages, and no objection was made to the Court's oral charge.
It would have been improper for the trial Court to grant The Housing Authority's motion for a directed verdict for the obvious reason that it would have been in diametric opposition to the Court's directed verdict for a portion of...
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