Houston Nat. Bank v. Adair

Decision Date07 January 1948
Docket NumberNo. A-1391.,A-1391.
Citation207 S.W.2d 374
PartiesHOUSTON NAT. BANK v. ADAIR.
CourtTexas Supreme Court

Fulbright, Crooker, Freeman & Bates, M. S. McCorquodale, and Sam W. Cruse, all of Houston, for petitioner.

Fred Parks, of Houston, for respondent.

HART, Justice.

This suit was brought by Joe Adair against Houston National Bank for damages resulting from personal injuries suffered by his wife when she slipped and fell on a stairway in the bank. The grounds of negligence relied upon by the plaintiff were in substance: (1) the failure of the bank to equip the stairs with handrails which could be grasped by persons using the stairs; (2) the failure of the bank to illuminate the stairway properly; (3) the failure of the bank to corrugate or cover the stairs to insure good footing; and (4) the construction and maintenance of the stairs by the bank in a slick condition. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence the district court granted the defendant's motion for an instructed verdict and judgment was entered accordingly. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded the case for a new trial upon the ground that the plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to require the submission of issues of fact to the jury. 203 S.W.2d 782. The principal question before us is whether the Court of Civil Appeals erred in this holding.

The evidence shows that at the time she was injured Mrs. Adair, who was then engaged in the real estate business, was in the bank at the request of one of its officers for the purpose of discussing a business transaction. She was a regular customer of the bank, having had an account there for a number of years. Upon her arrival at the bank at about 9 o'clock in the morning, she observed that the officer who had called her was not at his desk, and she then decided to go to the statement window in the basement to pick up her statements. The stairway leading to the basement was located in the central portion of the main floor or lobby of the bank. Mrs. Adair was the only witness who described the accident resulting in her injury, and her testimony is as follows: "* * * I went over to the stairway, put my hand on the right hand side of the balustrade and started to go down and when I got down I couldn't say the exact number of steps, why I felt my left foot slipping and that is when I realized that I was in danger and I tried to grasp hold of this balustrade and I couldn't. I couldn't hold it, because you just can't hold it; that is all; and that is the last I remember until late afternoon * * *".

Mrs. Adair further testified with reference to the stairs, "I didn't notice them being slick until I was falling and then I realized the danger I was in". Although she did not so testify directly, it seems evident that Mrs. Adair intended to imply that the stairs were slick; but what caused the slickness is not shown. There is no evidence of any substance having been placed or dropped on the stairs or of any cleaning fluid or compound having been used on them. The stairs were made of white, smooth marble. They have not been altered, rebuilt or repaired since the bank building was completed in 1928. There is no testimony that the stairs were narrow or steep or that they were uneven, slanting or sloping, and the photographs introduced by the plaintiff do not disclose any such condition. The stairs were not covered; there were no corrugations, mats, rugs, abrasive treads or carpets on them.

On each side of the stairway, which was seven feet, seven and a half inches wide, was an ornamental marble balustrade. The top surface of this balustrade was so wide that it could not be grasped or gripped by a person's hand, although the photographs and the architect's drawing introduced by the plaintiff show that the outer side of the top of the balustrade had a projection which could have been grasped. There was no handrail except the balustrade on each side of the stairway.

The evidence shows that the day was cloudy and because of the early hour it may be inferred that the daylight was not sufficient to illuminate the interior of the bank properly. However, the stairway was located in the central portion of the building and there is no evidence that the stairs depended upon daylight for illumination. Neither Mrs. Adair nor any other witness testified that the stairway was dark, nor did Mrs. Adair testify that she had any difficulty in seeing the stairs. She did testify that the only light that she saw near the stairway was over a desk situated to the right of the stairs. However, the pictures in evidence show that the upper portion of the stairway would be illuminated by lights in the ceiling of the lobby and...

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