Houston v. Cotter

• Decision Date: 14 February 2017
• Docket Number: No07–CV–3256 (JFB) (AYS),07–CV–3256 (JFB) (AYS)
• Citation: 234 F.Supp.3d 392
• Parties: Robert HOUSTON, Plaintiff, v. Thomas COTTER, John Weiss, and the County of Suffolk, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

234 F.Supp.3d 392

Robert HOUSTON, Plaintiff,

v.Thomas COTTER, John Weiss, and the County of Suffolk, Defendants.

No07–CV–3256 (JFB) (AYS)

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

February 14, 2017

Victor L. Hou, Diarra M. Guthrie, Sarah Elizabeth Edwards, Stewart Chenault Dearing, Matthew C. Vogele, Laura Amber Zuckerwise, Christopher Pattison DeNicola, Andrew Michael Darcy, Benjamin Leo Leffler, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Brian C. Mitchell, Suffolk County Dept. of Law–County Attorney, Hauppauge, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Joseph F. Bianco, District Judge:

Plaintiff Robert Houston ("plaintiff") brought this action against defendants Thomas Cotter ("Officer Cotter"), John Weiss ("Officer Weiss"), and the County of Suffolk ("the County") (collectively, "defendants") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"). Plaintiff commenced suit on July 26, 2007 by filing a pro se complaint against Officers Cotter and Weiss¹ alleging that they used excessive force against him on January 11, 2007. (ECF No. 1.) Counsel from the law firm Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP ("Cleary Gottlieb") were subsequently designated to represent plaintiff (ECF No. 51),² and plaintiff filed an amended complaint on December 16, 2011 (ECF No. 68) that added a Due Process claim against the County for implementing a policy whereby corrections officers confined plaintiff to suicide watch for two weeks as punishment.

This case was tried before a jury from February 23, 2015 to March 9, 2015. On March 9, 2015, the jury returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor as to (1) his excessive force claim against Officer Cotter, awarding $1,000 in compensatory damages and $4,000 in punitive damages; and (2) his Due Process claim against the County, awarding $25,000 in compensatory damages. (ECF No. 165.) The jury found that Officer Weiss was not liable on the excessive force claim. (Id. )

Presently before the Court is plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs. (ECF No. 181.) Plaintiff requests an award of $89,281.93 in fees and costs against Officer Cotter and $883,726.77 in fees and costs against the County. For the reasons set forth below, the Court awards plaintiff $7,500 in attorneys' fees against Officer Cotter ($1.00 of which is to be satisfied from the jury award) and $338,979.55 in attorneys' fees against the County, for a total of $346,479.55. The Court further awards plaintiff $23,856.57 in costs against Officer Cotter and $56,235.33 in costs against the County, for a total of $80,091.90.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

The Court has set forth the background facts of this case in the March 27, 2014 Memorandum and Order denying the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, see Houston v. Cotter , 7 F.Supp.3d 283, 287–89 (E.D.N.Y. 2014), and the March 30, 2016 Memorandum and Order denying defendants' post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law, Houston v. Cotter , No. 07–CV–3256 (JFB) (AYS), 2016 WL 1253391, at *2–10 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2016). Accordingly, the Court does not repeat those facts here and instead discusses all relevant facts in conjunction with its analysis of each issue raised by the instant motion.

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed his pro se complaint in this case on July 26, 2007 alleging Section 1983 excessive force claims against Officers Cotter and Weiss, as well as against Officers Douglas Gubitosi, Arthur Thomas, and Gerard Reynolds. (ECF No. 1.) After several years of discovery, Cleary Gottlieb was designated as counsel to plaintiff in December 2010. (ECF No. 51.) Thereafter, the Court granted plaintiff's motion to re-open discovery (ECF No. 58), and on December 16, 2011, plaintiff filed an amended complaint asserting excessive force claims against Officers Cotter and Weiss and a Due Process claim against the County (ECF No. 68).

Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on January 20, 2012 (ECF No. 70), and after the Court denied that motion on August 10, 2012 (ECF No. 79), defendants and plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment on July 26, 2013 and September 6, 2013, respectively (ECF Nos. 111, 113). The Court denied the cross-motions on March 27, 2014 (ECF No. 125), and the case proceeded to eight days of trial from February 23, 2015 through March 9, 2015 (see ECF Nos. 147–63).

On March 9, 2015, the jury reached a verdict and found for plaintiff as to (1) his excessive force claim against Officer Cotter, awarding $1,000 in compensatory damages and $4,000 in punitive damages; and (2) his Due Process claim against the County, awarding $25,000 in compensatory damages. (ECF No. 165.) The jury also concluded that Officer Weiss was not liable on the excessive force claim. (Id. ) On March 15, 2015, defendants moved to set aside the verdict only with respect to the Due Process claim against the County on the ground that the jury's determination was against the weight of evidence. (ECF No. 166.) The Court denied that motion on March 30, 2016. (ECF No. 177.)

Plaintiff subsequently filed the instant motion for recovery of attorneys' fees and costs on April 26, 2016. (ECF No. 181.) Defendants submitted their opposition on June 24, 2016 (ECF No. 187), and plaintiff submitted his reply on July 22, 2016 (ECF No. 188). The Court held oral argument on September 6, 2016 and requested supplemental letters from the parties. (ECF No. 190.) Plaintiff submitted his letter on September 20, 2016 (ECF No. 191), and defendants filed their letter on October 4, 2016 (ECF No. 192). The Court has fully considered all of the parties' submissions.

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff requests an award of attorneys' fees and costs against Officer Cotter in the amount of $89,281.93 and attorneys' fees and costs against the County in the amount of $883,726.77.³ Defendants do not dispute that plaintiff's calculation of $7,500 is a reasonable award of attorneys' fees against Officer Cotter pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. (Defs.' Br., ECF No. 187–1, at 20.) However, defendants do contest the reasonability of plaintiff's request for $81,781.93 in costs with respect to Officer Cotter and $677,959.10 in fees and $205,767.67 in costs with respect to the County. Specifically, defendants contend that (1) plaintiff achieved limited success in this action; (2) plaintiff's requested fees with respect to the County are unreasonable; (3) plaintiff failed to adequately document his costs with respect to both defendants; and (4) plaintiff should in no event recover more than $50,000 in total fees and costs.

For the following reasons, the Court awards plaintiff $346,479.55 in attorneys' fees and $80,091.90 in costs.

A. Applicable Law

"The general rule in our legal system is that each party must pay its own attorney's fees and expenses." Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn , 559 U.S. 542, 550, 130 S.Ct. 1662, 176 L.Ed.2d 494 (2010). However, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) ("Section 1988") provides that:

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, ... title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d et seq. ], ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity such officer shall not be held liable for any costs, including attorney's fees, unless such action was clearly in excess of such officer's jurisdiction.

42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) ; see also Blum v. Stenson , 465 U.S. 886, 888, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984) ("[I]n federal civil rights actions ‘the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.’ " (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988 )).

Generally, to determine reasonable attorneys' fees, a court must calculate a "lodestar figure," which is determined by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on a case by a reasonable hourly rate. See Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) ; see also Luciano v. Olsten Corp. , 109 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1997). "Both [the Second Circuit] and the Supreme Court have held that the lodestar ... creates a ‘presumptively reasonable fee.’ " Millea v. Metro–N. R.R. Co. , 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Assoc. v. Cnty. of Albany , 522 F.3d 182, 183 (2d Cir. 2008) ; Perdue 559 U.S. at 542, 130 S.Ct. 1662 ). " ‘[T]he lodestar figure includes most, if not all, of the relevant factors constituting a ‘reasonable’ attorney's fee.' " Perdue , 559 U.S. at 553, 130 S.Ct. 1662 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air , 478 U.S. 546, 566, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986) ). Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized that "the lodestar method produces an award that roughly approximates the fee that the prevailing attorney would have received if he or she had been representing a paying client who was billed by the hour in a comparable case." Id. at 551, 130 S.Ct. 1662. "The burden is on the party seeking attorney's fees to submit sufficient evidence to support the hours worked and the rates claimed." Hugee v. Kimso Apartments, LLC , 852 F.Supp.2d 281, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Hensley , 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ).

In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized that "plaintiff's success is a crucial factor in determining the proper amount of an award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988." Hensley , 461 U.S. at 440, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ; see also Stanczyk v. City of New York , 752 F.3d 273, 284–85 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Hensley , 461 U.S. at 434–35, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ). In Hensley , the Court held that:

Where the plaintiff has failed to prevail on a claim that is distinct in all respects from his successful claims, the hours spent on the unsuccessful claim should be excluded in

...