Houston v. Grigsby

• Decision Date: 29 March 1928
• Docket Number: 8 Div. 977
• Citation: 116 So. 686,217 Ala. 506
• Parties: HOUSTON v. GRIGSBY.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

116 So. 686

217 Ala. 506

HOUSTON v. GRIGSBY.

8 Div. 977

Supreme Court of Alabama

March 29, 1928

Rehearing Denied May 17, 1928

Appeal from Circuit Court, Limestone County; James E. Horton, Judge.

Petition of Jack Grigsby to probate the will of Irena Grigsby deceased, contested by Phil Houston. From a judgment of the circuit court, to which the proceeding was transferred from the probate court under Code 1923, § 10636, admitting the will to probate, contestant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

The refusal of requested instructions covered by those given is not error.

The following charges were refused to contestant:

"(8) I charge the jury that insanity is a disease, and that it has been established in this case that Irena Grigsby was a person of unsound mind, before the execution of said will, and that you must find against the will, unless you are satisfied by clear and satisfactory proof that Irena Grigsby had been either temporarily or permanently relieved of her insanity before the execution of the alleged will, and that the burden rests upon the proponent to reasonably satisfy you of the restoration of sanity to the said Irena Grigsby at the time the alleged will was executed."

"(12) The fact, if it be a fact, and is found by you from the evidence, that the entire estate of the said Irena Grigsby was given to those strangers to her blood, may be considered by you in reaching your verdict."

"(14) I charge you, gentlemen of the jury that the fact that the witnesses Chandler and Murphey attested the will of Irena Grigsby does not furnish any evidence of any opinion they may have had as to the sanity of Irena Grigsby, and their testimony as to the soundness of the mind of Irena Grigsby is entitled to no more weight than such testimony would have been entitled to had they not been witnesses to said will."

The following charges were given at proponent's request:

"(6) The court charges the jury that, if they should find that Irena Grigsby knew at the time of making the alleged will in general what her property was, who the people were, named in the instrument offered for probate, and what the making of a will was, although they find that she had been adjudged to be of unsound mind, they cannot find the will invalid by reason of unsoundness of mind."

"(18) The court charges the jury that, if the testator possessed at the time of the execution of the instrument offered for probate sufficient mind to understand without prompting the business about which she was engaged, the kind and extent of the property willed, and the persons who were the natural objects of her bounty and the manner in which she desired the disposition of her property to take effect, and that no undue influence was practiced upon her, they must find the will to be valid."

R.B Patton, of Athens, for appellant.

Edw. Goodrich, of Athens, for appellee.

ANDERSON C.J.

This case involves the contest of the will of one Irena Grigsby, deceased; the grounds of contest being mental incapacity to make a will, a failure to comply with the statute as to the execution of same, and undue influence.

We think the evidence made out a prima facie case as to the execution of the will as required by the statute, and there was no error in the admission of said will. It prematurely admitted, there was subsequent evidence, which, when connected with the antecedent evidence, established a prima facie case as to a compliance with the statute as to the execution of said will. Hall v. Hall, 38 Ala. 131, Barnewall v. Murrell, 108 Ala. 366, 18 So. 831.

On September 13, 1926, the said intestate was declared mentally unsound by the verdict of a jury and a decree of the probate court. The will was executed by her on her deathbed January 20, 1927, and she died February 3, 1927. In other words, the will was made about four months after she was adjudged of unsound mind, and about two weeks before her death, and evidently when her health had been failing rather than improving, though there was evidence tending to show her mental capacity was good when she made the will, notwithstanding the adjudication of mental incapacity just a few months prior thereto, and which was sufficient to take the question of soundness of mind to the jury, and the trial court did not err in refusing the affirmative charge for the appellant upon this theory of the case.

Sanity being the normal condition of the human mind, the law presumes that every person of full age has sufficient mental capacity to make a will, and casts on the contestant, in the first instance, the burden of proving mental incapacity at the time the will was executed, but, when the contestant has established habitual, fixed, or permanent insanity, as distinguished from spasmodic or temporary insanity at a time prior to making the will, the burden of proof is then shifted to the proponent, and he is required to show that the will was executed during a lucid interval. O'Donnell v. Rodiger, 76 Ala. 222, 52 Am.Rep. 322, McBride v. Sullivan, 155 Ala. 166, 45 So. 902. We think proof of the adjudication of insanity and that the intestate was under guardianship of the probate court when she executed the will was sufficient to cast upon the proponent the burden of establishing testamentary capacity when the will was made. 7 A.L.R. note, page 595. The adjudication, however, is conclusive of insanity only at the time of the inquisition, and not anterior or subsequent thereto.

The rule is that nonexpert witnesses cannot give an opinion as to the sanity...