Houston v. Queen

• Decision Date: 25 March 2014
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 13–2738.
• Citation: 8 F.Supp.3d 815
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana
• Parties: Michael HOUSTON, et al. v. Vernetta QUEEN, et al.

8 F.Supp.3d 815

Michael HOUSTON, et al.
v.
Vernetta QUEEN, et al.

Civil Action No. 13–2738.

United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Shreveport Division.

Signed March 25, 2014.

8 F.Supp.3d 816

Michael Houston, Chicago, IL, pro se.

Steve Houston, Chicago, IL, pro se.

Walter Orie Hunter, Jr., Law Office of Walter O. Hunter Jr., Shreveport, LA, Leonard L. Kilgore, III, Erin Percy Tadie, Esteban Herrera, Jr., Richard Dean McConnell, Jr., Kean Miller LLP, Baton Rouge, LA, James A. Porter, EP Energy Management, Houston, TX, for Vernetta Queen, et al.

MEMORANDUM RULING

ELIZABETH ERNY FOOTE, District Judge.

Before the Court is the Defendant EP Energy E & P Company, L.P.'s Motion To Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. [Record Document 18].¹ Defendant Vernetta Queen is not a party to this motion and has filed her own Motion To Dismiss on different grounds. [Record Document 12]. Because subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue as to all Defendants in this case, this ruling applies to the claim against Defendant Queen. Plaintiffs' complaint in this Court calls upon the Court to review and reverse a “Judgment and Judgment of Possession” (hereinafter referred to as a “Judgment of Possession”) rendered by the Forty–Second Judicial District Court of Louisiana (hereinafter referred to as the “42nd J.D.C.”), a state court.² For the following

8 F.Supp.3d 817

reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion To Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction [Record Document 18] and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the claims against both Defendants.

I. Background

Plaintiffs Michael Houston and Steve Houston (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Houston Brothers”) filed this complaint seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against EP Energy E & P Company, L.P. (“EP Energy”) and Vernetta Queen (hereinafter referred to as “Queen”), the administrator of the Succession of Daisy Cotton. [Record Document 1, p. 3].³ The complaint pertains to a Judgment of Possession rendered in state court in DeSoto Parish, which placed the Estate of Daisy Cotton in full possession of Mack Houston, Jr.'s undivided one-fourth interest in immovable property in that parish. [Record Documents 1, p. 17; 8–3, p. 2]. While the Defendants in this case are Queen and EP Energy, EP Energy is not a party to the state court suit but holds an oil, gas, and mineral lease over the property described in the state court Judgment of Possession. [Record Document 8–1, p. 2].

The Houston Brothers have presented this matter to multiple federal and state courts.⁴ The 42nd J.D.C. was the most recent court to examine the Houston Brothers' claims. Although the Plaintiffs were present at the hearing when the trial date was set, they filed motions to continue and to recuse the 42nd J.D.C.'s only two judges, Judge Adams and Judge Burgess, on the morning of the trial. The Houston Brothers allege the judges had “conspired to defraud them of their constitutional rights of due process.” [Record Document 12–5, pp. 2–3]. Judge Adams took the following actions: 1) he denied the Houston Brothers a continuance of the trial date and proceeded with the trial; 2) he denied the motion to recuse Judge Burgess and himself; 3) he commanded the Houston Brothers to appear and show cause why they should not be held in direct and constructive contempt of the court; 4) he found the will of Mack Houston, Jr., an Illinois resident, to be valid under the law of Illinois, where it was “fully litigated,” and thus “presented for

8 F.Supp.3d 818

probate in Louisiana in accordance with the law of Louisiana”; 5) he found Mack Houston, Jr. was in sole possession of any property that McKinley Houston had in Louisiana; 6) he denied the Houston Brothers' claims of forced heirship based on the Louisiana Civil Code articles dealing with conflict of laws, specifically Louisiana Civil Code Article 3533 ; 7) he placed the Estate of Daisy Cotton in full possession of the one-fourth property interest located in DeSoto Parish, Louisiana; and 8) he assigned the cost of the proceedings to the Houston Brothers. [Record Document 8–3, pp. 1–2]. When Judge Adams addressed the Houston Brothers' motion to recuse and commanded the Houston Brothers to appear and show cause why they should not be held in direct and constructive contempt of the court, he rejected the Houston Brothers' allegations of fraud as being “totally and completely groundless,” while noting the Louisiana Supreme Court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeal of Louisiana had denied the Houston Brothers' writ applications as to these claims. [Record Document 12–5, pp. 4–5]. Judge Adams framed the Houston Brothers' allegations that he, Judge Burgess, Clerk of Court Jeremy Evans, Walter Hunter, and David Butterfield “conspired to defraud them of their constitutional rights of due process” as a “last ditch, desperate attempt to prevent the judicial system of Louisiana from operating.” Id. at pp. 3–4.

The Houston Brothers contend the 42nd J.D.C.'s judgment is void, because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and its judgment is the product of fraud. [Record Document 1, p. 11].⁵ According to the Houston Brothers, EP Energy conspired with Queen to “influence” Judge Adams and Judge Burgess to prevent the Houston Brothers from inheriting royalties to which they were lawfully entitled. [Record Document 1, pp. 15, 17, 24]. Although the only named Defendants in this federal suit are Queen and EP Energy, the complaint alleges EP Energy's in-house attorney, James Porter, influenced Judge Adams and solicited Walter Hunter, Jr. to file forged documents in the Second Circuit Court of Appeal of Louisiana. [Record Documents 1, pp. 15, 17, 26; 25–1, p. 13]. The 42nd J.D.C. considered the same allegations that officers of the court conspired to defraud the Houston Brothers and found those claims to be “totally and completely groundless.” [Record Document 12–5, p. 4].

The Houston Brothers' complaint calls upon this Court to render thirteen declaratory judgments, all of which would require this Court to review and reverse the 42nd J.D.C.'s decision.⁶ The complaint also calls upon this Court to enter a preliminary

8 F.Supp.3d 819

and a permanent injunction enjoining the enforcement of the Judgment of Possession. [Record Document 1, pp. 76–77, 79]. Finally, the Houston Brothers request a judgment forcing the Defendants to pay the costs of litigation and “declaring any further relief that this Honorable Court deems just and equitable.” Id. at pp. 76, 79.

EP Energy filed the instant Motion To Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction under the Rooker–Feldman Doctrine. [Record Document 18]. Queen also filed a Motion To Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, based on grounds other than the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, and a Motion To Dismiss for Failure To State a Claim. [Record Document 12]. The Houston Brothers filed a Memorandum in Opposition to EP Energy's Motion To Dismiss. [Record Document 25]. EP Energy filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of the Motion To Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. [Record Document 27]. The Houston Brothers then filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition To EP Energy's Motion To Dismiss For Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. [Record Document 34].

II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction as the Threshold Issue

The Court must address the Rooker–Feldman doctrine before other issues because it raises a jurisdictional question. See Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 381–82 (5th Cir.2013). The Court must dismiss an action if it determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) ; 12(h)(3). This requires the Court to determine whether the Rooker–Feldman doctrine applies to both EP Energy and Queen. The party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 1675, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). In determining the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, this Court may rely on the following: “(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.” Barrera–Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir.1996).

III. Law and Analysis

Under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, a federal district court may not reverse or modify final state court judgments. See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923) ;

8 F.Supp.3d 820

D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). “The Rooker–Feldman doctrine merely recognizes that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is a grant of original jurisdiction, and does not authorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments, which Congress has reserved to this Court.” Verizon Maryland, Inc. v....