Houston v. Safeway Stores, Inc.

• Decision Date: 01 September 1995
• Docket Number: No. 1013,1013
• Citation: 674 A.2d 87,109 Md.App. 177
• Parties: Carrie HOUSTON v. SAFEWAY STORES, INC. ,
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 177

109 Md.App. 177

674 A.2d 87

Carrie HOUSTON v. SAFEWAY STORES, INC.

No. 1013, Sept. Term, 1995.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

April 1, 1996.

Lawrence S. Lapidus (Jack A. Gold and Chaikin & Karp, P.C., on the brief) Bethesda, for Appellant

L. Palmer Foret (Craig L. Davitian and Foret & Thompson, on the brief) Washington, DC, for Appellee.

Argued before BLOOM, FISCHER and CATHELL, JJ.

CATHELL, Judge.

In resolving the instant appeal, we shall address an issue of first impression--the immunity from civil liability of retail establishments under Maryland Code (1973, 1995 Repl.Vol.) [Immunity]--Customer use of employee toilet facility in retail establishment. ¹

§ 5-378 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (CJ). In toto, that section, as codified, now reads:

(a) Definition.--In this section "customer" means an individual who is lawfully on the premises of a retail establishment.

(b) In general.--A retail establishment and any employee of a retail establishment are not civilly liable for any act or omission in allowing a customer, including a customer as defined in § 24-209 of the Health-General Article, to use a toilet facility that is not a public toilet facility, if the act or omission:

(1) Is not willful or grossly negligent;

(2) Occurs in an area of the retail establishment that is not accessible to the public; and

(3) Results in an injury to or death of the customer or any individual other than an employee accompanying the customer.

(c) Employee toilet not public restroom.--Notwithstanding any provision of this section, an employee toilet facility is not to be considered a public restroom.

Appellant, Carrie Houston, challenges the interpretation and application of CJ § 5-378 by the Circuit Court for Prince George's County (Melbourne, J., presiding) in its rendering of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of appellee, Safeway Stores, Inc. (Safeway). She presents two issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred in granting the defendant judgment notwithstanding the verdict in light of substantial evidence supporting the jury's finding that the restroom at issue was a public toilet facility rather than an employee toilet facility.

2. Whether the trial court erred in its construction and application of the statute entitled "Immunity--Customer Use of Employee Toilet Facility in Retail Establishment," Md.Code Ann., Cts. & Jud.Proc. § 5-378 (1995 Repl.Vol.).

For reasons to be discussed, we shall affirm the trial court's entry of judgment non obstante veredicto, addressing both issues simultaneously.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

On September 16, 1992, appellant, while shopping at appellee's Lanham location, "inquired of a[n] ... employee whether there was a restroom available for her use." She was directed by Safeway personnel to go to the back of the store and to proceed through a set of double doors, each bearing a "No Admittance" sign. Beyond the double doors is a storage area or stockroom, described by one witness as the store's back room. Whatever its characterization, it is clearly a nonretail area designed to support the public, retail areas of the store. In that nonpublic area, beyond the doors bearing the "No Admittance" signs, is a nine-foot wide, ninety-foot long passageway. Appellant was directed to walk down that passageway to reach the rest room. Notably, the store is equipped with two other rest room facilities, adjacent to an employee lounge area on an upper floor, which are accessible by a stairway located just beyond the rest room at issue. Appellant indicated at trial that she went up and down the path three times in search of the facility; it was on her third pass that she slipped and fell on what she described as a piece of twine or rope, sustaining severe injuries, resulting in the amputation of a toe.

Appellant brought suit against appellee on negligence grounds, claiming, inter alia, that appellee had breached its "duty to reasonably maintain and inspect the premises in issue." The issues of liability and damages were bifurcated, and the four-day trial commenced on February 27, 1995. At the close of appellant's case-in-chief, appellee moved for judgment Appellee then filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, Motion for a New Trial, Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment, and Motion to Vacate Judgment. Safeway argued that CJ § 5-378 was designed to shield retailers from liability in precisely the situation presented by the case at bar. It also claimed that appellant had failed to present sufficient proof that the rest room at issue was a public, rather than an employee, facility. ² A hearing on the Motion was held May 10, 1995, after which the trial court, stating that the statute "was designed exactly for this situation," ruled in favor of appellee on the Motions for Judgment upon which it had earlier reserved ruling. Judgment was entered accordingly, notwithstanding the jury's verdict.

relying largely on CJ § 5-378 and the immunity granted thereby. The trial court reserved ruling on the motion, and appellee presented its case. At the close of all the evidence, appellee renewed its Motion for Judgment, relying on the same grounds as previously iterated. The trial court again reserved ruling thereon, and the case was submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict in favor of appellant. By special verdict, the jury found as fact the following: that the rest room at issue was not an employee facility; that the facility was a public rest room; that Safeway was negligent; and that appellant was not contributorily negligent.

Appellant filed the instant appeal therefrom.

APPELLATE STANDARD OF REVIEW

We note at the outset that Maryland Rule 2-532(b) provides that a motion for judgment, made at the close of all the evidence and upon which the trial court reserves ruling, "becomes a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict if

                the verdict is against the moving party."   See also McSlarrow v. Walker, 56 Md.App. 151, 154 n. 1, 467 A.2d 196 (1983), cert. denied, 299 Md. 137, 472 A.2d 1000 (1984).  "[A] motion ... n.o.v. tests the legal sufficiency of the evidence," Impala Platinum Ltd. v. Impala Sales (U.S.A.), Inc., 283 Md. 296, 326, 389 A.2d 887 (1978), and "is reviewed under the same standard as a judgment granted on motion during trial," Huppman v. Tighe, 100 Md.App. 655, 663, 642 A.2d 309 (1994).  To this end, we "assume[ ] the truth of all credible evidence and all inferences of fact reasonably deducible from the evidence supporting the party opposing the motion.  If there exists any legally competent evidence, however slight, from which the jury could have found as they did, a j.n.o.v. would be improper."  Huppman, 100 Md.App. at 663, 642 A.2d 309;  see also Dennard v. Green, 335 Md. 305, 322-23, 643 A.2d 422 (1994) (quoting Impala Platinum, 283 Md. at 328, 389 A.2d 887);  Levine v. Rendler, 272 Md. 1, 12, 320 A.2d 258 (1974);  McSlarrow, 56 Md.App. at 158, 467 A.2d 196 and cases cited therein
                

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Paramount in undertaking the construction of any statute is the intent of the Legislature. See Mauzy v. Hornbeck, 285 Md. 84, 92, 400 A.2d 1091 (1979); Mazor v. Department of Correction, 279 Md. 355, 360, 369 A.2d 82 (1977); Board of Supervisors of Elections v. Weiss, 217 Md. 133, 136, 141 A.2d 734 (1958). "The language of the statute itself is the primary source of this intent...." Privette v. State, 320 Md. 738, 744, 580 A.2d 188 (1990); see also Tucker v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 73, 517 A.2d 730 (1986). Where the statutory language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a definite and simple meaning, courts do not normally look beyond the words of the statute itself. Giant of Maryland, Inc. v. State's Attorney, 267 Md. 501, 512, 298 A.2d 427, appeal dismissed, 412 U.S. 915, 93 S.Ct. 2733, 37 L.Ed.2d 141 (1973); Hunt v. Montgomery County, 248 Md. 403, 414, 237 A.2d 35 (1968). But see Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387-88, 614 A.2d 590 (1992); Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, [t]hat a term may be free from ambiguity when used in one context but of doubtful application in another context....

                309 Md. 505, 514-15, 525 A.2d 628 (1987).  To this end, the words are to be accorded their ordinary and generally understood signification, absent evidence to the contrary.  Brodsky v. Brodsky, 319 Md. 92, 98, 570 A.2d 1235 (1990);   Privette, 320 Md. at 744-45, 580 A.2d 188;  Mazor, 279 Md. at 360, 369 A.2d 82.   Care must be given to avoid construing a statute by forced or subtle interpretations.  Comptroller of the Treasury v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 303 Md. 280, 284, 493 A.2d 341 (1985).  We are quick to note, however,
                

....

... [W]here a statute is plainly susceptible of more than one meaning and thus contains an ambiguity, courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of the enactment.... [T]he court ... may consider the consequences resulting from one meaning rather than another, and adopt that construction which avoids an illogical or unreasonable result, or one which is inconsistent with common sense.

Tucker, 308 Md. at 74-75, 517 A.2d 730 (citations omitted); see also Tracey, 328 Md. at 387, 614 A.2d 590 ("[T]he statute must be construed reasonably with reference to the purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting body."). Moreover, "[i]f reasonably possible, a statute is to be read so that no word, phrase, clause or sentence is rendered surplusage or meaningless." Mazor, 279 Md. at 360, 369 A.2d 82. "Statutes are enacted to further an underlying goal, aim, or purpose, and must be interpreted in accordance with their general purposes and policies." Toft v. State of Nevada ex rel. Ali Pimentel, 108 Md.App. 206, 671 A.2d 99 (1996).

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

In tracing the legislative history of the relevant statute, CJ § 5-378, since its inception and the inception of its...