Houston v. State, 983S342
| Decision Date | 18 July 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 983S342,983S342 |
| Citation | 480 N.E.2d 218 |
| Parties | Joseph HOUSTON, Appellant (Petitioner below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Respondent below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, David Swinford, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant (petitioner below).
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee (respondent below).
The petitioner-appellant, Joseph Houston, is before this Court appealing from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He was charged initially with burglary, a class A felony, Ind.Code Sec. 35-43-2-1 (Burns 1985 Repl.). Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement he pleaded guilty to class B burglary and was sentenced to the Indiana Department of Correction for a term of fifteen years. The sole issue presented in this appeal from denial of post-conviction relief is whether the trial court erred by failing specifically to advise appellant of any possible increased sentence based upon his prior criminal conviction.
Appellant claims that at his guilty plea hearing in June, 1978, he was not specifically advised of the possibility that his sentence could be enhanced based upon a prior conviction. He maintains that the trial court not only failed to so advise him, but that the trial court relied on his prior conviction to increase the presumptive sentence of ten years to a fifteen-year, enhanced sentence. Appellant seeks to have his conviction and sentence set aside or, alternatively, to withdraw his guilty plea.
Strict compliance with Ind.Code Sec. 35-35-1-2 (Burns 1985 Repl.) necessitates that the trial court advise defendants of any possible increased sentence based upon a prior conviction. German v. State (1981), Ind., 428 N.E.2d 234. Pre-German cases are evaluated by the Neeley standard whereby we look to the entire record to determine whether appellant was informed that his sentence could be enhanced by virtue of his prior conviction. Williams v. State (1984), Ind., 468 N.E.2d 1036; Neeley v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 588, 382 N.E.2d 714. Moreover, the trial court need not use the statutory language when advising of the potential adverse sentencing effects resulting from a defendant's prior conviction, provided that the essence of this statutory advisement is conveyed to defendant. Lowe v. State (1983), Ind., 455 N.E.2d 1126. This case is governed by the Neeley standard.
These are the facts pertinent to this issue. At appellant's guilty plea hearing, appellant admitted to the trial court that he had previously been convicted of a felony. Appellant understood that because of his prior conviction the sentence in this case could not be suspended. Since ap...
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Allen v. State
...would have violated the terms of the plea agreement. Accord, Stonebreaker v. State (1985), Ind., 476 N.E.2d 837; Houston v. State (1985), Ind., 480 N.E.2d 218 (trial court's explanation that parole status could be adversely affected by guilty plea conviction, a plea bargain agreement which ......
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Sage v. State
...the inference that Sage was duly informed, prior to pleading guilty, that consecutive sentences could be imposed. Cf., Houston v. State (1985), Ind., 480 N.E.2d 218. The judgment of the trial court is GIVAN, C.J., and PIVARNIK and DICKSON, JJ., concur. DeBRULER, J., concurs in result. ...