Howard Express Co. v. Wile

• Decision Date: 17 February 1870
• Citation: 64 Pa. 201
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
• Parties: Howard Express Company <I>versus</I> Wile.

Page 201

64 Pa. 201

Howard Express Company versus Wile.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

February 10, 1870.

February 17, 1870.

February 10th 1870.

Before READ, AGNEW, SHARSWOOD and WILLIAMS, JJ. THOMPSON, C. J., at Nisi Prius

Error to the District Court of Philadelphia: No. 144, to January Term 1870.

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D. Webster, for plaintiffs in error.—There was no sufficient evidence of negligence. The court should have determined it as matter of law: Pittsburg & Con. Railroad v. McClurg, 6 P. F. Smith 294; Catawissa Railroad v. Armstrong, 2 Id. 286; Penna. Railroad v. Ogier, 11 Casey 71. Negligence is the absence of care according to the circumstances: Frankford Turnpike v. Trenton Railroad, 4 P. F. Smith 345.

H. G. Hartranft and W. Ernst, for defendant in error.— Non-delivering goods is primâ facie evidence of negligence, and throws the burden of proof on the defendant: Verner v. Sweitzer, 8 Casey 208. Where the deposit of the goods until delivery is merely accessary to the carriage, the common carrier is liable in case of loss by fire in the mean time: Clarke v. Needles, 1 Casey 338. If the carrier cannot deliver, he must still keep the goods safely in the mean time: Tanner v. Oil Creek Railroad Co., 3 P. F. Smith 415.

The opinion of the court was delivered, February 17th 1870, by SHARSWOOD, J.

The doctrine that wherever there is a scintilla of evidence of a material fact, the question must be submitted to the jury has not stood the test of experience, and it has accordingly been exploded in England: Ryder v. Coombwell, Law Rep. 4 Exch. 34. The more reasonable statement of the rule is, that where there is any evidence which alone would justify an inference of the disputed fact, it must go to the jury, no matter how strong or persuasive may be the countervailing proof. A court may set aside a verdict as against the weight of the evidence but that is the most they can do to assist the party. But in a case in which a court ought to say that there is no evidence sufficient to authorize the inference, then the verdict would be without evidence, not contrary to the weight of it. Wherever this is so they have the right, and it is their duty to withhold it from the jury. Evidence may be legally admissible as tending to prove a particular fact, which yet by itself is utterly insufficient for the purpose. It may be a link in the chain, but it cannot make a chain unless other links are added. Where successive juries from prejudice against one party or sympathy for the other, persist in finding verdicts wholly unwarranted, must the court permit palpable injustice to be done? If a verdict is contrary to the charge of the court on a question of law it must be set aside, whether it be the second or the second hundredth. Where evidence on both sides is to be weighed, so as to determine on which side the scales incline, the jury is the appropriate tribunal. But where the weight on one side is of such a character as not to incline the beam at all — what the civilians term a mere adminiculum, good to help something else but nothing in itself — nothing but a conjecture — then it is as much a question for the court as if even this scintilla was absent. The rule thus understood does not impair the true value of trial by jury. It restrains it from arbitrary power,...