Howard v. Ashcroft
| Decision Date | 27 February 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. CRIM. 00-106-D-M3.,No. CIV. 03-123-D-M3.,CIV. 03-123-D-M3.,CRIM. 00-106-D-M3. |
| Citation | 248 F.Supp.2d 518 |
| Parties | Deborah Lou HOWARD v. Attorney General ASHCROFT, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Kathleen Hawk Sawyer, Ray E. Holt, and Callie P. Farr and United States of America v. Deborah Lou Howard |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana |
Pending before the court are two actions brought by petitioner Deborah Lou Howard against the United States and various of its agents in their official capacities (collectively referred to as the "Government"). The core of her complaint is that the Department of Justice and the Bureau of Prisons ("Bureau") have violated her federal constitutional and statutory rights by changing their interpretation of the Bureau's discretion to place certain classes of convicts directly into community corrections centers. The Bureau has regarded itself as having that discretion for decades and, in fact, exercised it in Ms. Howard's favor in October of 2002. The Department of Justice has since reconsidered the Bureau's interpretation of the relevant statutory language. It now thinks the Bureau's earlier acts of discretion were "unlawful." Based on this opinion, the Bureau has informed the federal courts that it will no longer exercise its former discretion. More importantly, for Ms. Howard, the Bureau has informed her that she will be transferred to a federal corrections facility in Marianna, Florida. It is this transfer that Ms. Howard seeks, in one way or another, to stop.
In her first action, Ms. Howard requests that this court issue a preliminary injunction against the Bureau, and its leadership in the persons of United States Attorney General John Ashcroft, Bureau Director Kathleen Hawk Sawyer,1 the Bureau's Regional Director for the South East Region, Ray E. Holt, and Callie P. Farr, who is the Community Corrections Manager for the same region of the Bureau. The injunction Ms. Howard seeks would order that she remain at her current place of confinement rather than be transferred to a federal corrections facility in Marianna, Florida. In the alternative, Ms. Howard asks this court for a preliminary injunction so that she may petition the court to hold a later hearing to vacate her prior sentence and resentence her in a manner that allows her to remain at the Bannum Place of Orlando Community Corrections Center ("Bannum Place") until her release.
Formally, this matter comes to the court on two motions. First, Ms. Howard brought a motion for an emergency stay which, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(f),2 this Court treated as two motions, one for a temporary restraining order and another to vacate her sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.3 Second, she has filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedures Act (the "APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 702, and 706 with jurisdiction predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1331.4
The court issued a temporary restraining order ("TRO") on January 28, 2003.5 By consent of the parties, the court extended the temporary restraining order until February 21, 2003.6 Additionally, by consent of the parties and representations made to the court by counsel for the Government, any issues regarding procedural defects or service were waived for the purposes of the preliminary injunction hearing so that all parties can get to the next step.7
The court took evidence and heard oral argument on February 21, 2003. Having determined that Ms. Howard has met her burden on at least one of her claims, the court granted her motion for a preliminary injunction and enjoined the Government from transferring Ms. Howard from Bannum Place pending a final determination on the merits.
In August 2000, the United States Attorney's Office confronted Deborah Howard with a charge of conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846(a)(1).8 Ms. Howard cooperated with authorities and pled guilty to the charge on November 8, 2001.9 Ms. Howard was a low level participant in the conspiracy. Her role was that of a courier, or a "mule."
The original pre-sentence investigation report, prepared on March 14, 2002, indicated that Ms. Howard had a criminal history category of I (the lowest level) and that her offense level was 25 because she met all of the criteria for the statutory "safety valve" and received a two level reduction for her "first offender" status under the Sentencing Guidelines. In between indictment and sentencing, Ms. Howard provided invaluable assistance to the Government with regard to information about her co-conspirators. In fact, Ms. Howard continued to provide assistance to federal and state investigators even though some of her co-conspirators were still at large and had significant criminal histories for violence. So valuable was the information she gave and so dangerous were some of the people her cooperation helped to convict, the court and counsel even considered placing her into the witness protection program. In the words of one of the prosecutors from the Middle District of Florida her cooperation was "crucial to the development of the case."
Ultimately, based on the assistance provided by Ms. Howard and her acceptance of responsibility for her actions, the Government filed a § 5K1.1 motion requesting this court to depart downward from the applicable offense level found in the Sentencing Guidelines by 11 levels. This court decided to depart an additional level, and reduced Ms. Howard's offense level to a 13. This categorization placed her at the lowest level of Zone D of the Sentencing Guidelines Sentencing Table, subject to a term of imprisonment between twelve and eighteen months.
On August 16, 2002, the court imposed a sentence of twelve months imprisonment, three years of supervised release immediately following said term of imprisonment, a $ 2,000 fine payable in monthly installments, and a mandatory $100 assessment.10 The court recommended that "the defendant serve her sentence at Bannum Place in Orlando, Florida"11 and ordered that she surrender herself "for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons" at a time "designated by the Probation or Pre-Trial Services Officer."12
The Bureau, acting pursuant to a statutory grant of authority, decided that it should follow this court's recommendation and ordered that Ms. Howard serve her term of imprisonment at Bannum Place, a community corrections center, beginning on October 14, 2002. This designation allowed Ms. Howard to continue working as a paralegal and provide financial support for her daughter and her infant grandchild during the daytime, but requires that she otherwise be confined to that community corrections center ("CCC").13 In fact, this designation was frequently the topic of conversation between the Government, Ms. Howard's counsel, and this court. All parties agreed that Ms. Howard deserved a lesser punishment due to the circumstances particular to her case. Moreover, all parties worked together to ensure that she would have the opportunity for this designation.
Ms. Howard surrendered herself at the appointed place and time on October 14, 2002, and began serving her sentence. By all accounts, Ms. Howard is a model prisoner. In addition, her ability to work generates sufficient income to pay for the cost of her incarceration at Bannum Place.
Meanwhile, the Department of Justice decided to reevaluate the very statutory grant of authority that the Bureau exercised in assigning Ms. Howard to Bannum Place. According to the Bureau at the time of Ms. Howard's sentencing, 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) gave it the discretion to commit people convicted of Zone C and D felonies directly to CCCs even though the federal district courts do not have such discretion in imposing their sentences.14 The crucial passage appears in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), which is entitled "Place of imprisonment." That section provides:
The Bureau of Prisons shall designate the place of the prisoner's imprisonment. The Bureau may designate any available penal or correctional facility that meets minimum standards of health and habiability established by the Bureau, whether maintained by the Federal Government or otherwise and whether within or without the judicial district in which the person was convicted, that the Bureau determines to be appropriate and suitable, considering—
(1) the resources of the facility contemplated;
(2) the nature and circumstances of the offense;
(3) the history and characteristics of the prisoner;
(4) any statement by the court that imposed the sentence—
(A) concerning the purposes for which the sentence to imprisonment was determined to be warranted; or
(B) recommending a type of penal or correctional facility as appropriate; and
(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of title 28.15
According to the Bureau's understanding of that section from the time it became effective in 1987 until December of 2002, the Bureau had the authority to "designate an offender directly to a community based facility to serve his or her sentence," though "ordinarily this is done only with the concurrence of the sentencing court."16 As these remarks make perfectly clear, the Bureau's policy was that its discretion under this statute was far more expansive than the discretion of the district courts.
Indeed, it would have to be in order to commit a defendant like Ms. Howard, convicted of a Zone D felony, directly to a CCC. Conversely, the discretion of the district courts is constrained by statute to follow the Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission ("Commission").17 That statute provides:
The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) un...
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Smith v. U.S., CIV.A. 03-0464(RMU).
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Jasperson v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, Civil Action No. 06-01488 (HHK).
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