Howard v. Chester Cnty. Office of Juvenile Prob. & Parole

• Decision Date: 30 August 2019
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-3997
• Citation: 396 F.Supp.3d 490
• Parties: Daniel HOWARD, Plaintiff, v. CHESTER COUNTY OFFICE OF JUVENILE PROBATION AND PAROLE, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

396 F.Supp.3d 490

Daniel HOWARD, Plaintiff,

v.CHESTER COUNTY OFFICE OF JUVENILE PROBATION AND PAROLE, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-3997

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed August 30, 2019

Daniel Howard, Wayne, PA, pro se.

Guy A. Donatelli, Katherine E. Ladow, Lamb & McErlane, P.C., West Chester, PA, Michael Daley, Supreme Court of PA Administrative Office of PA Courts, Jeffrey B. McCarron, Swartz Campbell & Detweiler, Philadelphia, PA, Baldev Singh, Michael D. Kristofco, Wisler Pearlstine LLP, Blue Bell, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Rufe, District Judge

Pro se Plaintiff Daniel Howard has filed this civil action asserting constitutional, statutory, and common law claims against Defendants based on their alleged failure to notify his father of his arrest and subsequent court proceedings when he was a minor, and the purportedly improper implementation and use of his Individualized Education Program ("IEP"). All Defendants, except for the Easttown Township Police Department and Officer Kevin Price, have moved to dismiss this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. For the reasons that follow, the motions will be granted. Further, as Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the Easttown Township Police Department and Officer Kevin Price, the claims against these Defendants will be dismissed as well.¹

I. Background

The following facts alleged in the Complaint are assumed to be true for purposes of the motion to dismiss.² Plaintiff Daniel Howard alleges that when he was a minor, he damaged a car during a game of tag and police responded to the incident.³ Police held Plaintiff at the scene, and Officer Kevin Price called Plaintiff's home where he lived with his father and grandmother, Beverly Miles, but only Miles was home. Miles allegedly told Officer Price that she was not Plaintiff's parent or guardian, but she responded to the scene and brought Plaintiff home. Plaintiff admits that he "could have called his father[']s cell phone and directly contacted his father," but he did not; he wanted to "prevent [his] father from finding out about the arrest ... because at the time he did not want to get into trouble with his father."⁴ Following the incident, Plaintiff asserts that Miles was contacted by police and instructed that if she failed to pay for the damages to the car, charges would be filed against Plaintiff. Miles was unable to pay for the damages, and ultimately, Defendant Juvenile Probation Officer Melissa Creedon issued a summons for Miles and Plaintiff to appear in court.

At the time of the summons, Plaintiff was in Maryland with his father, who, upon learning of the incident, "was angry and told [Miles] that she wasn't taking his son, plaintiff, to court because he was not notified by the police or by the court of the incident."⁵ While Plaintiff's father was at work, Plaintiff's aunt and uncle drove to Maryland and brought Plaintiff back to Pennsylvania, where Miles then took him to a juvenile court proceeding. Miles informed Plaintiff's mother about the hearing as well, and "told her that she had to attend."⁶ Defendant Vincent DiFabio, an attorney retained by Plaintiff's aunt and Miles, represented Plaintiff at this hearing.

Prior to the second juvenile court proceeding in February 2018, Plaintiff's father wrote a letter to the juvenile court explaining that he was Plaintiff's guardian and that the hearing was illegal because he had not been contacted. Defendant Keith DiFabio, an attorney who represented Plaintiff at this second juvenile court proceeding, shared this letter with Defendant Juvenile Probation Officers Melissa Creedon and Jamie Durning, and Plaintiff alleges that these Defendants hid the letter from the court and told Plaintiff that the "letter wouldn't matter."⁷

Plaintiff ultimately was adjudicated delinquent, placed on probation, and ordered to enter residential treatment.⁸ Plaintiff argues that Defendants' failure to notify his father was a violation of his due process and equal protection rights, thus rendering the court proceedings and the juvenile court's orders unlawful.

Plaintiff also alleges a conspiracy among Defendants relating to his IEP. Specifically, he contends that the School District sought to have more black children than white children on IEPs in order to obtain government subsidies, place black children at a disadvantage, and "prepare [them] for the industrial prison complex."⁹ According to Plaintiff, his father sought to have him removed from his IEP, but the school resisted these efforts and had "someone else" sign off on the continuation of the IEP. Plaintiff also alleges that police are more inclined to treat a child harshly if they discover the child has an IEP; however, Plaintiff does not allege that any police officer involved in the facts of this case ever asked him about an IEP or knew that he was a student with an IEP, nor does Plaintiff allege that his IEP influenced how he was treated ultimately in this case.

II. Legal Standard

A. Federal Rule 12(b)(1)

A defendant may move to dismiss a civil action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).¹⁰ The plaintiff, then, bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.¹¹ In considering the 12(b)(1) motion, "no presumptive truthfulness attaches to [the] plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims."¹² A court may "make factual findings, beyond the pleadings, that [are] decisive to determining jurisdiction."¹³ If the Court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) requires dismissal.¹⁴

B. Federal Rule 12(b)(6)

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged"¹⁵ and "enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element" of a claim.¹⁶ Specifically, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ... on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact) ...."¹⁷ The question is not whether the plaintiff ultimately will prevail but whether the complaint is "sufficient to cross the federal court's threshold."¹⁸

In evaluating a challenged complaint, a court must "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief."¹⁹ Although the Court must draw all reasonable inferences from the allegations in favor of the plaintiff,²⁰ it "need not accept as true ‘unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences,’ "²¹ or the plaintiff's "bald assertions" or "legal conclusions."²² A pro se plaintiff's pleadings should be "liberally construed."²³

III. Discussion

A. Federal Constitutional Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiff alleges violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution against the Chester County Office of Juvenile Probation and Parole, Officers Creedon and Durning in their official and individual capacities, the Tredyffrin Easttown School, as well as the Police Department and Officer Price. Plaintiff also alleges a Sixth Amendment violation by the Law Office of Platt, DiGiorgio, and DiFabio, and its attorneys Vincent DiFabio and Keith DiFabio.

1. Chester County Office of Juvenile Probation and Officers Creedon and Durning in their Official Capacities

Plaintiff's constitutional claims for damages against the Chester County Office of Juvenile Probation and Probation and Officers Creedon and Durning in their official capacities must be dismissed with prejudice. The Eleventh Amendment provides immunity to "subunits of the State," which, according to the Third Circuit, include the County Probation and Parole Departments.²⁴ Because a suit against a state officer in his or her official capacity is "no different from a suit against the State itself," the probation officers are also afforded this Eleventh Amendment immunity.²⁵ This immunity shields the Chester County Office of Juvenile Probation and the probation officers in their official capacity from Plaintiff's damages claims under § 1983.²⁶ This Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to Plaintiff's claims under the Pennsylvania Constitution and under §§ 1985 and 1986, although those claims fail against all Defendants for unrelated reasons as well, as explained below.²⁷

Plaintiff has also brought claims for injunctive relief against these Defendants, and although these claims are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, they will be dismissed. First, Plaintiff seeks an order requiring the Office of Juvenile Probation to adopt guidelines and policies relating to parental notification when a juvenile damages property. Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue such injunctive relief, as he is no longer a minor, and there is no threat that such alleged conduct by Defendants will again cause him injury.²⁸

Second, Plaintiff requests that the Court enjoin the Office of Juvenile Probation from enforcing any further actions against Plaintiff. Although Plaintiff does not specify what "these actions" refer to, he appears to seek to have the juvenile court's adjudication of him that resulted in a term of probation overturned, because Plaintiff contends that the judgments and order of the state court should be "halted and nullified" as they have been made without notice to his father.²⁹ Such a claim must be dismissed as an improper collateral attack on his state court adjudication. The Supreme Court held in Heck v. Humprhey ,³⁰ that a plaintiff may not bring a...