Howard v. Chester Cnty. Office of Juvenile Prob.

• Decision Date: 15 March 2019
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-2209
• Citation: 365 F.Supp.3d 562
• Parties: Harold HOWARD, Plaintiff, v. CHESTER COUNTY OFFICE OF JUVENILE PROBATION AND PAROLE, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

365 F.Supp.3d 562

Harold HOWARD, Plaintiff,

v.CHESTER COUNTY OFFICE OF JUVENILE PROBATION AND PAROLE, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-2209

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Filed March 15, 2019

Harold Howard, Wayne, PA, pro se.

Andrew J. Coval, Michael Daley, Supreme Court of PA Administrative Office of PA Courts, Jeffrey B. McCarron, Swartz Campbell & Detweiler, Philadelphia, PA, Guy A. Donatelli, Katherine E. Ladow, Lamb & McErlane, P.C. West Chester, PA, Baldev Singh, Wisler Pearlstine LLP, Lawrence D. Dodds, Wisler, Pearlstine, Talone, Craig, Garrity & Potash, LLP, Blue Bell, PA, Michael D. Kristofco, Wisler Pearlstine, LLP, Blue Bell, PA, J. Michael Kvetan, Law Office of Dennis O. Wilson, Mount Laurel, NJ, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Rufe, District Judge.

Plaintiff Harold Howard, proceeding pro se , asserts constitutional, statutory, and common law claims against Defendants based on their alleged failure to adequately notify Plaintiff of the complaint made against his then-minor son after his son damaged a car, and Defendants' use of private information related to his son's alleged disability during the resulting juvenile proceedings. All Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint.¹ Each of these motions to dismiss, except for the School District's motion, has been converted to a motion for summary judgment.² For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the motions for summary judgment and the School District's motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND³

Plaintiff's claims arise from Defendants' actions toward, and treatment of, Plaintiff and his teenaged son, D.H., in the juvenile proceedings brought against D.H. for damaging a car. Upon D.H.'s arrest in Chester County, Pennsylvania, police officers from Defendant Easttown Township Police Department held D.H. at the scene while they called the home where Plaintiff, D.H., and Beverly Miles (D.H.'s grandmother and Plaintiff's mother) lived.⁴ Plaintiff was not home, but Miles responded to the scene and brought D.H. home to 1000 Townsend Circle, Wayne, Pennsylvania.⁵ Plaintiff asserts that Miles was later contacted by the police, who told her that if she did not pay for the damage that D.H. caused to the car, charges would be brought against D.H.⁶ Miles was unable to pay for the damage. Plaintiff complains that, because he was never personally notified of this complaint against his son, he was unable to pay the injured party himself and was therefore deprived of the opportunity to prevent charges from being filed against his son.⁷

Plaintiff claims that the resulting juvenile proceedings against his son were faulty because he and his wife, Andrea Howard, who is D.H.'s mother, were never notified of the proceedings against their son.⁸ He asserts that Defendant Chester County Office of Juvenile Probation and Juvenile Court Probation Officer Melissa Creedon improperly issued a summons for Miles, rather than Plaintiff, to bring D.H. to court for juvenile proceedings. In response to the summons, Miles sent a letter to Creedon, explaining that she was not D.H.'s guardian and that Plaintiff was, but this letter did not provide contact information for Plaintiff.⁹ Plaintiff alleges that his sister, Kimberly Brunson, also called Creedon with the same information.¹⁰ Plaintiff asserts that he and D.H. were in Maryland at the time the summons was issued, and that Kimberly Brunson and her husband, John Brunson, brought D.H. from Maryland to Pennsylvania to attend the initial hearing "against [Plaintiff's] wishes."¹¹

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants improperly allowed the proceedings to continue against his son, despite knowing that Plaintiff should have been properly and formally notified of them. Plaintiff claims that, at the first hearing, Defendant Creedon hid the fact that Miles was not D.H.'s guardian from the hearing officer and proceeded with the case knowing that Plaintiff was not personally notified. At the second hearing, Plaintiff claims that Creedon, along with Defendant Keith DiFabio, a lawyer from Defendant law firm Platt, DiGiorgio and DiFabio, failed to inform the hearing officer that Plaintiff was D.H.'s guardian.¹²

In addition to his claims related to lack of notice, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Tredyffrin Easttown School District ("the School District") improperly provided Defendant Chester County Office of Juvenile Probation with information related to D.H.'s Individualized Education Program ("IEP"). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that, without his consent, Miles signed off on the School District's continued use of an IEP for D.H., as well as the release of this IEP to Creedon for use in D.H.'s juvenile proceedings. According to Plaintiff, this was improper because Miles, D.H.'s grandmother, is a "third party," and as D.H.'s father, Plaintiff should have been consulted on decisions related to D.H.'s IEP.¹³

Plaintiff, through his Third Amended Complaint, asserts causes of action under the United States Constitution, federal statutes, the Pennsylvania Constitution, and common law. Plaintiff also filed for preliminary injunctive relief, seeking to enjoin Defendants Chester County Office of Juvenile Probation and Parole, and Probation Officers Melissa Creedon and Jamie Durning, from taking any further actions against his son, D.H.¹⁴ The Court held a hearing on August 14, 2018, at which witnesses, including Plaintiff, Beverly Miles, and Andrea Howard, testified.

In contrast to Plaintiff's conclusory allegations against Defendants, the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction and documents appended to the parties' briefs, show that Plaintiff was afforded every opportunity to participate in his son's hearings but that he refused to do so. While Plaintiff testified that he was upset that he was not being "involved in any of the decisions that have been made" regarding his son, he also testified that he decided, on his own, to not be involved because he was "angry about the fact that [he] was never notified" of his son's arrest.¹⁵ In particular, Plaintiff admitted that he knew about most, if not all of D.H.'s hearings, including the initial intake hearing,¹⁶ which Andrea Howard explained "everybody" attended including herself, D.H.'s aunt and uncles, and Miles.¹⁷ Although Plaintiff alleges that the Office of Juvenile Probation and individual probation officers did not try to involve D.H.'s parents in the matter, Andrea Howard testified that, at that initial hearing, the officers "wanted to know who was all in the room," and that "they knew [she] was there, they knew [she] was a parent."¹⁸ Andrea Howard further explained that she gave the Office of Juvenile Probation her contact information at that same hearing, after which she received notice for each of D.H.'s court dates.¹⁹ Both Andrea Howard and Miles testified that they attended all but one court date, and Plaintiff admitted that his sister and brother-in-law, despite having no more information than he did, went to at least one hearing and hired D.H. an attorney.²⁰

Plaintiff, on the other hand, did not attend a single hearing, despite being aware of them, and even sought to prevent his son from attending the initial intake hearing; D.H. was only able to attend because Plaintiff's sister brought him there "against [Plaintiff's] will and knowledge."²¹ Additionally, Plaintiff never provided the Office of Juvenile Probation with his contact information as Andrea Howard had done, and instead asked Miles to write a letter to the Office,²² which stated D.H. and Plaintiff moved and their location was "unknown at th[at] time."²³ Even when the Office of Juvenile Probation ultimately obtained Plaintiff's contact information and sent him formal notice, he refused to attend his son's hearing, because he "didn't want to be involved," in the process he determined was "illegal."²⁴

All Defendants moved to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, to which Plaintiff has responded. On December 7, 2018, the Court directed the parties to file statements as to whether any of the motions to dismiss should be converted to motions for summary judgment in order to allow the Court to consider the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction. All parties, except Plaintiff, filed a statement as directed by the Court. All Defendants, except the School District, requested that their motions be converted to summary judgment motions, and on January 3, 2019, all motions, excluding the School District's motion, were so converted. The parties were then permitted to submit materials in support of, or in opposition to, summary judgment.²⁵

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Motion for Summary Judgment

A court will award summary judgment on a claim or part of a claim where there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."²⁶ A fact is "material" if resolving the dispute over the fact "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing [substantive] law."²⁷ A dispute is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."²⁸

In evaluating a summary judgment motion, a court "must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party," and make every reasonable inference in that party's favor.²⁹ Further, a court may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations.³⁰ Nevertheless, the party opposing summary judgment must support each essential element of the opposition with concrete evidence in the record.³¹ "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted."³² This requirement upholds the "underlying purpose of summary judgment [which] is to avoid a pointless trial in cases where it is unnecessary and would only cause delay and expense."³³...