Howard v. Columbia Public School Dist.

Decision Date13 April 2004
Docket NumberNo. 03-1882.,03-1882.
Citation363 F.3d 797
PartiesKarol K. HOWARD, Appellant, v. COLUMBIA PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT; James R. Ritter, individually and in his official capacity as the Superintendent of the Columbia Public Schools; Cheryl Cozette, individually and in her official capacity as Assistant Superintendent of the Columbia Public Schools, Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Karen Kristine Howard, argued, Kansas City, MO (Joseph Y. DeCuyper, Jr., on the brief), for appellant.

Blumeyer Weaver, St. Louis, MO (Joan Z. Cohen on the brief), for appellee.

Before WOLLMAN, RICHARD S. ARNOLD, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Karol K. Howard appeals from the district court's1 grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on each of her claims, asserting that there exist genuine issues of material fact to be resolved by a jury. After de novo review and examination of the voluminous record, Turner v. Honeywell Fed. Mfg. & Techs., L.L.C., 336 F.3d 716, 719-20 (8th Cir.2003), we affirm.2

I.

Dr. Howard was hired in 1998 to be a principal at Robert E. Lee Elementary School (Lee) in the Columbia, Missouri, Public School District, where she served for two years. Dr. Cheryl Cozette, Deputy Superintendent of Elementary Education for the district, supervised and evaluated the elementary school principals in the district and frequently communicated with Howard via email and in person about how things were going at Lee. Howard often asked Cozette for advice on how to deal with particular situations she encountered in working with certain teachers. In monthly meetings with all the principals, Cozette discussed with and encouraged them to implement both the district-wide literacy plan, initiated in the 1999-2000 school year, and each individual school's improvement program.

Towards the end of Howard's second year at Lee, tensions among Lee staff, previously unknown to district-wide leadership, reached a head. Upon receiving a series of letters expressing concern about the tension at Lee due to Howard's leadership (a letter from a "concerned citizen," a letter signed by seventeen faculty who had worked at Lee the previous year, a letter from the PTA president, two letters from concerned parents, and a resignation letter from a Lee teacher stating that she could no longer work under Howard), the District Superintendent, Dr. James Ritter, and Cozette took steps to investigate the situation. Cozette met with Howard several times to discuss the situation at Lee, expressing concern about Howard's communication and interpersonal relationships with Lee teachers. Howard wrote a detailed letter in response, in which she described all the achievements and improvements that had occurred at Lee under her leadership. The letter did not address possible causes for the tension among faculty or present ideas for improving the situation.

A week later, Cozette met with several of the Lee teachers who had signed the faculty letter to hear their concerns in more detail. Two days later, Cozette met with Howard again and indicated that she did not think Howard would be successful at Lee, given the scope of the discontent among the teachers. Cozette and Ritter met with Howard in July 2000 to discuss a district-wide position in grant writing and data analysis that had been created for Howard and which provided the same salary and benefits as her principalship at Lee. Howard worked in the newly-created position for three days, though she never signed or returned the contract. On the advice of her attorney, she then returned to her former office at Lee, claiming that she was still the rightful principal there. To eliminate the awkward situation for the new administration at Lee and allow for further negotiations, the district temporarily placed Howard on paid administrative leave. It then placed Howard in a newly-established "Principal on Special Assignment" position for the 2000-2001 school year at Blue Ridge Elementary School. Howard performed her duties in this position for the year and was given notice on April 10, 2001, that she would not be rehired as principal for the following year. Although Howard applied for several other principal positions within the Columbia Public School District, she was not hired to fill any of them.

Howard filed a complaint in district court in August 2001, alleging several constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (freedom of speech, procedural due process, substantive due process and equal protection), as well as alleging several state law claims (tortious interference with contract, breach of contract, and violations of district policy and state law). She sought, among other things, reinstatement, lost wages and other benefits, attorneys' fees, and a clear record. Following nearly a year of discovery, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on all counts. Howard filed objections and a motion for partial summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment on the merits of each of the constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the school district and on qualified immunity grounds for Ritter and Cozette. It also granted summary judgment to Ritter and Cozette on each of the state law claims against them. This appeal followed.

II.

We review a motion for summary judgment in the same manner as that utilized by the district court and affirm if there is there is no issue of material fact and defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Allen v. City of Pocahontas, 340 F.3d 551, 554-55 (8th Cir.2003). Although we view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, we do not accept unreasonable inferences or sheer speculation as fact. See Mole v. Buckhorn Rubber Prods., Inc., 165 F.3d 1212, 1218-19 (8th Cir.1999). The moving party bears the burden to demonstrate that there is no issue of material fact. The plaintiff may not then simply point to allegations made in her complaint but must identify and provide evidence of "specific facts creating a triable controversy." Jaurequi v. Carter Mfg. Co., 173 F.3d 1076, 1085 (8th Cir.1999). Simply providing a massive record does not satisfy this burden, and we will not sort through a voluminous record in an effort to find support for the plaintiff's allegations.3 Crossley v Georgia-Pacific Corp., 355 F.3d 1112, 1113-14 (8th Cir.2004) (per curiam). See also Johnson v. City of Shorewood, 360 F.3d 810, 819 (8th Cir.2003) ("It is not a court's obligation to search the record for specific facts that might support a litigant's claim[.]"). We consider only admissible evidence and disregard portions of various affidavits and depositions that were made without personal knowledge, consist of hearsay, or purport to state legal conclusions as fact. See Shaver v. Independent Stave Co., 350 F.3d 716, 723 (8th Cir.2003); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). We examine each of Howard's claims in the light of these considerations.

Defendants Ritter and Cozette have asserted the defense of qualified immunity, a defense that enables government officials to avoid the compulsion to stand trial. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). In evaluating a claim of qualified immunity, we ask the threshold question of whether the facts alleged show that the official's actions violated a constitutional right. Id. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. If no constitutional right would have been violated had the alleged facts been established, "there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity." Id.

A.

Howard alleges that Cozette, Ritter and the district violated her first amendment right to freedom of speech when they removed her from her position as the principal at Lee. She contends that their actions were motivated by her speaking out in favor of aggressive literacy training and against the exclusionary treatment of minority, disabled, disadvantaged, and special needs children.

A school district may not fire an employee because he or she has spoken critically of the school on a matter of public importance. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). To establish such a claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate that she has engaged in protected speech (speech on a matter of public concern), that her interest as a citizen in commenting on the issue outweighs the public employer's interest in promoting efficient public service, and that her speech was a motivating factor in the action taken against her. See Calvit v. Minneapolis Pub. Sch., 122 F.3d 1112, 1116 (8th Cir. 1997); Meyers v. Neb. Health & Human Serv., 324 F.3d 655, 659 (8th Cir.2003).

Howard cannot succeed on her first amendment claim because she has failed to present any evidence that her speech motivated defendants to terminate her employment. For the purposes of this appeal, we will assume, as did the district court, that Howard's speech involved a matter of public concern. The mere fact that Howard engaged in protected conduct, however, is "not sufficient to give rise to an inference of causation." Allen, 340 F.3d at 555. Some factors that are probative, though not conclusive, of causation, are the timing of the adverse employment action and any evidence of statements made by the defendants with reference to the protected activity. See Meyers, 324 F.3d at 659 (finding an issue of material fact as to causation because the employment action occurred shortly after the speech and was accompanied by comments that supported the inference); Calvit, 122 F.3d at 1118-19 (noting that Calvit's reports about the school's child abuse policy were closely followed by a series of negative employment actions); Allen, 340 F.3d at 555-56 (stating that the significant time lapse between protected conduct and the adverse action could preclude a finding of causation).

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