Howard v. Colvin

• Decision Date: 18 March 2015
• Docket Number: CAUSE NO.: 2:13-CV-376-JEM
• Parties: OTIS E. HOWARD, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

OTIS E. HOWARD, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.

CAUSE NO.: 2:13-CV-376-JEM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA HAMMOND DIVISION

March 18, 2015

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on a Complaint [DE 1], filed by Plaintiff Otis E. Howard on October 17, 2013, and a Social Security Opening Brief of Plaintiff [DE 19], filed by Plaintiff on April 24, 2014. Plaintiff requests that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge be reversed and remanded for further proceedings. On August 11, 2014, the Commissioner filed a response, and on August 26, 2014, Plaintiff filed a reply. For the following reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff's request for remand.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 8, 2011, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and for supplemental security income ("SSI") with the U.S. Social Security Administration ("SSA") alleging that he became disabled on July 7, 2010. Plaintiff's application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. On January 22, 2013, Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Edward P. Studzinski held a hearing at which Plaintiff, with an attorney, and a vocational expert ("VE") testified. On March 22, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled.

The ALJ made the following findings under the required five-step analysis:

1. The claimant met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through March 31, 2012.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 9, 2011, the application date. (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq. and 20 CFR 416.971 et seq.).

3. Since the alleged onset date, the claimant had severe impairments: borderline intellectual functioning (BIF); diabetes mellitus; obesity and degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 20 CFR 416.920(c)).

4. Since the alleged onset date, the claimant has not had an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals any of the listed impairments in 20 CFR 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 20 CFR 404.1525, 20 CFR 404.1526, 20 CFR 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

5. Prior to November 1, 2012, the date on which the claimant because disabled, he had the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), as he could lift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, and had no limitations in his ability to sit, stand, and/or walk. The claimant could assume any one position for no more than 60 minutes before needing to alternate positions for 5 minutes at a time. The claimant could only occasionally operate foot controls. The claimant could never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds and could occasionally climb ramps and stairs, as well as balance, stoop, crouch, kneel, and crawl. The claimant could frequently, but not constantly, use his hands for fine or gross manipulation, and could not use his hands for forceful, repetitive grasping or torqueing maneuvers. The claimant could not work around unprotected heights, large bodies of water, unexposed flames, or hazardous unguarded machinery. The claimant could not drive. The claimant was limited to simple, routine and repetitive tasks, simple decision-making, occasional and minor changes in the work setting, and tasks requiring no more than the exercise of simple judgment.

6. Beginning on November 1, 2012, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 20 CFR 416.967(a).

7. Since July 7, 2010, the claimant has been unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565 and 20 CFR 416.965).

8. Prior to the established disability onset date, the claimant was an individual closely approaching advanced age (20 CFR 404.1563 and 20 CFR 416.963).

9. The claimant has limited education and is able to communicate in English (20 CFR 404.1564 and 20 CFR 416.964).

10. Prior to November 1, 2012, transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because the claimant was "not disabled" whether or not he had transferable job skills. Beginning on November 1, 2012, the claimant has not been able to transfer job skills to other occupations (SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Supbart P, Appendix 2).

11. Prior to November 1, 2012, considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could have performed (20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969 and 416.969(a)).

12. Beginning on November 1, 2012, considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there were no jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could perform (20 CFR 404.1560(c), 404.1566, 416.960(c) and 416.966).

13. The claimant was not disabled prior to November 1, 2012, but became disabled on that date and has continued to be disabled through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).

14. The claimant was not under a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act at any time through March 31, 2012, the date last insured (20 CFR 404.315(a) and 404.320(b)).

On September 4, 2013, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, leaving the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner.

The parties filed forms of consent to have this case assigned to a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final judgment in this case. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

FACTS

Since at least July 6, 2010, Plaintiff has suffered from uncontrolled diabetes mellitus, dysuria, hypertension, renal insufficiency, diabeti neuropathy, and hypercholesterolemia. On August 10, 2011, Plaintiff went to the emergency room with complaints of back pain. He had decreased range of motion and x-rays showed degenerative disc disease and facet hypertrophic disease throughout the lumbar spine.

Plaintiff first sought treatment from Dr. Monterubianesi for his diabetes in April 2011. On March 9, 2012, she ordered a CT scan which revealed degenerative disc disease, osteopenic changes, moderate central stenosis and bilateral foraminal stenosis at several levels, severe facet hypertrophic disease, early lateral recess narrowing, and disc protrusion. Dr. Monterubianesi opined that Plaintiff was only able to "walk 2 blocks before having to stop due to pain, can't carry more than 15 lbs at a time, [and] can't climb a full flight of stairs." On a visit with Dr. Monterubianesi on November 12, 2013, Plaintiff told her that he had not been making appointments with her because of lack of funds. He reported falling, and Dr. Monterubianesi recommended a neurosurgery consult. Her exam revealed numbness, decreased range of motion in his lumbar spine, antalgic gait, and a positive straight-leg test. On January 16, 2013, Dr. Monterubianesi completed a physical residual functional capacity assessment indicating that Plaintiff experienced significant postural, environmental, exertional, and manipulative limitations.

On September 8, 2009, Plaintiff had a psychological examination. The examining psychologists found mild impairments in some areas of cognition, including working memory and calculations, mild limitations in mood/affect and communication. They found that Plaintiff had an IQ of 78, indicating borderline intellectual functioning and reading and arithmetic abilities at theelementary school level. They also diagnosed an adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood. There is no other mental health treatment or assessment in the record.

Plaintiff testified that he tried to do temporary assembly line work in 2011, but the employer stopped calling him to work because it was hard for him to keep up with the assembly line. He dropped items and was in a lot of pain from trying to bend over.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Social Security Act authorizes judicial review of the final decision of the agency and indicates that the Commissioner's factual findings must be accepted as conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus, a court reviewing the findings of an ALJ will reverse only if the findings are not supported by substantial evidence or if the ALJ has applied an erroneous legal standard. See Briscoe v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence consists of "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Gudgel v. Barnhart, 345 F.3d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 2003)).

A court reviews the entire administrative record but does not reconsider facts, re-weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in evidence, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. See Boiles v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005); Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000); Butera v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 1049, 1055 (7th Cir. 1999). Thus, the question upon judicial review of an ALJ's finding that a claimant is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act is not whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled, but whether the ALJ "uses the correct legal standards and the decision is supported by substantial evidence." Roddy v. Astrue, 705 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing O'Connor-Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614, 618(7th Cir. 2010); Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 734-35 (7th Cir. 2006); Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2004)). "[I]f the Commissioner commits an error of law," the Court may reverse the decision "without regard to the volume of evidence in support of the factual findings." White v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 369, 373 (7th Cir. ...