Howard v. Flagstar Bank
| Decision Date | 20 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3:19-CV-01071 (SVN) |
| Citation | 599 F.Supp.3d 71 |
| Parties | Daniel HOWARD, Plaintiff, v. FLAGSTAR BANK, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Amanda Maria DeMatteis, Joseph D. Garrison, Elisabeth Lee, Garrison, Levin-Epstein, Fitzgerald & Pirrotti, P.C., New Haven, CT, for Plaintiff.
Kelly Marie Cardin, Marc L. Zaken, Nicole S. Mule, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Stamford, CT, for Defendant.
RULING AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Daniel Howard brought this action against his former employer, Defendant Flagstar Bank, alleging a common law claim for wrongful discharge in violation of a clear mandate of public policy and an independent claim for punitive damages. See generally Am. Compl., ECF No. 25. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendant violated the public policy expressed in the Connecticut Personnel Files Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-128e, by discharging Plaintiff after he contested what he perceived to be inaccurate information in his personnel file.
Defendant seeks summary judgment, contending that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case for wrongful discharge and that, even if he can, Defendant had legitimate, permissible, non-pretextual reasons for terminating Plaintiff. Plaintiff disagrees, maintaining that there are genuine issues of material fact for the jury to resolve. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion for summary judgment, as genuine issues of material fact remain for the jury to decide.
The parties agree on the following facts. Plaintiff worked for Flagstar as an at-will employee from about March of 2011 through January of 2019. Pl. Responses to Def. Rule 56(a)1 St., ECF No. 113, ¶¶ 1, 47. In January of 2013, Plaintiff became Flagstar's Vice President – East Coast Regional Manager. Id. ¶ 1. In that role, Plaintiff supervised local branch managers, who in turn supervised loan officers. Id. ¶ 6. In 2016, Flagstar added a layer of management through the position of area manager, to whom branch managers began to report; Plaintiff, as regional manager, supervised the area managers. Id. ¶¶ 7–8.
In late 2017, Flagstar hired Kristy Fercho as its Executive Vice President, President of Mortgage. Id. ¶ 9. On December 19, 2018, Plaintiff was placed on a performance improvement plan ("PIP"). Id. ¶ 23. The PIP, which was scheduled to last forty-five days, noted two areas for improvement: "Growth and High Turnover" and "Leadership." Id. ¶ 24. As part of the PIP, Plaintiff was to have weekly meetings with Scott Bristol, whom Fercho had hired as Flagstar's National Sales Director in October of 2018. Id. ¶¶ 19, 25.
On January 13, 2019, Plaintiff emailed a letter to Bristol and Bethany Metzger, a member of Defendant's Human Resources staff. Id. ¶ 30. The letter stated, in part: "In accordance with the Connecticut Personnel Files Act, I am requesting that [the PIP] be rescinded and removed from any supervisory or other personnel file(s) that contain documents or other information that may be used in the future or referenced for my job performance with Flagstar Bank." Id. ; see Ex. I to Mot., ECF No. 108-11 (). The rebuttal further stated: "It seems more likely that you have already decided to terminate my employment, and this performance improvement plan is merely a tool intended to create the false impression of poor performance." Ex. I to Mot., ECF No. 108-11, at 3.
The weekly calls between Bristol and Plaintiff contemplated by the PIP generally did not occur. Pl. Responses to Def. Rule 56(a)1 St. ¶ 33. But one of Plaintiff's weekly calls with Bristol regarding his PIP was scheduled to take place on January 14, 2019, at 9:30 a.m. Id. ¶¶ 19, 34; see ECF No. 108-1 at 4–5, 10. This call had been scheduled since before Plaintiff submitted his rebuttal to the PIP. Pl. Responses to Def. Rule 56(a)1 St. ¶ 35. Sometime on January 14, 2019, after Plaintiff submitted his rebuttal, the weekly call was rescheduled to take place at 5:00 p.m. with Fercho, rather than Bristol. Id. ¶ 36. During the call, Fercho stated that "she thought it was time to transition" Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 39. Fercho also stated that Defendant could "pay [Plaintiff] through the end of February," so Plaintiff could "hopefully find something different." Id. ¶ 40.
On January 15, 2019, Plaintiff's counsel sent a letter to Metzger discussing "Flagstar Bank's decision to terminate [Plaintiff's] employment." Id. ¶ 46; Ex. J to Mot., ECF No. 108-12, at 2. The letter indicated that, during Plaintiff's January 14, 2019, call with Fercho, Fercho had "told [Plaintiff] that Flagstar had decided to terminate his employment." Pl. Responses to Def. Rule 56(a)1 St. ¶ 46. On January 16, 2019, Metzger emailed Plaintiff and stated in part: "We are in receipt of the letter from your attorney and since you interpreted your discussion with Kristy [Fercho] on Monday as a termination, we are going to move forward with that action." Id. ¶ 47.
Plaintiff subsequently initiated this action by filing his original Complaint in July of 2019. ECF No. 1. In September of 2019, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. ECF No. 18. In response, Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint, alleging claims for wrongful discharge and punitive damages. ECF No. 25. Defendant filed a second motion to dismiss in November of 2019. ECF No. 30. Following denial of Defendant's second motion to dismiss, ECF No. 56, the parties continued with discovery, which concluded in June of 2021. Defendant has now filed a motion seeking summary judgment on both counts of the Amended Complaint.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides, in relevant part, that a court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." With respect to materiality, a fact is "material" only if a dispute over it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law[.]" Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). With respect to genuineness, "summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. In considering a motion for summary judgment, a court "must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant." Kee v. New York , 12 F.4th 150, 158 (2d Cir. 2021) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In moving for summary judgment against a party who will bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial, the movant's burden of establishing there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute will be satisfied if the movant can point to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the non-moving party's claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The movant bears an initial burden of "informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. However, a movant Parker v. Sony Pictures Ent., Inc. , 260 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ). The non-moving party, in order to defeat summary judgment, must come forward with evidence that would be sufficient to support a jury verdict in his or her favor. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If the non-movant fails "to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [their] case with respect to which [they have] the burden of proof," then the movant will be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff filed a rebuttal to the PIP. Rather, the parties dispute whether the end of Plaintiff's employment with Defendant constituted a resignation or a termination and, if the latter, whether Defendant terminated Plaintiff because Plaintiff filed his rebuttal. The parties also disagree on two threshold issues: first, whether a wrongful discharge claim may rest on the public policy expressed in the Connecticut Personnel Files Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-128e ; and second, whether the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), should apply to Plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim.1 The Court addresses each issue below, taking the threshold issues first.
"In Connecticut, an employer and employee have an at-will employment relationship in the absence of a contract to the contrary." Thibodeau v. Design Grp. One Architects, LLC , 260 Conn. 691, 697, 802 A.2d 731 (2002). "Employment at will grants both parties the right to terminate the relationship for any reason, or no reason, at any time without fear of legal liability." Id. at 697–98, 802 A.2d 731. But Connecticut law has "carve[d] out" certain exceptions to the at-will doctrine, giving rise to tort claims for wrongful discharge. Id. at 698, 802 A.2d 731. In particular, state law recognizes that "public...
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