Howard v. Harrell

Decision Date25 July 1963
Docket Number1 Div. 52
Citation275 Ala. 422,155 So.2d 525
PartiesO. H. HOWARD v. C. E. HARRELL, Jr., et al.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Hubert P. Robertson, W. Dewitt Reams and Pillans, Reams, Tappan, Wood & Roberts, Mobile, for appellant.

Adams, Gillmore & Adams, Grove Hill, for appellees.

LIVINGSTON, Chief Justice.

The appellees filed their bill of complaint in the Circuit Court of Washington County, in Equity, praying that certain lands located in that county be sold for division. It is undisputed that appellees, C. E. Harrell, Jr., and S. Moxey Harrell, appellant O. H. Howard, and Robert Lewis, Jr., own the property in question as tenants in common.

The land is situated in three distinct parcels and is mostly wild and unimproved. Apparently, its principal use is for the growing of timber. The characteristics of the various parcels vary appreciably and there is evidence that within the separate parcels the land also varies as to the type of soil, type of vegetation, etc. Part of the land is covered with a thick layer of sand; on another portion is a pond. Both of the appellees testified that in their opinion, an equitable division in kind would be impossible.

The parties agree that where lands are owned by tenants in common, the right to sell for division is conditioned upon averment and proof that such property cannot equitably be divided in kind, and when this condition appears, the right to sell for division is a matter of right. Leonard v. Meadows, 264 Ala. 484, 88 So.2d 775; Littledale v. Brush, 240 Ala. 566, 200 So. 411; Chambliss v. Derrick, 216 Ala. 49, 112 So. 330. Thus, the primary question for our consideration is whether or not the property in question could be equitably divided in kind. The trial judge, after hearing the evidence ore tenus, decreed that it could not be equitably divided in kind and ordered it sold for division.

Where all the testimony is taken before the trial judge ore tenus, the findings of fact and decree of that court will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly or palpably erroneous. Johnson v. Harrison, 272 Ala. 210, 130 So.2d 35; Berry v. Kimbrough, 265 Ala. 459, 92 So.2d 20; Meador v. Meador, 255 Ala. 688, 53 So.2d 546.

Appellant urges that where a respondent by cross-bill invokes the rule of owelty, an equitable partition in kind is thus made possible and would, therefore, be the appropriate remedy. In support of this, appellant cites Title 47, Sec. 190, Code of 1940; Hall v. Hall, 250 Ala. 702, 35 So.2d 681; Compton v. Simmons, 223 Ala. 352, 135 So.570; and Smith v. Hill, 168 Ala. 317, 52 So.949. We cannot agree with appellant's interpretation of these authorities. Neither the statute nor the cases cited are authority for the proposition that a mere offer to invoke the rule of owelty always fosters a partition in kind. It is true that the decree in this case does not mention owelty at all. That doctrine...

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1 cases
  • Brown v. Bateh
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • April 30, 1976
    ...be sold for division except upon averment and proof that the property is incapable of equitable partition 'in-kind.' Howard v. Harrell, 275 Ala. 422, 155 So.2d 525 (1963). The burden of proving that the instant property cannot be equitably partitioned must be affirmatively carried by the pa......

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