Howard v. Henderson

• Decision Date: 06 September 2000
• Docket Number: No. CIV. A. 99-D-299-N.,CIV. A. 99-D-299-N.
• Parties: Natalie C. HOWARD, Plaintiff, v. William J. HENDERSON, Postmaster General for the United States Postal Service, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

112 F.Supp.2d 1276

Natalie C. HOWARD, Plaintiff, v. William J. HENDERSON, Postmaster General for the United States Postal Service, Defendant.

No. CIV. A. 99-D-299-N.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

September 6, 2000.

Gary E. Atchison, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff.

Leura J. Garrett, U.S. Attorney's Office, Redding Pitt, U.S. Attorney's Office, Montgomery, AL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DE MENT, District Judge.

Before the court is the Motion To Dismiss Or, In The Alternative, Motion For Summary Judgment filed by Defendant on July 1, 1999 ("Def.'s Mot."). On August 18, 1999, Plaintiff filed an untitled document in opposition to Defendant's Motion, which the court construes as a Response ("Pl.'s Resp."). Defendant filed a Reply on September 20, 1999 ("Def.'s Reply").¹ After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant law, and the record as a whole, the court finds that Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Or, In The Alternative, Motion For Summary Judgment is due to be granted.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court has subject matter jurisdiction over this lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (Title VII). The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

On a motion for summary judgment, the court is to construe the evidence and factual inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Summary judgment can be entered on a claim only if it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). As the Supreme Court has explained the summary judgment standard:

[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be `no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c)).

The trial court's function at this juncture is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir.1989).

The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and of establishing, based on relevant "portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,'" that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting FED. R.CIV.P. 56(c)). The mechanics of satisfying the initial burden vary, however, depending upon which party, the movant or the nonmovant, bears the burden of proof at trial. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir.1993) (detailing the nature of the parties' responsibilities when preparing or defending against a motion for summary judgment).

Once this initial demonstration under Rule 56(c) is made, the burden of production, not persuasion, shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [his or] her own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e)). In meeting this burden, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). That party must demonstrate that there is a "genuine issue for trial." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. An action is void of material issues for trial "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The undisputed facts are as follows: Plaintiff is a former employee of the United States Postal Service ("Postal Service"). (Pl.'s Aff., attached to Pl.'s Resp., ¶¶ 3, 11; Carrie Springer's Decl., Attach. 1 to Def.'s Mot., ¶¶ 6a, 6x.) On November 23, 1996, the Postal Service hired Plaintiff as a Part-Time-Flexible, Distribution Window and Markup Clerk for the Hayneville, Alabama Post Office. (Pl.'s Aff. ¶¶ 3, 4; Springer's Decl. ¶ 6a.) Plaintiff held probationary status with the Postal Service during her first 90 days of employment, from November 23, 1996, through February 20, 1997. (Springer's Decl. ¶ 6k.)

One week into her employment with the Postal Service, Plaintiff took maternity leave. (Id. ¶ 61; Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff was on maternity leave from November 29, 1996, through January 20, 1997. (Springer's Decl. ¶ 61; Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 4.) As a result, Katie Zellars, Hayneville Postmaster and Plaintiff's immediate supervisor, was not able to complete Plaintiff's 30 and 60 day evaluations, which are standard Postal Service procedures for probationary employees. (Springer's Decl. ¶¶ 6k, 6m.)

After returning from maternity leave, in late January and early February 1997, Plaintiff participated in on-the-job window clerk training. (Id. ¶ 6o.) Soon thereafter, from February 10, 1997, through February 18, 1997, James Russell, On-The-Job Training Instructor, gave Plaintiff on-the-job training. (Id. ¶ 6p.) Russell rated Plaintiff's on-the-job performance as "marginal." (Id.) According to Russell, "[Plaintiff] could not determine the different classes of mail, she was slow when waiting on customers and often had to have help completing a transaction. The IRT confuses her, she could not complete 1412 and do her close-out without help." (Id.)

Two days after completing on-the-job training with Russell, Plaintiff completed the Postal Service's mandatory standardized window clerk training examination. (Id. ¶ 6q.) One week later, on February 28, 1997, the Postal Service's National Test Administration Center reported that Plaintiff scored an "ineligible" rating on the standardized window clerk examination. (Id. ¶ 6r.) Because she received an ineligible rating on that examination, Plaintiff was not eligible to perform window clerk services, an essential function of a Distribution Window and Markup Clerk. (Id. ¶ 6s.)

The following month, on March 13, 1997, Zellars completed her 80 day evaluation of Plaintiff's on-the-job performance. (Id. ¶ 6u.) Zellars rated Plaintiff's performance in the six major, essential functional areas of the Distribution Window and Markup Clerk position — dependability, personal conduct, work quality, work quantity, work relations, and work methods. (Id.) Zellars rated Plaintiff's performance "unsatisfactory" in four of those areas — work quality, work quantity, work relations, and work methods — and "satisfactory" in the other two areas — dependability and personal conduct. (Id.)

The following week, on March 20, 1997, Zellars gave Plaintiff a Notice of Proposed Removal, which informed Plaintiff that her employment with the Postal Service would be terminated. (Id. ¶ 6v.) On April 3, 1997, Cody Ward, Manager, Post Office Operations, issued Plaintiff a Letter of Decision that upheld Zellars' decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment. (Id. ¶ 6w.) Consequently, effective April 19, 1997, Plaintiff's employment with the Postal Service terminated. (Id. ¶ 6x.)

Two weeks before Plaintiff's employment with the Postal Service ended, on April 4, 1997, the American Postal Workers' Union ("APWU") filed a grievance on Plaintiff's behalf challenging the Postal Service's decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment.² (Debi Edmunds' Decl., Attach 2 to Def.'s Mot., ¶ 6; Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 14.) In her grievance, Plaintiff alleged that she should have been transferred to another craft within the Postal Service, not terminated, and that her training was flawed. (Edmunds' Decl., Ex. D.) Plaintiff's grievance did not allege discrimination. (Id.; Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 14.)

Almost one year later, on March 19, 1998, Arbitrator James J. Odom, Jr. held an arbitration hearing on Plaintiff's grievance. (Edmunds' Decl. ¶ 11.) Two months later, on May 18, 1998, Odom issued his arbitration award denying Plaintiff's grievance. (Id. ¶ 16; Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 15.) Odom reasoned that (1) the Postal Service's failure to place Plaintiff in an alternate position did not violate her contract because Plaintiff was hired for the position of Window Clerk, failed the training for that position, and there were no other positions available in her installation or the district for which Plaintiff was qualified, (Edmunds' Decl. ¶ 15;) and (2) the evidence did not show that the Postal Service breached or failed its responsibility to provide Plaintiff with adequate training. (Id. ¶ 14.)

The following month, on June 22, 1998, Plaintiff filed an appeal of her termination from the Postal Service with the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB"). (Id. ¶ 17; Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 16.) In her appeal to the MSPB, Plaintiff alleged that (1) the Postal Service...