Howard v. Livingston Cnty., Mich.
| Decision Date | 20 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 21-1689 |
| Parties | SHALIMAR HOWARD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LIVINGSTON COUNTY, MICHIGAN, et al., Defendants, WILLIAM J. VAILLIENCOURT; MIKE TAYLOR, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
Before: STRANCH, DONALD, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.
Shalimar Howard, a probation officer employed by the Michigan Department of Corrections, brought federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and one state law claim, against state officials and entities, including William Vailliencourt and Mike Taylor, prosecutors for Livingston County Michigan.[1] Howard alleges that the prosecutors did not approve of her public criticism of their handling of probation cases and took retaliatory action against her, including unwarranted investigations and criminal prosecution, in an effort to have her removed from her position. Vailliencourt and Taylor moved for dismissal, claiming absolute prosecutorial, sovereign, or qualified immunity, as well as governmental immunity to the state law claim. The district court denied their motion, and this interlocutory appeal followed. We hold that Howard has adequately pled claims for: violation of her First Amendment rights; federal civil conspiracy related to that violation; and a state law claim of tortious interference with business relationship. As to Howard's claims for the violation of her Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights and conspiracy to violate those due process rights, we grant qualified immunity to the Defendants.
We therefore AFFIRM IN PART and REVERSE IN PART the denial of the motion to dismiss.
Because this case arises from a motion to dismiss, the facts are drawn from the Complaint. Shalimar Howard became a probation officer for the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) in 2002 and, beginning in 2010, she was assigned to the Department of Corrections Livingston County Probation Office. In 2017, Vailliencourt was elected prosecutor for Livingston County, Michigan; Taylor served as an assistant prosecutor.
Howard's allegations include the following. MDOC maintained a policy of "collaborative case management" that allowed probation officers "vast discretion" on how to handle probation violations and whether to seek formal charges based on violations. Vailliencourt and Taylor frequently sought to override probation officers' charging decisions in violation of MDOC's case management policy. Howard observed, and eventually spoke out about, the prosecutors' "discriminatory and/or arbitrary" "misuse" of their charging discretion, selectively choosing to pursue charges against certain classes of probation offenders and not others. As "a direct consequence" of her public opposition, Vailliencourt and Taylor developed "animosity" toward her, criticized her, and expressed their dissatisfaction with her for following MDOC's collaborative case management policy instead of conforming to their discriminatory practices.
On March 23, 2017, Howard was called as a witness to testify in a domestic civil matter in Livingston County concerning one of her probation clients. She states that she gave truthful testimony despite being interrupted by the judge, who refused to allow her to explain her testimony. After the March hearing, Vailliencourt and Taylor undertook "a secretive investigation" by reviewing a video recording of the hearing, ordering a transcript, and obtaining Howard's notes from the probationer's MDOC file. Howard was then intentionally excluded from participating in a June 2017 hearing concerning the same probationer, and, without grounds to do so, Vailliencourt requested that the Michigan state police investigate whether Howard committed perjury during the March 23 hearing.
On August 18, 2017, Vailliencourt sent a letter to Howard's supervisor "falsely" accusing her of committing perjury at the March 23 hearing in an effort to "undermine [her] credibility with her employer," and to silence her opposition to Defendants' discriminatory treatment of probationers. The letter stated that (1) Howard would not be called by the Livingston County prosecutors to testify in any proceedings, (2) the prosecutor's office would not respond to any request by Howard to pursue charges against any probationer, and (3) Howard was banned from entering the Livingston County prosecutor's office.
MDOC internal affairs division investigated the perjury allegations, including by taking a statement from Howard, and determined she had done nothing improper. She was not disciplined in any way. Despite knowing that MDOC found she did nothing wrong, Vailliencourt and Taylor continued to "actively participate" in further investigations regarding their accusation of perjury by Howard.
On January 12, 2018, Vailliencourt and Taylor charged Howard with three counts of perjury, knowing that the charges were without probable cause. The charges were based on a "sham" investigation conducted by Craig Carberry, an investigator with the Michigan state police, that "only repeat[ed]" the cursory inquiries Vailliencourt and Taylor had previously made, and which did not produce any evidence that Howard had committed perjury. Howard alleges that a warrant was prepared and submitted by Carberry, Vailliencourt, and Taylor without probable cause. Howard was arraigned that same day, and based on the perjury charges, she was suspended without pay from her position at MDOC. A preliminary examination was held in May 2019, at which Vailliencourt and Taylor voluntarily dropped one of the perjury charges against Howard. On August 2, 2019, the trial court granted Howard's motion to dismiss and quash the two remaining perjury charges due to lack of probable cause.
Howard filed a § 1983 complaint against Vailliencourt and Taylor in their individual and official capacities claiming (1) false arrest and detention without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment (Count I); (2) First Amendment retaliation arising from the prosecutors' conduct in response to her protected speech about their discriminatory practices (Count II); (3) violation of her substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment for pursuing an unwarranted criminal prosecution that tarnished plaintiff's reputation (Count III); (4) civil conspiracy by Vailliencourt and Taylor to pursue an unfounded prosecution despite knowing that there was no evidence plaintiff had committed a crime (Count IV). She also asserted a state law claim for tortious interference with business relationship (Count VI).[2]
Vailliencourt and Taylor filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the complaint is barred by various immunity doctrines and is factually deficient. The district court denied their motion to dismiss as to Howard's First and Fourteenth Amendment claims, as well as a civil conspiracy and state law claims. The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss as to Howard's Fourth Amendment claim based on false arrest, because it found that filing charges is a "core function" of preparing and presenting a case for prosecution, and it is therefore barred by prosecutorial immunity.[3] Howard v. Livingston Cnty., No. 20-11236, 2021 WL 4458542 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 29, 2021). This appeal followed.
Appeals courts generally lack jurisdiction over a district court's decision not to dismiss a suit for failure to state a claim. But a public official may be shielded from certain lawsuits based on an assertion of immunity, and a district court's denial of that motion is an immediately appealable collateral order. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 742 (1982); Cullinan v. Abramson, 128 F.3d 301, 307 (6th Cir. 1997). Because Vailliencourt and Taylor raise a number of defenses based on immunity, the denial of their motion to dismiss was immediately appealable.
We review a district court's decision under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo. Courtright v. City of Battle Creek, 839 F.3d 513, 518 (6th Cir. 2016). We take a plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). To survive a motion to dismiss, Howard must plead "enough factual matter" that, when taken as true, "state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 570 (2007). Plausibility requires showing more than the "sheer possibility" of relief but less than a "probab[le]" entitlement to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S 662, 678 (2009).
Howard's federal claims allege violations of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which states, in part, that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege violation of a right secured by the United States Constitution or laws of the United States and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S 42, 48 (1988) (citing ...
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