Howard v. Missouri Bone and Joint Center, 5-05-0476.

• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois
• Citation: 869 N.E.2d 207
• Docket Number: No. 5-05-0476.,5-05-0476.
• Parties: Alvin HOWARD, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. MISSOURI BONE AND JOINT CENTER, INC., Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant.
• Decision Date: 24 April 2007

869 N.E.2d 207 Alvin HOWARD, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee,
v.
MISSOURI BONE AND JOINT CENTER, INC., Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant. No. 5-05-0476. Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District. April 24, 2007.

[869 N.E.2d 208]

William J. Knapp, Elizabeth A. Bradley, Knapp, Ohl & Green, Edwardsville, for Appellant.

Clyde L. Kuehn, The Kuehn Law Firm, James R. Mendillo, Freeark, Harvey, Mendillo, Dennis, Wuller, Cain & Murphy, P.C., Belleville, for Appellee.

[869 N.E.2d 209]

Justice WEXSTTEN¹ delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff, Alvin Howard, appeals the circuit court's order finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant, Missouri Bone and Joint Center, Inc. We affirm.

FACTS

On January 23, 2002, the plaintiff filed a complaint seeking damages for physical injuries and monetary losses arising out of the defendant's negligence in providing athletic training services to him in Missouri.

On March 1, 2002, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint for a lack of personal jurisdiction. In support of its motion, the defendant submitted an affidavit from Leo A. Whiteside, the defendant's president, setting forth the following facts. The defendant is a Missouri corporation with its principal place of business and corporate headquarters in Missouri. The defendant has no facilities in Illinois. The defendant owns no property in Illinois. The defendant transacts no business in Illinois. The defendant is not registered to do business in Illinois. The fitness center that the defendant owns and operates has no activities conducted at locations other than the Missouri facility.

The plaintiff's attorney filed an affidavit in opposition to the defendant's motion to dismiss for a lack of personal jurisdiction. In the affidavit, the plaintiff's attorney stated that the defendant maintains an interactive website at mobojo.com that is accessible to persons residing in Illinois. Persons who access the website can fill out a form to request an appointment, fill out a patient survey, and contact the defendant with comments. The plaintiff's attorney stated that the defendant admitted sending flyers to high school and college coaches within a 100-mile radius (which included Illinois) inviting coaches to attend informational meetings. The plaintiff's attorney stated that the defendant admitted giving a presentation on injury prevention at Sparta High School, located in Sparta, Illinois, on April 5, 2002.

On July 9, 2002, the circuit court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. The defendant filed a petition for leave to appeal to this court, but the petition was denied.

Approximately three years later, at the conclusion of the presentation of the plaintiff's evidence at a bench trial, the defendant renewed the motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint for a lack of personal jurisdiction. The renewed motion was denied.

On May 13, 2005, the circuit court entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $458,470.03.

On June 1, 2005, the defendant filed a motion for a rehearing/modification and to vacate the judgment. The defendant asked the court to reconsider, inter alia, its ruling on personal jurisdiction. The defendant incorporated its previous motion to dismiss and the memorandum in support thereof and directed the court's attention to case law that had been filed subsequent to the original hearing.

On July 22, 2005, the circuit court vacated the earlier judgment in favor of the plaintiff, declared that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and dismissed the case for a lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiff appeals.

869 N.E.2d 210

ANALYSIS

The plaintiff argues that the circuit court erred in considering the defendant's motion for a rehearing on the issue of personal jurisdiction. We disagree.

Section 2-1203(a) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure states:

"§ 2-1203. Motions after judgment in non[]jury cases. (a) In all cases tried without a jury, any party may, within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or within any further time the court may allow within the 30 days or any extensions thereof, file a motion for a rehearing, or a retrial, or modification of the judgment or to vacate the judgment or for other relief." 735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West 2002).

In the case at hand, the defendant filed a motion for a rehearing/modification and to vacate the judgment within the required 30-day time period, and the defendant asked the court to reconsider its ruling on personal jurisdiction. Although the motion was timely, the plaintiff claims that the circuit court could only consider that motion if (1) newly discovered evidence had not been available at the original hearing, (2) a change in the law had occurred since the original hearing, or (3) the court made an error in its previous application of existing law. See Weidner v. Midcon Corp., 328 Ill.App.3d 1056, 1061, 263 Ill.Dec. 89, 767 N.E.2d 815 (2002). We disagree. Where a trial court does not have personal jurisdiction over a party, any order or judgment entered against that party is void and subject to direct or collateral attack at any time. See Sullivan v. Bach, 100 Ill.App.3d 1135, 1140, 56 Ill.Dec. 450, 427 N.E.2d 645 (1981).

The plaintiff contends that the circuit court erred in finding that it did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant, because the exercise of jurisdiction did not offend federal or state guarantees of due process (735 ILCS 5/2-209(c) (West 2000)) and because the defendant was "doing business within Illinois." See 735 ILCS 5/2-209(b)(4) (West 2000). We disagree.

In making the determination that it had personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the circuit court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing. Therefore, our review of the personal jurisdiction issue is de novo. See Rosier v. Cascade Mountain, Inc., 367 Ill.App.3d 559, 561, 305 Ill.Dec. 352, 855 N.E.2d 243 (2006).

Initially, we note that the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie basis upon which jurisdiction over the out-of-state defendant could be exercised. Khan v. Van Remmen, Inc., 325 Ill.App.3d 49, 53, 258 Ill.Dec. 628, 756 N.E.2d 902 (2001). The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution limits the instances in which a state may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate defendant. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2181, 85 L.Ed.2d 528, 540 (1985). "The Due Process Clause protects an individual's liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful `contacts, ties, or relations.'" Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 471-72, 105 S.Ct. at 2181, 85 L.Ed.2d at 540 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319, 66 S.Ct. 154, 160, 90 L.Ed. 95, 104 (1945)). For that reason, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the out-of-state defendant had the necessary minimum contacts with the forum state. Riemer v. KSL Recreation Corp., 348 Ill.App.3d 26, 33-34, 283 Ill.Dec. 163, 807 N.E.2d 1004 (2004). The minimum-contacts standard ensures that requiring an out-of-state resident to defend in the forum "does not offend `traditional notions of fair play and

869 N.E.2d 211

substantial justice.'" International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. at 158, 90 L.Ed. at 102 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 343, 85 L.Ed. 278, 283 (1940)); see Zazove v. Pelikan, Inc., 326 Ill.App.3d 798, 803, 260 Ill. Dec. 412, 761 N.E.2d 256 (2001). A nonresident defendant can only be subjected to the authority of the forum state if the defendant's conduct and connections with the forum are such that it is reasonably foreseeable that it would be haled into court there. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980).

In the instant case, there is no dispute that the plaintiff's suit neither arises from nor relates to his activities within Illinois; hence, the court was limited to exercising general jurisdiction over the out-of-state defendant. See Borden Chemicals & Plastics, L.P. v. Zehnder, 312 Ill.App.3d 35, 41-42, 244 Ill.Dec. 477, 726 N.E.2d 73 (2000). Federal standards permit a court to exercise general jurisdiction over a nonresident only where the nonresident has continuous and systematic general business contacts with the forum. Borden Chemicals & Plastics, L.P., 312...