Howard v. Mitchell

Decision Date03 July 1986
Citation492 So.2d 1018
PartiesBetsy Jane HOWARD v. Dr. Kermit MITCHELL, et al. 85-36.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Ronald R. Crook and S. Shay Samples, of Hogan, Smith, Alspaugh, Samples & Pratt, Birmingham, for appellant.

Braxton W. Ashe, of Almon, McAlister, Ashe, Baccus & Tanner, Tuscumbia, for appellees.

TORBERT, Chief Justice.

This is a wrongful death case in which the plaintiff, Betsy Jane Howard, filed suit against the defendants, Dr. Kermit Mitchell, Dr. Joseph Flippen, and Drs. Mitchell and Flippen, a partnership, alleging that negligence on their part proximately caused the death of her child. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that there were no genuine issues of material fact. The trial court granted the motion, and the plaintiff appeals.

In February 1971, the plaintiff first visited the defendants, who are obstetrician/gynecologists, complaining of spotting and passing blood clots. The defendants learned that the plaintiff had been six to eight weeks pregnant and determined that she had suffered a spontaneous abortion. The plaintiff's blood was typed at that time as having an Rh negative factor. The plaintiff became pregnant again in 1972 and delivered a healthy baby girl in December of that year. The baby's blood was typed at that time as containing the Rh negative factor also. In 1974, the plaintiff again became pregnant and her doctors discovered at this time that she tested positive for an antibody to the Rh positive factor. This pregnancy was spontaneously aborted. The plaintiff became pregnant once again in 1980 and underwent a cesarean section in March 1981. The infant died several days later from a condition known as erythroblastosis fetalis. This condition results from crossing of the mother's antibodies to the Rh positive factor of the fetus through the placenta and into the fetus's bloodstream, where it destroys the fetus's red blood cells. In 1984, after this suit was filed, the plaintiff's child born in 1972 was correctly typed as having the Rh positive factor.

The defendants treated the plaintiff only on the occasion of her first pregnancy in 1971. She alleges that the defendants did not follow the applicable standard of care in their treatment of her. She contends that since her blood was typed as Rh negative and she had just had a spontaneous abortion, the defendants should have treated her with a medicine known as RhoGAM, in order to prevent the formation of the antibodies to the Rh positive factor. She contends that the RhoGAM treatment, had it been given to her by the defendants in 1971, would have prevented the formation of antibodies to the Rh positive factor and thereby prevented the death of her child in 1981.

The issue presented is whether the defendants' summary judgment was proper. In a medical malpractice case, in order to find liability there must be more than a mere possibility that the alleged negligence caused the injury. Williams v. Bhoopathi, 474 So.2d 690, 691 (Ala.1985). There must be some evidence that that negligence probably caused the injury. Orange v. Shannon, 284 Ala. 202, 206, 224 So.2d 236, 239 (1969). This rule, of course, does not eliminate Alabama's "scintilla" rule, for if there is a scintilla of evidence that the negligence complained of probably caused the injury, then a jury question is presented. Williams, supra; Orange, supra. After a careful review of the record, we are of the opinion that the plaintiff has not presented a scintilla of evidence that the defendants' failure to give the RhoGAM treatment probably caused the death of her child.

In opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff presented the deposition of her medical expert, Dr. Marvin A. Krane. Through Dr. Krane's deposition testimony, the plaintiff attempted to establish that the defendants had failed to meet the standard of care required of those doctors who treat Rh-negative females following spontaneous abortions. Dr. Krane clearly testified that at the time the plaintiff saw the defendants the accepted medical practice was to give such a person the RhoGAM treatment within 72 hours of the spontaneous abortion, in order to prevent the development of Rh positive antibodies. It is the Rh positive antibodies, allegedly allowed to develop because of the defendants' negligence, which caused the death of the plaintiff's child.

After this testimony, Dr. Krane's deposition then continued on to the crucial point as to when the plaintiff developed the Rh positive antibodies. Dr. Krane testified that there was only a three to five percent chance that the plaintiff could have developed the Rh positive antibodies following the spontaneous abortion for which she was treated by the defendants in 1971. He further testified that there was at least a twenty percent chance that the plaintiff developed the Rh positive antibodies following the birth of her child in 1972. Dr. Krane also testified that there were no tests available now to determine when the plaintiff developed the Rh positive antibodies, and that it was "more likely that it occurred during the full term pregnancy" in 1972. On the plaintiff's re-direct examination of Dr. Krane, he also testified in the following manner:

"If she could have had the RhoGam after the abortion, we could have eliminated--just about eliminated any sensitization [development of the Rh positive antibodies], and then blame the full term...

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19 cases
  • Pacifico v. Jackson
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • February 2, 1990
    ...in order to find liability there must be more than a mere possibility that the alleged negligence caused the injury." Howard v. Mitchell, 492 So.2d 1018, 1019 (Ala.1986); and see Williams v. Bhoopathi, 474 So.2d 690 The testimony of Dr. Jackson's experts tended to show that the injury was c......
  • Ensor v. Wilson By and Through Wilson
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • October 23, 1987
    ...is presented. Orange v. Shannon, 284 Ala. 202, 224 So.2d 236 (1969)." This principle was recognized and applied in Howard v. Mitchell, 492 So.2d 1018 (Ala.1986), and follows the pronouncement contained in Orange v. Shannon, 284 Ala. 202, 206, 224 So.2d 236, 239 (1969): "The rule of our case......
  • Ex parte Lucas
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • November 17, 2000
    ...Ex parte Bailey, 590 So.2d 354, 359 (Ala. 1991) (quoting Ex parte Mauricio, 523 So.2d 87, 94 (Ala.1987)). See also Howard v. Mitchell, 492 So.2d 1018 (Ala.1986). Thus the record does not contain evidence tending to prove that, but for Lucas's failure to seek prompt medical treatment for her......
  • Iacullo v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
    • March 12, 2014
    ...omission constituting the breach and the injury sustained by the plaintiff. Ensor v. Wilson, 519 So.2d 1244 (Ala. 1987); Howard v. Mitchell, 492 So.2d 1018 (Ala. 1986).Bradford v. McGee, 534 So.2d 1076, 1079 (Ala. 1988). Unless the applicable standard of care would be obvious to a layperson......
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