Howard v. Mt. Sinai Hospital, Inc.
| Citation | 217 N.W.2d 383,63 Wis.2d 515 |
| Decision Date | 08 May 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 271,271 |
| Parties | Florence HOWARD et al., Respondents, v. MT. SINAI HOSPITAL, INC., et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
Borgelt, Powell, Peterson & Frauen, Milwaukee, Frank A. Scherkenbach, Milwaukee, of counsel, for appellants.
Warshafsky, Rotter & Tarnoff, Milwaukee, for respondents.
The sole issue on this appeal relates to the element of damages: whether the present fear or phobia that the plaintiff will develop cancer in the future is compensable.
Negligence is conceded. The sole question then is one of causation. The long standing rule on whether a particular claim of damages is compensable is 1
Applying this rule, we have held a defendant not liable for injuries sustained solely by fear for another's safety without physical impact. 2 Again on public policy grounds, we have held a plaintiff, hit on the arm by a flyinbg object, not liable for his contributory negligence in driving with his arm out the window. 3 In these and other cases, 4 on public policy grounds, we have refused to impose liability where such imposition of liability would offend sound considerations of public policy. 5 Today in the Reshan case 6 again we have refused to impose liability, on public policy grounds, where a conspicuously negligent northbound car on I--94 in Racine county went out of control and moved across the median strip hitting a car which was proceeding southerly on I--94 and the only negligence of the driver of the southbound car was with respect to maintaining an improper lookout for objects in the median strip.
In these cases these public policy considerations are regarded as an element of the legal cause, although not a part of the determinations of cause in fact, which this court refers to as 'substantial factor.' 7
In this case, although there is no question about there being in fact a fear of future cancer, the claim of damages (by way of cancer) is so remote and is so out of proportion to the culpability of the tortfeasor that, as a matter of public policy, we conclude that the defendant are not to be held liable for this element of damages.
The three cases cited by plaintiff from other jurisdictions 8 in support of her contention that this element of damage is compensable are not in point because as we have stated, the prevailing rule in Wisconsin is that, even though the fear or phobia exists in fact, the defendants are not held accountable where, as here, public policy compels this court, because of the remoteness of this element of damage, to excuse defendants from liability.
Since we have ruled here that the award of damages included a sum for the plaintiff's present fear of future cancer which we have found not compensable, we must reverse the judgment and remand for a retrial on the issue of damages. Appellants seek a new trial on all issues. While various evidentiary rulings during the conduct of the trial are challenged, they appear to relate primarily to the manner in which the plaintiff sought to establish the existence of the present fear of a future harm. With our holding here based on the public policy considerations involved in disallowing recovery for her present anxiety as to a future consequence, we find no reason or basis for ordering a new trial on other than the issue of damages. Therefore, the judgment is set aside on the issue of damages only, and a new trial in the interest of justice is ordered on that issue alone.
Judgment affirmed in part; reversed in part; and cause remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
The writer joins the majority in holding, on the facts of this case, that as a matter of public policy plaintiff's fear as to a future imagined consequence, having no reasonable basis, was not a recoverable element of damages in this case. The writer agrees that the long-standing rule on this point in this state is that 1 Public policy is involved in determining whether a particular claim of damage is compensable as a matter of law. 2 However, the writer would additionally make clear that a present fear as to a future harm (which describes the fear or 'phobia' which the plaintiff here had that she would develop cancer in the future) is not compensable whenever the future harm feared cannot reasonably be apprehended to result from the injury sustained. This rule of law, based on public policy considerations, is the rule in most jurisdictions, 3 with one state court going so far as to state, '. . . we know of no case where the injured party has been permitted to magnify the damages by calling the attention of the jury to fears that were altogether groundless, and never materialized. . . .' 4
For her contrary contention that the reality of the fear, not any reasonable basis for it, is all that ought be required for compensability, plaintiff relies upon three out-of-state decisions. One, a state court holding in an eastern state, does appear to hold that an entirely mistaken present fear of future harm is a compensable element of damages. 5 But, in the second case relied upon, a federal district court decision in an eastern state, evidence was admitted to establish that the fear involved was reasonable, and the trial judge held only '. . . Under the circumstances of this case I feel that it was entirely reasonable for this plaintiff to fear the development of cancer as the result of the severe injury to her breasts caused by this accident.' 6 In the third case cited, a state court case in an eastern jurisdiction, the court held admissible a statement made by the treating dermatologist to plaintiff that she should have a badly burned shoulder checked every six months inasmuch as the area of the burn might become cancerous, such six-month checkups being considered by the dermatologist essential as a protective measure, and the court concluded, '. . . It is entirely plausible, under such circumstances, that plaintiff would undergo exceptional mental suffering over the possibility of developing cancer. . . .' 7 While requiring and finding a reasonable basis for any present anxiety as to future harm, the New York State case makes clear that: "Liability for damages caused by wrong ceases at a point dictated by public policy or common sense." 8
The writer would find the applicble rule of law in this state and elsewhere to be that, assuming negligence and causation, a fear of a future consequence is not compensable as an element of damages in a negligence action if there is established no reasonable basis for such fear. This court has said that recovery may be denied on public policy grounds where the '. . . injury is too remote from the negligence or too 'wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent tort-feasor' . . .' 9 Where there is, as in the case before us, no claim of connectedness between the injury sustained and a future consequence of cancer, 10 the injury is too remote, and the claim of damage is wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the tort-feasor. We have said that recovery may be denied where '. . . in retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that the negligence should have brought about the harm. . . .' 11 Here it is not even claimed that the negligence brought about an increased likelihood of the future consequence feared. 12 We have said that recover may be denied where '. . . allowance of recovery would place too unreasonable a burden. . . .' 13 In the case before us, allowance of this element of damage would place a heavy and unpredictable burden upon the medical profession for the most minor and inconsequential of professional errors. We have said that recovery may be denied where it allowance would '. . . be likely to . . .' 14 We have said that recovery . . .' 14 We have said that revoery may be denied where granting recovery '. . . would 'enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point.' . . .' 15 If the slightest of fender-bender accidents could result in recovery for a baseless fear or claim of fear of developing cancer or arthritis years later, it would be difficult to...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Coffey v. City of Milwaukee
...act is a 'substantial factor' in causing the injury rests upon considerations of public policy.' See also: Howard v. Mt. Sinai Hospital, Inc., 63 Wis.2d 515, 519, 520, 217 N.W.2d 383, 219 N.W.2d 576 (1974); Padilla, supra, 56 Wis.2d 779, 203 N.W.2d 15; Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis.2d 594, 599, ......
-
Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hospital
...out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent tortfeasor. . . ." We do not agree. The case on which defendant relies, Howard v. Mt. Sinai, supra note 20, dealt with a fear or phobia of future cancer which resulted from a negligent act. Liability was denied on the basis of the remote......
-
Martindale v. Ripp
...Anxiety about a fictitious or imagined or highly unlikely consequence is not a recoverable element. Howard v. Mt. Sinai Hospital, Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 515, 217 N.W.2d 383 (1974). Liability ceases at a point dictated by public policy and common sense. Wilson v. Continental Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 3......
-
Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp.
... ... Page 1201 ... 856 (Tenn.1985); Owens Illinois, Inc. v. Lane, 576 S.W.2d 348 (Tenn.1978); P & L Construction Co. v. Lankford, ... See, e.g., Howard v. Mt. Sinai Hospital, 63 Wis.2d 515, 217 N.W.2d 383 (1974). While there ... ...
-
Stigma damages: property damage and the fear of risk.
...(proposing appraisal model that considers how stigma changes over time as contamination is discovered and subsequently remediated). (51.) 217 N.W.2d 383 (Wis. 1974). See also Annotation (C.C. Marvel), Anxiety as to Future Disease, Condition or Death Therefrom, as Element of Damages in Perso......