Howard v. Offshore Liftboats, LLC
| Decision Date | 27 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | c/w 13-6407 SECTION "E" (5),CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-4811 SECTION "E" (5),c/w 14-1188 SECTION "E" (5) |
| Parties | CALVIN HOWARD, ET AL. v. OFFSHORE LIFTBOATS, LLC, ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Before the Court is a renewed post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) and, in the alternative, a motion for new trial under Rule 59(a).1 The motion was filed jointly by Plaintiffs Calvin Howard and Raymond Howard. Defendant, Offshore Liftboats, LLC, opposes the motion.2 For the reasons that follow, the motion is DENIED.
The matter of Calvin Howard, et al. v. Offshore Liftboats, LLC, et al. proceeded to a jury trial on January 25, 2016. The trial involved the claims of Plaintiffs Calvin Howard and Raymond Howard against their employer, Offshore Liftboats, LLC ("OLB"); K&K Offshore, LLC ("K&K"); and the insurers of both entities.3 The claims asserted by the Plaintiffs were for various personal injuries, including alleged traumatic brain injuries, which the Plaintiffs claim they sustained during a failed personnel-basket transfer in the offshore waters of the Gulf of Mexico on May 16, 2013.4 Plaintiffs brought claims against OLB, their employer, for: (1) Jones Act negligence; (2) the unseaworthiness of OLB's vessel, the L/B Janie, under the General Maritime Law; and (3) maintenance and cure.5Plaintiffs initially brought claims against K&K, a non-employer third party, for negligence and unseaworthiness under the General Maritime Law.6 Plaintiffs' claims that K&K's vessel, the M/V Contender, was unseaworthy were dismissed prior to trial.7 Plaintiffs settled their remaining claims with K&K after trial commenced but prior to the submission of the case to the jury for decision.
The trial lasted approximately four (4) weeks, concluding on February 19, 2016, when the jury returned its verdict. The jury concluded that both OLB and K&K were negligent and that their negligence played parts, however slight, in causing Plaintiffs' injuries.8 With respect to Plaintiffs' unseaworthiness claims against OLB, the jury found that OLB's vessel, the L/B Janie, was not unseaworthy under the General Maritime Law.9 The jury also found that neither Raymond Howard nor Calvin Howard was negligent. In allocating fault between OLB and K&K, the jury found OLB to be 20% at fault for the accident and K&K to be 80% at fault.10
A Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law "is a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's verdict."12 Such a motion may be grantedonly if the trial court finds that "there is no legally sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to have found for that party with respect to that issue."13 Stated differently, the Fifth Circuit has held that granting judgment as a matter of law is proper only when "the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in the movant's favor that reasonable jurors could not reach a contrary conclusion."14 In analyzing a Rule 50(b) motion, the court "consider[s] all of the evidence, drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all credibility determinations in the light most favorable to the non-moving party."15 A court must be especially deferential to a jury's verdict,16 upsetting the verdict only when it is not supported by a legally sufficient evidentiary basis.17
The Court notes first that whether the jury found the L/B Janie to be seaworthy or not is moot. The jury found that OLB was negligent under the Jones Act, that the L/B Janie was seaworthy, and that Plaintiffs were not contributorily negligent. Under these circumstances, a jury finding of unseaworthiness would have made no difference in the damages recovered by the Plaintiffs.18 Putting this fact aside, although with great reluctance, the Court will consider the Plaintiffs' motion.
As stated above, the jury concluded that OLB's vessel, the L/B JANIE, was a seaworthy vessel. Plaintiffs contend, however, that "[t]he evidence presented at trialundeniably showed that the attempted ingress by means of the crane lift of Raymond and Calvin Howard from the M/V CONTENDER to the L/B JANIE was an unsafe lift."19 Moreover, according to Plaintiffs, the jury's verdict "finding OLB negligent undoubtedly leads to the conclusion that the L/B JANIE was unseaworthy as a matter of law as it is clear the jury found the crew of the L/B JANIE played a role in failing to provide Raymond and Calvin with a safe means of transport to its vessel."20 Plaintiffs argue that, in light of the evidence presented at trial and the jury's conclusion that OLB was negligent, the jury's conclusion that the L/B Janie was seaworthy is contrary to the law.
Plaintiffs contend the evidence presented at trial provided a sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable person to conclude that the L/B Janie was unseaworthy. The Plaintiffs have misstated the standard to be applied in analyzing a Rule 50(b) motion. On a motion for judgment as a matter of law following trial, the movant must show that, after consideration of the evidence presented at the trial and the arguments of Plaintiffs, and drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all credibility determinations in favor of OLB, no reasonable jury could have reached the verdict rendered.21 In other words, the Plaintiffs must show that no reasonable jury could have found that the L/B Janie was seaworthy. The fact that a reasonable jury might also have found the L/B Janie to be unseaworthy is irrelevant to the success of the Plaintiffs' motion for judgment as a matter of law. Courts must be especially deferential to jury verdicts and may reverse a jury only when the verdict is not supported by legally sufficient evidence. That is not the case here.
In their supplemental memorandum in support of their motion for judgment as a matter of law,22 the Plaintiffs added a new ground for their Rule 59(b) motion based onthe Court's failure to properly instruct the jury. Plaintiffs argue that the Court's failure to include an instruction that the duty to provide a seaworthy vessel includes the duty to provide safe ingress and egress for crewmembers was error. This argument is untimely as it was not presented within 28 days of the entry of the judgment. Even if not waived, the Court finds that the argument lacks merit. If a vessel has a safe, appropriate means of ingress and egress, then ingress and egress is a negligence concept. If the vessel owner's employees are negligent in carrying out the ingress and egress using the mode provided, the vessel owner is liable for its employees' negligence.23 Only if a vessel fails to provide a safe, appropriate means of ingress and egress is ingress and egress an unseaworthiness concept.24
The jury was instructed on Plaintiffs' claims against OLB for (1) negligence under the Jones Act and (2) unseaworthiness of the L/B Janie under the General Maritime Law, including the duty to supply an adequate, competent, and properly trained crew.25 The Plaintiffs admit the only negligence of OLB was the negligence of its crew.26 The Plaintiffs are correct that the duty to provide a seaworthy vessel encompasses affording the seaman a reasonably safe means of boarding and departing from the vessel.27 But the cases cited by the Plaintiffs involve situations where the employer failed altogether to provide a reasonably safe means of ingress and egress. For example, in Superior Oil, the "transfer from one vessel to the other was by the simple expedient of waiting for the vessels to swing together and stepping or jumping from one to the other when the decks reached a level ornear level position."28 The Fifth Circuit in Superior Oil found that the vessel owner failed to provide a reasonably safe means of ingress and egress.29 There was no evidence presented at the trial of this case that there was not a reasonably safe method of ingress and egress to the L/B Janie—clearly there was in the form of the crane and personnel basket. Plaintiffs did not present evidence that using a crane and personnel basket is so unsafe as to amount to the failure to provide a reasonably safe method of ingress and egress—clearly this method is an accepted means of transfer which is routinely used in the Gulf of Mexico. Instead, Plaintiffs presented evidence that the operation of the crane and personnel basket by K&K and OLB employees did not meet the standard of care required—clearly a negligence claim. The Court properly instructed the jury on Jones Act negligence that "[a] Jones Act employer has a duty to provide its employees safe ingress to and from its vessels."30
The only issue with respect to the transfer on which the Plaintiffs arguably introduced evidence is whether the L/B Janie was unseaworthy because OLB failed to provide an adequate, competent, and properly trained crew. The Court properly instructed the jury on unseaworthiness, stating that "[t]he duty to provide a seaworthy vessel includes a duty to supply an adequate, competent, and properly trained crew."31 If the jury had come to the conclusion that the crew of the L/B Janie was not adequate, competent, or properly trained, it would have answered Question No. 5A of the Jury Verdict form "yes," and then proceeded to Question No. 5B for a determination of whether this unseaworthy condition was the proximate cause of the injuries.32 The jury did notfind the L/B Janie to be unseaworthy because of an inadequate crew. Legally sufficient evidence was presented to support this determination.
Plaintiffs' argument that the jury's finding OLB negligent undoubtedly leads to the conclusion that the L/B JANIE was unseaworthy as a matter of law also fails. It is a fundamental concept of maritime law that negligence under the Jones Act and unseaworthiness under the General Maritime Law are separate...
To continue reading
Request your trial