Howard v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 83-8078

• Decision Date: 12 March 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-8078,83-8078
• Citation: 726 F.2d 1529
• Parties: 34 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 341, 33 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 34,216 Henry James HOWARD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1529

726 F.2d 1529

34 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 341,

33 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 34,216

Henry James HOWARD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 83-8078.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

March 12, 1984.

John D. Allen, Columbus, Ga., for plaintiff-appellant.

William F. Gardner, Birmingham, Ala., James F. Humes, II, Columbus, Ga., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia.

Before GODBOLD, Chief Judge, RONEY and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.

KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal, plaintiff Henry James Howard challenges the district court's orders granting summary judgment in favor of, and awarding court costs and attorney's fees to, defendant Roadway Express, Inc. in an action under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e and section 1981, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981. The case presents three issues: (1) whether Howard's charge under Title VII was filed with the EEOC in timely fashion and whether his section 1981 claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations; (2) whether his lawsuit was barred by the doctrine of laches; and (3) whether there was no discrimination as a matter of law. We conclude that the court below erred in granting summary judgment with respect to Howard's claim under Title VII and his claim for equitable relief under section 1981. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings, and vacate the award of costs and fees to Roadway Express.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Howard, a black male, was employed by Roadway Express on a part-time basis from 1972 to 1976. In May 1976, he applied for regular employment as a pickup and delivery driver, and was required to take a polygraph test. His application was rejected in July of that year, and he has not since worked for Roadway Express. Franklin Wilborn, a black male, was hired for regular employment in June 1977.

In December 1976, Howard filed a charge with the EEOC. Daniel Gunn, Roadway Express' vice-president for employee and labor relations at the time, acknowledged receipt of the charge in January 1977. In 1978, Howard's attorney requested issuance of a right-to-sue letter and then withdrew the request. Also that year, Jerry Flynt, the Roadway Express employee responsible for handling Howard's application, died. In December 1981, the EEOC determined that there was no reasonable cause to believe Howard's allegations of racial discrimination and issued a Notice of Right to Sue.

The action giving rise to this appeal was filed in March 1982 in the Middle District of Alabama and was later transferred to the Middle District of Georgia. In his complaint, Howard alleged, inter alia, that because of his race he had been subjected to conditions for full-time employment to which similarly situated whites had not been subjected, i.e., polygraph examination, and that Roadway Express had maintained a pattern and practice of discrimination for several years continuing up to the time of his application. In November 1982, Roadway Express filed a motion for summary judgment accompanied by affidavits supporting its contention that the action was time-barred. In its order of December 28, 1982, the district court ruled that Howard's claims were barred by the doctrine of laches and, in the alternative, that there was no discrimination inasmuch as the person selected for the position Howard sought was black. In its supplemental order of January 26, 1983, the court awarded Roadway Express court costs and attorney's fees totaling $5,289.95, for which Howard and his attorney were adjudged jointly and severally liable.

II. THE PERIOD FOR FILING EEOC CHARGE AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Roadway Express' assertion that the Title VII claim was precluded by Howard's failure to file a timely EEOC charge was not discussed by the district court and may be disposed of quickly on appeal. Under Sec. 706(e) of the statute, "[a] charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred ...." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(e). In its brief in support of its motion for summary judgment, Roadway Express conceded that "the plaintiff's charge in December 1976 came ... within 180 days following July 1976 when his application for regular employment was rejected." However, it added that, as shown by his deposition testimony, the complaint was actually based on Roadway Express' passing over Howard in favor of another person in 1973, some three years preceding the EEOC filing. We conclude that the deposition does not support Roadway Express' characterization of the complaint; rather, the alleged unlawful employment practice was the rejection of Howard's application on the basis of race following the discriminatory administration of a polygraph test in 1976. The EEOC charge at issue, therefore, was timely filed.

Roadway Express' contention that the section 1981 claim was precluded by the applicable statute of limitations is partially meritorious. As a general rule, where there is no federal statute of limitations expressly applicable to a federal claim, the most closely analogous statute of limitations under state law applies. DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2287, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983). Because section 1981 contains no express limitations period, the controlling period is ordinarily taken from the law of the state in which the action was filed. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1721, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975); Scarlett v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co., 676 F.2d 1043, 1050 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982); Whatley v. Department of Education, 673 F.2d 873, 874 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). Although the present action was originally filed in Alabama, the events from which the case arose occurred in Georgia, and venue was changed to the Middle District of Georgia. As Georgia was the forum state, we look to its law for the appropriate statute of limitations. See Scarlett, 676 F.2d at 1051.

Employment discrimination actions under section 1981 most closely resemble state-law "suits for the enforcement of rights accruing to individuals under statutes" and therefore are governed by section 9-3-22 of the Georgia Code. Stafford v. Muscogee County Board of Education, 688 F.2d 1383, 1389 (11th Cir.1982); Scarlett, 676 F.2d at 1050-51; Whatley, 673 F.2d at 877. Section 9-3-22 provides:

All actions for the enforcement of rights accruing to individuals under statutes or acts of incorporation or by operation of law shall be brought within 20 years after the right of action has accrued; provided, however, that all actions for the recovery of wages, overtime, or damages and penalties accruing under laws respecting the payment of wages and overtime shall be brought within two years after the right of action has accrued.

6 Ga.Code Sec. 9-3-22 (1982).

Howard seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as well as damages for "earnings, wages, and other benefits." In such a situation, the state statute "must be applied in a bifurcated manner so that an action for equitable relief is barred only after 20 years, but an action for back pay is barred after only 2 years." Stafford, 688 F.2d at 1389 (quoting Whatley, 673 F.2d at 877). Because this suit was filed over five years after the right of action accrued, Howard's section 1981 claim for back pay was barred; ¹ his claim for equitable relief, however, was not barred by the statute of limitations.

III. LACHES

Even where the legal limitations periods have not run, the equitable doctrine of laches is applicable to Title VII and section 1981 actions brought by private plaintiffs. Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249, 1256 (5th Cir.1979), aff'd on other grounds, 452 U.S. 89, 101 S.Ct. 2193, 68 L.Ed.2d 693 (1981). "To apply laches in a particular case, the court must find both that the plaintiff delayed inexcusably in bringing the suit and that this delay unduly prejudiced defendants." EEOC v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 668 F.2d 1199, 1202 (11th Cir.1982) (quoting Bernard, 596 F.2d at 1256) (emphasis added). Under this two-part analysis, the doctrine of laches does not apply to Howard's claims.

Roadway Express, like the defendants in Bernard, emphasizes the plaintiff's early knowledge of his cause of action and his ability to obtain a right-to-sue letter as indicative of inexcusable delay. Like the plaintiffs in that case, Howard asserts his right to await completion of the EEOC administrative process. Thus we are confronted with the issue "whether plaintiff['s] failure to file a private action until after the termination of the EEOC's active, continuing administrative process is unreasonable." 596 F.2d at 1256.

In Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 97 S.Ct. 2447, 53 L.Ed.2d 402 (1977), the Supreme Court observed, "[w]hen Congress first enacted Title VII in 1964 it selected '[c]ooperation and voluntary compliance ... as the preferred means for achieving' the goal of equality of employment opportunities." Id. at 367-68, 97 S.Ct. at 2455. This preference for the administrative resolution of claims is also reflected in the legislative history of the 1972 amendments to Title VII:

It is hoped that recourse to the private lawsuit will be the exception and not the rule, and that the vast majority of complaints will be handled through the offices of the EEOC or the Attorney General as appropriate. However, as the individual's right to redress are [sic] paramount under the provisions of Title VII it is necessary that all avenues be left open for quick and effective relief.

118 Cong.Rec. 7565 (1972).

We agree with the former Fifth Circuit's conclusion that:

[T]he private remedy allowed by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1) is only an alternative method for a plaintiff to obtain relief from discrimination. A plaintiff cannot be penalized for choosing to forego...