Howard v. Steris Corp.

• Decision Date: 17 August 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:10–cv–932–MEF.
• Citation: 886 F.Supp.2d 1279
• Parties: Joseph HOWARD, Plaintiff, v. STERIS CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

886 F.Supp.2d 1279

Joseph HOWARD, Plaintiff,
v.
STERIS CORPORATION, Defendant.

Case No. 2:10–cv–932–MEF.

United States District Court,
M.D. Alabama,
Northern Division.

Aug. 17, 2012.

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John Mark Englehart, Englehart Law Offices, M. Wayne Sabel, Sr., Sabel & Sabel, P.C., Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff.

[886 F.Supp.2d 1283]

Christopher T. Van Dyke, Brandon M. Cordell, Jackson Lewis LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant.

Memorandum Opinion & Order
MARK E. FULLER, District Judge.
I. Introduction

Joseph Howard (“Howard”) filed suit against his former employer, STERIS Corporation (“STERIS”), claiming disability and age discrimination. Now the case comes before the Court on two motions filed by STERIS. The first is a garden variety motion for summary judgment that contests the sufficiency of the evidence produced by Howard. (ECF No. 26.) The second asks for summary judgment on collateral estoppel grounds. (ECF No. 28.) For the reasons discussed below, the former is due to be GRANTED and the latter DENIED.

II. Jurisdiction & Venue

The Court has jurisdiction over Howard's claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and § 1343 (civil rights). The parties do not claim that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them, nor do they dispute that venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). The Court finds adequate allegations supporting both contentions.

III. Summary Judgment Standard

A motion for summary judgment looks to “pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). A court should grant summary judgment when the pleadings and supporting materials show that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and that the moving party deserves judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying” the relevant documents that “it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). To shoulder this burden, the moving party can present evidence to this effect. Id. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Or it can show that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it ultimately bears the burden of proof. Id.

If the moving party meets its burden, the non-movant must then designate, by affidavits, depositions, admissions, and answers to interrogatories, specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593–94 (11th Cir.1995). A genuine issue of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in his or her favor. Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir.2001). Thus, summary judgment requires the nonmoving party to “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348. A plaintiff, indeed, must present evidence demonstrating that he can establish the basic elements of his claim, Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, because “conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value” at the summary judgment stage. Evers v. Gen. Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir.1985).

A court ruling on a motion for summary judgment must believe the non-movant's evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. It also must draw all justifiable

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inferences from the evidence in the nonmoving party's favor. Id. After the nonmoving party has responded to the motion, the court must grant summary judgment if there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party deserves judgment as a matter of law. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

IV. Factual & Procedural Background A. Background—STERIS Corporation and Joseph Howard

STERIS Corporation makes surgical tables, cabinets, and lights at its facility in Montgomery, Alabama. (Thomas Aff. ¶ 4, ECF No. 27–1.) Malcolm McBride (“McBridge”)—known as “Mac” to STERIS's employees—served as the Montgomery facility's Director of Operations. (McBride Dep. 19–21, ECF Nos. 27–2 to –3.) In this position, he was the final decisionmaker on all matters related to employee discipline. ( Id. at 20–21.) Ken Thomas (“Thomas”) worked at the Montgomery facility, too, and was the Senior Human Resources Manager there. (Thomas Aff. ¶ 2.)

Joseph Howard began working for STERIS as a grinder in 1985. (Howard Dep. 53, ECF Nos. 27–15 to –20.) Four year later, he moved to assembler, a position in the Case Work Department. ( Id. at 57.) There he built the upper and lower heating units on medical warming cabinets, which hospitals use to store warm towels and blankets. ( Id. at 63–65.)

From 2003 to 2009, Howard reported to supervisor Jimmy Williams (“Williams”). ( Id. at 58–60.) The two got along fine during that time. ( Id. at 60.) His coworkers in the Case Work Department were Randy Bush, Mike Rucker, and Tommy Skipper. ( Id. at 59.) The men typically built the warming cabinets on a small assembly line called a “cell.” ( Id. at 64.) The cell had four different work stations, each used for assembling a different part of the cabinets. ( Id. at 65–67.)

B. STERIS's rules, regulations, and policies

STERIS distributed the company's Montgomery Employee Handbook to all of its employees at the Montgomery facility. The manual contained a comprehensive set of policies related to discrimination in the work place. It touched on discrimination based on race, color, religion, ancestry, age, sex, national origin, disability, and any other characteristic protected by law:

It is the policy of STERIS Corporation to provide a workplace free from illegal discrimination. All employment decisions at STERIS will be based on merit, qualifications, and abilities without regard to race, color, religion, ancestry, age, sex, national origin or disability. Discrimination against any individual on these bases or any other characteristic protected by law is prohibited and will not be tolerated. This affects decisions including but not limited to recruitment and selection, placement, training, compensation, benefits, promotions, transfers, terminations from employment, and other aspects of employment.

STERIS Corporation will make reasonable accommodations for qualified individuals with known disabilities unless doing so would result in an undue hardship.

(Thomas Aff. ¶ 5, Ex. A.) STERIS even had a separate policy discussing its commitment to compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act:

It is the policy and practice of STERIS Corporation to comply fully with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and ensure equal opportunity in employment for all qualified persons with disabilities. STERIS is committed to ensuring nondiscrimination in all terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. Employment practices and activities

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will be conducted in a nondiscriminatory manner.

STERIS is committed to taking actions necessary to ensure equal employment opportunity for persons with disabilities in accordance with the ADA and other applicable federal, state, and local laws.

( Id. at ¶ 6, Ex. B.)

The Montgomery Employee Handbook also listed work rules, discussed appropriate workplace conduct, and addressed discipline for violations. To this end, it listed examples of employee misconduct that might result in immediate termination, specifically including “sleeping on the job” in that section. ( Id. at ¶ 7, Ex. C.) Yet STERIS declined to write rigid rules or use a zero tolerance approach to violations, opting instead to reserve the right to make decisions “in a manner other than provided in this section.” (Thomas Dep. Ex. 16; McBride Dep. 53–54.)

This gave McBride, the final decisionmaker on disciplinary matters, some flexibility to weigh the specific circumstances and create precedent for discipline. (McBride Dep. 54.) One rule that emerged was that anyone caught sleeping on the job would be fired after the first offense—but only if two supervisors independently confirmed the violation. (Thomas Aff. ¶ 8; Thomas Dep. 59–60, 74, ECF Nos. 27–4 to–14.) STERIS followed this policy consistently. (Thomas Aff. ¶ 9; McBride Dep. 41, 47–48.) For example, in 2002, STERIS fired Gary Teel, Danny Bryant, and Harold Jones for sleeping in the job. (Thomas Aff. ¶ 9; Thomas Dep. 72–74.) When STERIS fired them, the men were 39, 48, and 49 years old, respectively; none of them had a known disability. (Thomas Aff. ¶ 9.)

C. Howard's medical history

Howard had issues with daytime sleepiness and difficulty sleeping at night ever since he attended high school. (Howard Dep. 101–04.) He first sought treatment for these problems in 1973 when he visited his physician, Dr. James Capel. ( Id. at 101.) Dr. Capel told Howard that he might have narcolepsy and gave him some caffeine pills to combat his drowsiness. ( Id. at 102, 105–06.) He also told Howard that he had “vampire tendencies” because he could stay up all night and sleep all day. ( Id. at 102.) Dr. Capel never created a record documenting either finding. ( Id. at 106.)

Howard did not seek treatment again for his sleeping issues until February of 2009—more than 30 years after seeing Dr. Capel. ( Id. at 109–10.) Howard's condition had worsened since his initial visit: he “could not sleep at night, could not stay alert,” and “would drift during [ ] idle time” at work. ( Id. at 110.) By midyear, Howard was only getting four to five hours of sleep a night ( id. at 172), and he experienced dizziness, headaches, and had difficulty concentrating during the day ( id. at 141).

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