Howe v. Larson
| Citation | 68 S.D. 204,299 N.W. 876 |
| Decision Date | 09 September 1941 |
| Docket Number | 8442 |
| Parties | MERRITT J. HOWE, Administrator of the Estate of Perry E. Howe, deceased, v. JAMES LARSON, Administrator of the Estate of George W. Wright, deceased, and B. O. Stordahl, et al. Appellants. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Minnehaha County, SD
#8442—Reversed
Robert G. May, Sioux Falls, SD
Attorney for Appellant.
Odin R. Davis, Sioux Falls, SD
Attorney for Respondents.
Opinion filed September 9, 1941
The defendant, B. O. Stordahl, appeals from a judgment quieting title to real property in plaintiffs.
The facts are not in dispute. Plaintiffs’ title is derived through George W. Wright, deceased. At the time of Wright’s death, the property was occupied as a family homestead. He died intestate in 1921 and was survived by a wife and children. Thereafter, the widow continued to occupy the property as a homestead until December 31, 1932, at which time she vacated the property and joined in a warranty deed thereof conveying title thereto to her father, Perry E. Howe. The plaintiffs, other than the administrator of the estate of Perry E. Howe, are heirs at law of Mr. Howe, who also died intestate. At the time of the death of Wright the property did not exceed in either area or value the limitations fixed by statute dealing with the family homestead. On the 23d day of December, 1921, an administrator of the estate of George W. Wright was appointed by the county court of Minnehaha County. In the course of that proceeding the county court entered an order allowing the defendant, Stordahl, a claim against the estate for $175 for attorney fees as a part of the expenses of administration. No appeal was perfected from that order. Other claims allowed have not been paid, and it is not shown that the estate is ready to be closed. Little remains of the estate except the property under consideration.
As indicated, the learned trial court decreed title in plaintiffs free of the described claim of defendant.
By apt answer and objections at the trial defendant contended that the county court of Minnehaha County had acquired jurisdiction of the subject matter in the above described proceedings in the probate of the estate of George W. Wright, deceased, and that no circumstances are shown to exist warranting the circuit court in interfering with those proceedings, or in exercising its equitable powers over the administration of the estate of a decedent. The adverse rulings of the trial court upon these objections are assigned as erroneous.
The defendant invokes two well settled principles. The circuit court will not assume jurisdiction of the administration of the estate of a decedent under its ancient equitable powers until exceptional circumstances are shown indicating that the county court is incompetent to afford adequate relief. Trotter et al. v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass’n et al., 9 SD 596, 70 NW 843, 62 AmStRep 887; Ward v. Du Pree et al., 16 SD 500, 94 NW 397; Welsh et al. v. Krause, 38 SD 264, 161 NW 189; Jacquish v. Deming et al., 40 SD 265, 167 NW 157; Haugen et al. v. Peterson et al., 63 SD 492, 260 NW 826; Song et al. v. Song, 64 SD 555, 268 NW 905. When a court of competent jurisdiction undertakes to deal with the subject matter of a case its authority continues, subject only to appellate authority, until the matter is finally and completely disposed of, and no court of co-ordinate authority is at liberty to interfere. This second principle, which but seeks to promote an orderly and dignified procedure, yields to the more vital and fundamental principle of justice which affirms that every litigant shall be accorded his day before a tribunal competent to afford adequate and complete relief. 14 AmJur 436. So it appears that the competency of the county court to deal adequately and completely with plaintiffs’ rights is the determining factor in the proper application of both principles advanced by defendant.
The real controversy between plaintiffs and defendant requires a construction of our statutes dealing with the family homestead to determine whether the Legislature intended that a husband’s property, not exceeding in value or area the limits fixed by law for such a homestead, which is occupied as such at the time of the death of the husband, and thereafter by the surviving wife, should be charged with the expenses of administration of his estate while so occupied by the wife, or that it should be so charged, if during the course of the probate proceeding the wife vacates the property and...
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