Howe v. Larson

• Decision Date: 09 September 1941
• Docket Number: 8442.
• Citation: 299 N.W. 876,68 S.D. 203
• Parties: HOWE et al. v. LARSON et al.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

299 N.W. 876

68 S.D. 203

HOWE et al. v. LARSON et al.

No. 8442.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

September 9, 1941

Appeal from Circuit Court, Minnehaha County; Lucius J. Wall, Judge.

Suit to quiet title by Merritt J. Howe, as administrator of the estate of Perry E. Howe, deceased, and as an individual, and others against James Larson, as administrator of the estate of George W. Wright, deceased, also known as G. W. Wright, B O. Stordahl, and others. From a judgment quieting title in the plaintiffs, B. O. Stordahl appeals.

Judgment reversed, and cause remanded, with directions to dismiss the complaint as to the appellant.

Robert G. May, of Sioux Falls, for appellant.

Odin R. Davis, of Sioux Falls, for respondents.

SMITH Judge.

The defendant, B. O. Stordahl, appeals from a judgment quieting title to real property in plaintiffs.

The facts are not in dispute. Plaintiffs' title is deraigned through George W. Wright, deceased. At the time of Wright's death, the property was occupied as a family homestead. He died intestate in 1921 and was survived by a wife and children. Thereafter, the widow continued to occupy the property as a homestead until December 31, 1932, at which time she vacated the property and joined in a warranty deed thereof conveying title thereto to her father, Perry E. Howe. The plaintiffs, other than the administrator of the estate of Perry E. Howe, are heirs at law of Mr. Howe, who also died intestate. At the time of the death of Wright the property did not exceed in either area or value the limitations fixed by statute dealing with the family homestead. On the 23d day of December, 1921, an administrator of the estate of George W. Wright was appointed by the county court of Minnehaha County. In the course of that proceeding the county court entered an order allowing the defendant, Stordahl, a claim against the estate for $175 for attorney fees as a part of the expenses of administration. No appeal was perfected from that order. Other claims allowed have not been paid, and it is not shown that the estate is ready to be closed. Little remains of the estate except the property under consideration.

As indicated, the learned trial court decreed title in plaintiffs free of the described claim of defendant.

By apt answer and objections at the trial defendant contended that the county court of Minnehaha County had acquired jurisdiction of the subject matter in the above described proceedings in the probate of the estate of George W. Wright deceased, and that no circumstances are shown to exist warranting the circuit court in interfering with those proceedings, or in exercising its equitable powers over the administration of the estate of a decedent. The adverse rulings of the trial court upon these objections are assigned as erroneous.

The defendant invokes two well settled principles. The circuit court will not assume jurisdiction of the administration of the estate of a decedent under its ancient equitable powers until exceptional circumstances are shown indicating that the county court is incompetent to afford adequate relief. Trotter et al. v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n et al., 9 S.D. 596, 70 N.W. 843, 62 Am.St.Rep. 887; Ward v. Du Pree et al., 16 S.D. 500, 94 N.W. 397; Welsh et al. v. Krause, 38 S.D. 264, 161 N.W. 189; Jacquish v. Deming et al., 40 S.D. 265, 167 N.W 157; Haugen et al. v. Peterson et al., 63 S.D. 492, 260 N.W. 826; Song et al. v. Song, 64 S.D. 555, 268 N.W. 905. When a court of competent jurisdiction undertakes to deal with the subject matter of a case its authority continues, subject only to appellate authority, until the matter is finally and completely disposed of, and no court of co-ordinate authority is at liberty to interfere. This second principle, which but seeks to promote an orderly and dignified procedure, yields to the more vital and fundamental principle of justice which affirms that every litigant shall be accorded his day before a tribunal competent to afford adequate and complete relief. 14 Am. Jur. 436. So it appears that the competency of the county court to deal adequately and completely with plaintiffs' rights is the determining factor in the proper application of both principles advanced by defendant.

The real controversy between plaintiffs and defendant requires a construction of our statutes dealing with the family homestead to determine whether the Legislature intended that a husband's property, not exceeding in value or area the limits fixed by law for such a homestead, which is occupied as such at the time of the death...