Howe v. Young

• Decision Date: 07 June 1861
• Citation: 16 Ind. 312
• Parties: Howe v. Young
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

16 Ind. 312

Howe v. Young

Supreme Court of Indiana

June 7, 1861

APPEAL from the Ripley Circuit Court.

The judgment is reversed, with costs. Cause remanded for further proceedings.

E. Dumont and G. Durbin, for the appellant.

OPINION

Perkins, J.

The following complaint was filed before a justice of the peace of Ripley county:

"William H. Howe, plaintiff, complains of Nicholas Young, defendant, and says the defendant on the 13th day of July 1859, at said county of Ripley, did mischievously cause to be injured the horse and buggy of the plaintiff, by driving his, said defendant's, horses and wagon along the public highway in a fast, improper, and reckless manner; thereby causing so loud a noise as to frighten, and otherwise frightening by such fast, reckless and improper driving, the horse of plaintiff, stationed and securely fastened along the side of said highway, where the plaintiff had a right to station his horse and buggy, so as to cause the plaintiff's horse to run away and break the buggy of plaintiff, to which he was harnessed, to the damage of the horse and buggy of $ 75." Wherefore plaintiff sues and demands judgment for $ 75. A demurrer was sustained to this complaint before the justice, and again on appeal to the Circuit Court.

This suit having originated before a justice, the same fullness, certainty and formality of statement is not required, as is demanded in complaints in the superior courts. 11 Ind. 203; 9 id. 502, 522; 6 id. 78; 3 id. 513; 2 id, 551, 636; 4 Blackf. p. 179, 420; 2 id. 237.

We think the complaint in this case alleges a cause of action. See 2 Hill. on Torts, p. 506. If a party does a wrongful act, or a rightful one in a negligent, wrongful manner, whereby injury happens to another, such act being the proximate cause, the party committing the act may be liable for the injury. And negligence has been defined to "consist in the omitting to do something that a reasonable man would do, or the doing something that a reasonable man would not do; in either case causing, unintentionally, mischief to a third party." 1 Hill. on Torts, p. 124.

The cases of Wright v. Brown, 4 Ind. 95; and The Pittsburgh, &c. Co. v. Karns, 13 Ind. 87, seem to be in point with that at bar. See, also, Wright v. Gaff, 6 Ind. 416; and Durham v. Musselman, 2 Blackf. p. 96.

Per Curiam.

The judgment is reversed, with costs. Cause remanded for further proceedings.