Howell v. Holland

Decision Date23 February 2015
Docket NumberCivil Action No.: 4:13-cv-00295-RBH
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
PartiesJames Odell Howell, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Dr. Fred Holland; McLeod Regional Medical Center of the Pee Dee, Inc., Defendants.
ORDER

This case was originally filed in the Court of Common Pleas for Florence County, South Carolina. Plaintiff, James Odell Howell, Jr., alleged claims against Defendant, Dr. Fred Holland ("Dr. Holland") and McLeod Regional Medical Center of the Pee Dee, Inc. ("McLeod"). Against McLeod, Plaintiff alleged a federal employment discrimination and retaliation claim pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. and a state law wrongful discharge claim under South Carolina's Workers' Compensation Statute, S.C. Code Ann. § 41-1-80 et seq. Against Dr. Holland, Plaintiff alleged state law claims for assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional interference with economic relations, and negligence/negligence per se. McLeod removed the case to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, on February 1, 2013.

Pending before the Court are: 1) McLeod's [Docket Entry #55] motion for summary judgment; 2) Dr. Holland's [Docket Entry #56] motion for summary judgment; and 3) Plaintiff's [Docket Entry #57] motion for summary judgment. This matter is before the court with the Report and Recommendation [Docket Entry #92] of Magistrate Judge Thomas E. Rogers filed on August12, 2014.1 The Magistrate Judge recommended that McLeod's motion for summary judgment be granted as to Plaintiff's ADA claims and that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be denied as to the ADA claims. The Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all remaining state law claims, including the claims on which Dr. Holland moved for summary judgment, and remand the case to the Florence County Court of Common Pleas for further adjudication. Plaintiff timely filed objections [Docket Entry #94] to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation and McLeod filed a reply to Plaintiff's objections. Neither Dr. Holland nor McLeod filed any objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation.

Standard of Review

The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to the Court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight. The responsibility to make a final determination remains with the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The Court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the R & R to which specific objection is made, and the Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The right to de novo review may be waived by the failure to file timely objections. Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). The Court need not conduct a de novo review when a party makes only "general and conclusory objections that do not direct the [C]ourt to a specific error in the [M]agistrate's proposed findings and recommendations." Id. Moreover, in the absence ofobjections to the R & R, the Court is not required to give any explanation for adopting the recommendation. Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983). However, in the absence of objections, the Court must "'satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).

Summary Judgment Standard

"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (2010). "A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . .; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). When no genuine issue of any material fact exists, summary judgment is appropriate. See Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1011 (4th Cir. 1991). The facts and inferences to be drawn from the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. However, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).

"Once the moving party has met [its] burden, the nonmoving party must come forward with some evidence beyond the mere allegations contained in the pleadings to show that there is a genuine issue for trial." Baber v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 874-75 (4th Cir. 1992). The nonmoving party may not rely on beliefs, conjecture, unsupported speculation, or conclusoryallegations to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Baber, 977 F.2d at 875. Rather, the nonmoving party is required to submit evidence of specific facts by way of affidavits, depositions, interrogatories, or admissions to demonstrate the existence of a genuine and material factual issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

Factual Background

In 1989, Plaintiff became employed by McLeod as a staff perfusionist. A perfusionist operates the heart and lung machine during open heart surgeries and is responsible for the blood supply to the patient while on bypass. Plaintiff's employment necessarily required him to work closely with open heart surgeons. In either 2000 or 2001, Plaintiff was promoted to Director of Perfusionists at McLeod. In 2007, Dr. Holland joined the cardiothoracic surgical group at McLeod and began working with Plaintiff in the operating room. Plaintiff and Dr. Holland appeared to others to have a good working relationship and also exercised together at the McLeod Health and Fitness Center.

Plaintiff testified and alleged, however, that in April of 2010, he was afraid for his personal safety and the safety of patients while he was working under Dr. Holland's direction. Plaintiff testified that he had seen outbursts by Dr. Holland and confrontations between Dr. Holland and other physicians, during which Dr. Holland used profanity. On one occasion, Dr. Holland approached Plaintiff in a manner that made Plaintiff feel threatened. During an internal investigation into Dr. Holland's conduct arising from another former employee's complaints, other employees of McLeod voiced concerns or complaints about Dr. Holland's conduct.

In September of 2011, Plaintiff raised a concern about Dr. Holland's use of a "pump sucker" device during an open-heart surgery. Plaintiff spoke to Dr. Michael Rose, Vice President ofSurgical Services, about the issue. Dr. Rose sent a letter to Dr. Holland outlining the concerns raised by Plaintiff. Upon receipt of the letter from Dr. Rose, Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Holland called Plaintiff and was extremely aggressive and abusive over the phone. Plaintiff testified and alleged that Dr. Holland essentially told Plaintiff in a very threatening way to watch his back.

After the threatening phone call, Plaintiff informed Shannon Carr, Human Resource Manager, that he refused to work with Dr. Holland. As the Director of Perfusionists, Plaintiff was able to change the perfusionist schedule to avoid working with Dr. Holland. However, because Dr. Holland was performing eighty percent of the open heart surgeries at the time, Plaintiff's caseload was substantially reduced creating a hardship on the other perfusionists, who were left to handle eighty percent of all open heart cases.

From September 2011 through November 2011, McLeod conducted a second internal investigation into the work environment in the cardiovascular operating room. The investigation concluded that the cardiovascular operating room was not a hostile work environment and an equal number of people complained about Dr. Jones, the other cardiothoracic surgeon, as complained about Dr. Holland.

On October 24, 2011, Dr. Holland sent Plaintiff a letter apologizing for the threatening phone call.

Plaintiff first sought treatment for anxiousness, sleeplessness, weight loss, and depression on October 27, 2011. Dr. Krista Kozacki assessed Plaintiff with acute stress and fatigue/malaise. Dr. Kozacki took Plaintiff out of work until January 2, 2012, and recommended Plaintiff obtain legal advice. Plaintiff was placed on medical leave pursuant to the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") beginning November 28, 2011.

In January of 2012, Plaintiff applied for workers' compensation benefits. McLeod admitted that Plaintiff sustained a work place mental injury and was in need of additional treatment. Plaintiff also filed complaints with the S.C. Board of Medical Examiners and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.

On January 30, 2012, Plaintiff's counsel formally requested accommodations pursuant to the ADA that he not be required or scheduled to work with Dr. Holland. On January 31, 2012, McLeod responded that Plaintiff could return to his regular full duties as Director of Perfusionists and Dr. Irvin would accompany Plaintiff for a limited time in the operating room when Plaintiff was required to work with Dr. Holland. McLeod also responded that Plaintiff could take a leave of absence in accordance with McLeod's Leave of Absence policy until he was comfortable returning to perform the essential functions of his position, which would include working with Dr. Holland. Under McLeod's Leave of Absence policy, Plaintiff could extend his leave of absence beyond FMLA leave until...

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