Howell v. State
| Citation | 707 So.2d 674 |
| Decision Date | 12 February 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 85193,85193 |
| Parties | 23 Fla. L. Weekly S90 Paul HOWELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender; and Robert A. Norgard, Bartow, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General and Richard B. Martell, Chief, Capital Appeals, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
We have on appeal the judgment and sentence of the trial court imposing the death penalty upon Paul Howell. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
In January of 1992, Howell constructed a bomb for the specific purpose of killing Tammie Bailey at her home in Marianna, Florida. Bailey, Howell, and Howell's brother, Patrick, were part of a drug ring involving a number of other individuals in which drugs were obtained in Fort Lauderdale and then sold in Marianna, Florida. Howell intended to eliminate Bailey as a witness because she had knowledge that could link Howell and his brother to a prior murder. The bomb was placed inside a microwave oven and then the oven was gift-wrapped. Howell paid Lester Watson to drive and deliver the microwave to Bailey. Although he knew that Howell had often made pipe bombs, Watson testified that he thought the microwave contained drugs. Howell rented a car for Watson to use for the trip. Watson was accompanied on the trip by Curtis Williams.
While traveling on I-10 toward Marianna, Watson was stopped by Trooper Jimmy Fulford for speeding. Fulford ran a registration check on the car and a license check on Watson, who gave the trooper a false name and birth date because he did not have a valid driver's license. The radio dispatcher contacted the car rental company and was informed that Howell had rented the car. The dispatcher contacted Howell at his home in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, to determine whether the rental car had been stolen from him. Howell told the dispatcher that he had loaned the car to Watson but did not know that Watson would be traveling so far with the vehicle. Howell was informed by the dispatcher that Watson was going to be taken to the Jefferson County Jail. Howell did not give any warning to the dispatcher regarding the bomb.
Deputies Harrell and Blount of the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department arrived at the scene and Watson gave them permission to search the vehicle. Trooper Fulford and the deputies observed the gift-wrapped microwave in the trunk of the car. Watson was arrested for speeding and driving without a valid driver's license and was transported, along with Williams, to the jail by Deputy Blount. Deputy Harrell also proceeded to the jail, leaving Trooper Fulford alone with the rental car. Shortly thereafter, a massive explosion took place at the scene. Testimony presented at Howell's trial by the State's explosives expert indicated that Trooper Fulford had been holding the microwave in his hands when the bomb went off. Trooper Fulford died instantly due to the massive trauma caused by the explosion.
Howell was arrested and charged with Trooper Fulford's murder. Frank Sheffield, a private attorney, was appointed to represent Howell due to a conflict of interest asserted by the Public Defender's Office for the Second Judicial Circuit. Venue of the trial was transferred from Jefferson County to Escambia County.
The jury found Howell guilty of first-degree murder and of making, possessing, placing Howell raises one guilt-phase issue and eight penalty-phase issues on appeal.
or discharging a destructive device or bomb. The jury also returned a special verdict finding that the charge of first-degree murder was established by both proof of premeditated design and felony murder. At the penalty phase, the jury recommended death by a vote of ten to two. The trial court found that the following aggravators applied to the murder: (1) Howell knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons; (2) the murder was committed while Howell was engaged in the unlawful making, possessing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb; (3) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest; (4) the victim was a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his official duties; and (5) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP). The trial court also found that the following statutory and nonstatutory mitigators applied: (1) Howell had no significant history of prior criminal activity; (2) the murder was committed while Howell was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (given little weight); (3) Howell had served in the military and received an honorable discharge (given little weight); (4) Howell displayed good behavior as a pretrial detainee; and (5) Howell was a good family man (deemed inconsequential). The trial court found that the enormity of the proved aggravating circumstances far outweighed the mitigating circumstances and imposed the death penalty in conformance with the jury's recommendation that Howell be sentenced to death. The trial court declined to impose a sentence on Howell's conviction for constructing the bomb because this charge and the murder charge both arose from a single underlying offense.
Howell's only point on appeal with reference to his conviction is his contention that the trial court erred in refusing to appoint different counsel for him and in refusing to appoint a second attorney. The facts surrounding this claim are set forth below.
Because of a conflict of interest asserted by the public defender's office, attorney Frank Sheffield was appointed to represent Howell in the defense of this case. Howell also faced federal charges arising out of much of the same conduct which had given rise to the State's indictment. Sheffield had also been appointed to represent Howell in defense of the federal charges. On March 18, 1993, the state attorney moved to disqualify Sheffield from this case, noting the fact that Sheffield had been allowed to withdraw from the federal prosecution. Three days before, Howell had written to the judge complaining that Sheffield had failed to communicate with him and that he wanted William Pfeiffer, who had replaced Sheffield during the federal trial, to serve as his counsel in state court and asked that attorney Clyde Taylor be appointed to assist Pfeiffer. At the hearing, the prosecutor stated that the State's motion was not predicated upon any belief that Sheffield was not rendering effective assistance but rather had been filed to bring to the court's attention that he had been relieved from representing Howell in federal court. Sheffield explained that he had received a telephone threat during the federal trial and that he had requested leave to withdraw, which had been granted. With respect to the current representation, Sheffield stated:
I am perfectly willing to continue representing Mr. Howell in this state case. I have tons and tons of discovery. We have taken depositions. I have no qualms whatsoever about my reputation as far as my abilities to represent him. I have handled over a dozen death cases. I have the experience in handling death cases, and I am more than willing to continue representing him. I see no reason why there should be a change at this point.
Judge Davey, who was then presiding over the case, asked Howell his views, and Howell stated that he did not want Sheffield to represent him because he had not shared discovery matters with him. After further examination of Sheffield's performance, the court stated that it was satisfied that Sheffield had On June 4, 1993, the State filed a motion for rehearing, attaching partial transcripts of the federal proceeding. However, this motion was not called up for hearing until November 19, 1993, at which point Judge Steinmeyer was presiding over the case. The prosecutor explained that the transcripts shed further light on the telephone incident which indicated "an apparent conflict" and that he felt that the court should inquire further of Sheffield and Howell in this respect. Sheffield then recounted some of the difficulties he had encountered during the federal proceeding and stated that under the federal practice during the trial he had been continuously served with new discovery but that Mr. Howell would not communicate with him concerning these matters, and their relationship became strained. At this point, Sheffield had obtained a psychological evaluation of Howell. The doctor reported that he was not incompetent to proceed, but that because of some perceived problem that Howell had with Sheffield at that point, he had a problem communicating with Sheffield. However, U.S. District Judge William Stafford denied Sheffield's motion to withdraw as counsel, indicating that he did not believe there were sufficient grounds to remove him. Sheffield went on to explain that on the following day his wife received a phone call at Sheffield's office from an unknown source in which the caller said that "if Paul Howell goes down, Mr. Sheffield is going down too." Sheffield explained that when he brought this to Judge Stafford's attention, the judge granted his motion for discharge. Sheffield then stated:
not been removed from the federal case due to any lack of diligence, that it found no basis to question his performance in the instant case, and noted that attorney Pfeiffer had no experience in capital cases.
Since that time Mr. Howell and I have communicated with one another. He has communicated with me in this case. This is not a case where there are [Jencks] Act rules that you have to deal with and that you don't get discovery in. We are getting discovery. We have taken depositions. I have visited him in the Broward County Jail. We have no problems between us with me continuing to represent him in this case, and the problems that were occurring at that time in the federal case no longer...
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