Howell v. Superintendent Rockview SCI

• Citation: 939 F.3d 260
• Decision Date: 17 September 2019
• Docket Number: No. 17-1758,17-1758
• Parties: Joseph HOWELL, Appellant v. SUPERINTENDENT ROCKVIEW SCI; Attorney General Pennsylvania; District Attorney Allegheny County
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

939 F.3d 260

Joseph HOWELL, Appellant
v.
SUPERINTENDENT ROCKVIEW SCI; Attorney General Pennsylvania; District Attorney Allegheny County

No. 17-1758

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued May 1, 2019
Filed: September 17, 2019

OPINION OF THE COURT

FISHER, Circuit Judge.

Criminal defendants are deprived of their Sixth Amendment right to a jury selected from a broad representation of the community when distinctive groups are systematically excluded from the jury selection process. See Duren v. Missouri , 439 U.S. 357, 363-64, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979). Because any underrepresentation in Joseph Howell’s jury pool was not caused by a systematically discriminatory process, the District Court properly denied his habeas petition alleging a Sixth Amendment violation. We will affirm.

I.

Jury selection in Howell’s 2004 prosecution consisted of two venire panels. The first included thirty-five individuals, two of whom were black but were both excused for hardship. The second panel included twenty-five potential jurors, all of whom were white. Ultimately, Howell, a black man, was convicted for the 2002 felony murder of a white man by an all-white jury.

Prior to jury selection, Howell filed a Motion to Ensure Representative Venire, arguing that he was entitled to a jury pool that represented a fair cross section of the community—Allegheny County—particularly with respect to race. The trial court held a hearing on Howell’s allegations that black individuals were systemically under-represented in Allegheny County’s jury pools, during which it adopted the record from two other cases where defendants also raised a fair-cross-section challenge. The incorporated record included expert testimony from Dr. John F. Karns, a sociologist, regarding the racial statistics and demography of Allegheny County.

Dr. Karns’ testimony expounded on demographic data gathered over a six-month period in 2001, over a ten-day period in 2002, and from the 2000 census. The 2001 study was based on data gathered by the firm Gentile Meinert & Associates and interpreted by Dr. Karns. Gentile Meinert & Associates provided prospective jurors (individuals who appeared for jury selection pursuant to a summons) with a paper survey

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that asked questions about their race, age, and gender. From this study, which surveyed approximately 4500 potential jurors, Dr. Karns calculated that black individuals made up 4.87% of Allegheny County’s jury pool. He also found that black individuals made up 10.7% of the population of Allegheny County eligible for jury service. Based on these numbers, Dr. Karns concluded that "whites [were] overrepresented" in jury pools, resulting in systematic exclusion of "a significant number of people for a significant time." App. at 112, 127. Despite this conclusion, the trial court denied Howell’s motion.

An all-white jury was impaneled and found Howell guilty of felony murder. Howell moved for extraordinary relief, arguing that he should be retried by a representative jury, even if assembling the jury would require multiple venires. The trial court denied his motion; it then sentenced Howell to a mandatory sentence of life without parole.

Howell timely appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which held that Howell had not been denied a trial by a fair cross-section of the community. The Superior Court noted Dr. Karns’ testimony,¹ and identified the proper test for determining whether a fair-cross-section violation occurred. The court then concluded that Howell "fail[ed] to demonstrate ‘an actual discriminatory practice in the jury selection process,’ " and, therefore, held that Howell did not demonstrate a constitutional violation. App. at 252-54 (quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson , 576 Pa. 23, 838 A.2d 663, 682 (2003) ). The state court stated that, though the U.S. Supreme Court’s test does not require a showing of discriminatory intent, it was bound to follow Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent, which does require such a showing.

Howell filed a habeas petition based on six grounds, including his fair-cross-section claim. A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation that assumed, without deciding, "that the Superior Court erred in requiring [Howell] to show discriminatory intent," but concluded that, under de novo review, Howell failed to establish a Sixth Amendment violation. App. at 14-16. The magistrate judge compared the level of racial disparity in Howell’s case to those in other cases around the country. She concluded that, because other courts found no constitutional violation in cases with higher percentages of disparity than here, Howell could not establish his claim.

The District Court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and denied Howell’s petition. Howell now appeals.

II.

The District Court exercised subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254. We exercise appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.

The District Court did not hold an evidentiary hearing but relied exclusively on the state court record; we therefore undertake a plenary review of the District Court’s order utilizing the same standard that the District Court applied. Branch v. Sweeney , 758 F.3d 226, 232 (3d Cir. 2014).

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") dictates the parameters of our review and requires us to afford considerable deference to the state court’s legal and factual determinations.

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Lambert v. Blackwell , 387 F.3d 210, 234 (3d Cir. 2004). We may overturn a state-court holding only where it "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law," or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented." Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) ). The state court’s factual conclusions " ‘shall be presumed to be correct’ unless the petitioner rebuts ‘the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.’ " Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) ).

If the state court erred, habeas relief should be granted only if, upon de novo review, the prisoner has established that he "is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) ; see also Saranchak v. Beard , 616 F.3d 292, 301 (3d Cir. 2010).

III.

The Sixth Amendment promises all criminal defendants a trial by a "jury drawn from a pool broadly representative of the community ... as assurance of a diffused impartiality." Taylor v. Louisiana , 419 U.S. 522, 530-31, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975) (quoting Thiel v. S. Pac. Co. , 328 U.S. 217, 227, 66 S.Ct. 984, 90 L.Ed. 1181 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). A violation of this right occurs where "jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries are drawn ... exclude distinctive groups in the community." Duren , 439 U.S. at 363-64, 99 S.Ct. 664 (quoting Taylor , 419 U.S. at 538, 95 S.Ct. 692 ). Howell argues that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated by Allegheny County’s systematic exclusion of black jurors at the time of his trial.

A.

A state-court decision is "contrary to" or an "unreasonable application of" federal law if it directly conflicts with Supreme Court precedent or reaches a different result than the Supreme Court when presented with materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).

In its analysis, the state court relied on its interpretation of Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent to determine whether Howell established a prima facie violation of his right to a jury composed of a representative cross-section of his community. Quoting Commonwealth v. Estes , 851 A.2d 933 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (citing Johnson , 576 Pa. 23, 838 A.2d 663 ), the court set forth the Duren standard for establishing such a violation—that (1) an allegedly excluded group is "distinctive" in the community; (2) the group’s representation in jury-selection panels is not fair and reasonable in relation to the community’s population; and (3) the group is under-represented due to its systematic exclusion from the jury-selection process—but then went on to state that "[p]roof is required of an actual discriminatory practice in the jury selection process, not merely underrepresentation of one particular group." App. at 252-54. The state court acknowledged Howell’s argument that he was "not required to prove discriminatory intent ... under Duren ," but the court concluded that "the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held otherwise" and that it was "bound by [that] prior decision[ ]." App. at 253-54.

Irrespective of how the Superior Court reached its conclusion, that conclusion must comport with "clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) ; see also Williams , 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495 ("As the statutory

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language makes clear ... § 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly established Federal law to [the Supreme] Court’s jurisprudence."). Therefore, the question before us is whether the Superior Court’s decision is consistent with Duren and its progeny.

Duren...