Howland v. Granger
| Decision Date | 02 March 1900 |
| Parties | HOWLAND v. GRANGER, City Treasurer. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Action by Mary S. Howland against Daniel L. D. Granger, city treasurer. Judgment in favor of defendant.
Comstock & Gardner, for plaintiff.
Francis Colwell and Albert A. Baker, for defendant.
The question raised on the agreed statement of facts is whether a married woman, while the unity of the marriage relation exists undisturbed between them, can acquire a domicile other than that of her husband. In behalf of the plaintiff it is contended that she can. The contention rests on the argument that the common-law status of a married woman, by which her legal existence is suspended during the marriage, or merged in that of her husband (1 Bl. Comm. 442), has largely ceased to obtain in modern times, and especially in this state, where the law recognizes her as having a separate existence and separate rights as to her property, and consequently separate interests. After a careful examination of the authorities, however, we have come to the conclusion that, though a wife may acquire a domicile distinct from that of her husband, whenever it is necessary or proper for her to do so,—as, for instance, where the husband and wife are living apart by mutual consent (In re Florance, 54 Hun, 328, 7 N.Y. Supp. 578), or where the wife has been abandoned by the husband (Shute v. Sargent, 67 N. H. 305, 36 Atl. 282), or for purposes of divorce (Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R. I. 87), or, in short, whenever the wife has adversary interests to those of her husband,—she cannot acquire such a domicile so long as the unity of the marriage relation continues, notwithstanding that from considerations of health, as in the present case, or of expediency, one of the parties, with the consent of the other, is actually living in a different place from the other. The question was apparently carefully considered In McClellan v. Carroll (Tenn. Ch.) 42 S. W. 185. In this case the husband of the defendant Clear, who had formerly resided in Tennessee, had removed to and become a domiciled resident of Missouri. She had remained In Tennessee with the view of retaining a homestead. They had not separated. There was no disagreement between them, and neither had deserted the other. It was held that she was not a resident of Tennessee, and could not claim a homestead, for the reason that, where the relation of husband and wife exists, and the unity of the marriage state to...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Green v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation
...120 (Customs Ct.1930). Matter of Crosby, 85 Misc. (N.Y.) 679, 680--682, 148 N.Y.S. 1045 (Surr.Ct.1914). But compare Howland v. Granger, 22 R.I. 1, 2--3, 45 A. 740 (1900). In recent years the remains of the common law rule have come under increasing attack as based on 'policy reasons' which ......
-
Younger v. Gianotti
...Anderson v. Watt, 138 U.S. 694 [11 S.Ct. 449, 34 L.Ed. 1078], (1891); Barning v. Barning, 46 Pa.Super. 291 (1911); Howland v. Granger, 22 R.I. 1, 45 A. 740 (1900). Contra: McCormick v. United States, 57 Treas.Dec. 117 (1930), (1930) 9 Ore.L.Rev. 393, (1930) 78 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 780; see Rinal......
-
Gallup Am. Coal Co. v. Lira
...and the wife must conform thereto.” The home or domicile of the husband is that of his wife. We quote the following from Howland v. Granger, 22 R. I. 1, 45 A. 740: “After a careful examination of the authorities, however, we have come to the conclusion that, though a wife may acquire a domi......
-
Town of Watertown v. Greaves
... ... held to exist upon a state of facts showing unjustifiable ... desertion ... Moreover, ... the case of Howland v. Granger, 22 R.I. 2, 45 A ... 740, contains a statement by the supreme court of Rhode ... Island which seems to us satisfactory evidence that ... ...