Howle v. Camp Amon Carter
| Decision Date | 07 July 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. B--2613,B--2613 |
| Citation | 470 S.W.2d 629 |
| Parties | John W. HOWLE, Individually and as Next Friend for Johnny Howle, a Minor, Petitioner, v. CAMP AMON CARTER et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Scarborough, Black, Tarpley & Scarborough, Abilene, Wilson, Berry & Jorgenson, Dallas, Byrd, Davis, Eisenberg & Clark, Bob Roberts, Austin, for petitioner.
Strasburger, Price, Kelton, Martin & Unis, Royal H. Brin, Jr., Dallas, for respondents.
The defense urged in this case is charitable immunity, which has heretofore been recognized to a limited extent in Texas as an exception to the rule of respondeat superior. See Watkins v. Southcrest Baptist Church, Tex., 399 S.W.2d 530. We hold that, with respect to causes of action arising from events occurring after the motion for rehearing in Watkins was overruled, a charitable enterprise is subject to vicarious liability under the rule of respondeat superior applicable to business organizations operated for profit.
While attending Camp Amon Carter, an establishment operated by the Young Men's Christian Association of Fort Worth, Johnny Howle was struck in the eye by a sinker or hook attached to a fishing line cast by a fellow camper, Gary Post. As a result of this accident, which occurred in 1967, Johnny lost the sight of one eye. Suit was brought by John W. Howle, individually and as next friend for Johnny, against Gary Post, Camp Amon Carter, and the Y.M.C.A. It was alleged, among other things, that the injuries and damage sustained by Johnny were proximately caused by the negligence of camp employees in failing to supervise Gary properly and prevent his casting in the area where he was casting. After severing the cause of action asserted against Gary, the trial court sustained the motion for summary judgment of Camp Amon Carter and the Y.M.C.A. on the ground of charitable immunity. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. 462 S.W.2d 624.
The several opinions in Watkins gave ample notice that the doctrine of charitable immunity would be reconsidered and might well be abrogated. It is now completely abrogated with respect to causes of action arising from events occurring after the motion for rehearing in Watkins was overruled on March 9, 1966.
The judgments of the courts below are reversed, and the cause is remanded to the district court.
It is my opinion that the question of immunity on the part of certain described charitable institutions is a policy matter which can be better resolved by the Legislature. Courts, unlike the Legislature, are not structured to hear public witnesses on issues of policy. Courts, unlike the Legislature, are incapable of detailing the limitations which often accompany changes in policy. Following our decision in Watkins v. Southcrest Baptist Church, 399 S.W.2d 530 (Tex.1966), the Legislature in May, 1967, authorized a committee to study the problem of charitable immunity. Texas Laws 1967, House Concurrent Resolution No. 54 at p. 2883. The absence of any further action by the Legislature is subject to differing meanings, but among them is the idea that the Legislature was not impressed with the desirability of abolishing the doctrine which exempts from liability charitable institutions, such as hospitals, schools, churches, and orphanages.
Immunity from tort liability is a subject to which the Legislature has very recently addressed its attention. The 61st Legislature in 1969 enacted the Tort Claims Act which became effective on January 1 1970. 1 I, therefore, find little merit in the suggestion that the Legislature failed to abolish charitable immunity because it probably way of the opinion that the judiciary should tend to that job. If the Legislature considered charitable immunity a judicial problem, one may wonder why it did not feel the same way about governmental immunity.
The fact is that the Legislature has already...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc.
...of the wrongs from New Jersey to Texas, which no longer recognizes the doctrine of charitable immunity (see, Howle v. Camp Amon Carter, 470 S.W.2d 629 [Tex 1971] ), provides New York with no greater interest in this action than it would have without the change. Our decision recognizing a po......
-
Chrismon v. Brown
...of volunteers and do not apply to the liability of the organization for acts or omissions of volunteers."); Howle v. Camp Anion Carter, 470 S.W.2d 629, 630 (Tex. 1971) (abolishing common-law doctrine of charitable immunity and holding that a charitable enterprise is subject to vicarious lia......
-
Jeffcoat v. Phillips
...injuries negligently inflicted by an employee of the hospital acting within the course and scope of his employment. Howle v. Camp Amon Carter, 470 S.W.2d 629 (Tex.Sup.1971). Secondly, a hospital may be liable for the breach of duties which the institution owes directly. Medical & Surgical M......
-
Doctor v. Pardue
...relevant policies of the forum, we note that Texas has abolished the common-law doctrine of charitable immunity. Howle v. Camp Amon Carter, 470 S.W.2d 629, 630 (Tex.1971); Sprague v. Mem'l Baptist Hosp. Sys., 580 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Howeve......