Howze v. Magee
| Decision Date | 21 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 221-CV-36-KS-MTP,2:21-CV-40-KS-MTP |
| Parties | CAROL HOWZE, et al. PLAINTIFFS v. PAUL F. MAGEE, et al. DEFENDANTS TYLER CARRUTH PLAINTIFF v. OFFICER PAUL F. MAGEE, et al. DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
For the reasons provided below, the Court grants Plaintiff Howze and T.H.'s Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss [36] their federal claims, declines to exercise pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiff Howze and T.H.'s state-law claims, grants in part and denies in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [26], and declines to exercise pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiff Tyler Carruth's state-law claims. Accordingly this case is closed.
This case arises from a motor vehicle accident. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Magee, a police officer employed by the Defendant City of Collins, was traveling in excess of the posted speed limit without running his siren or blue lights and rammed into the side of their car as they crossed U.S Highway 49. They further allege that Magee deleted his vehicle's dash-cam video of the accident. Plaintiff Carol Howze was driving. Plaintiffs T.H. and Tyler Carruth were passengers. Howze, T.H., and Carruth suffered injuries in the accident.
Howze filed a lawsuit against Magee and the City of Collins on behalf of herself and T.H., and Carruth filed his own lawsuit. The two lawsuits were consolidated by the Court on April 16, 2021. At the same time, Howze and T.H. pursued a parallel case in state court. See Exhibit A [35-1]. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss [26] all Plaintiffs' claims, which the Court now addresses.
Plaintiffs Carol Howze and T.H. filed a Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss [36] their claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In response, Defendants represented that they do not oppose dismissal of Howze and T.H.'s federal claims, but they argued that the Court should then dismiss Plaintiffs' remaining state-law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In reply, Howze and T.H. argued that the Court would still retain jurisdiction over the two consolidated cases because Plaintiff Tyler Carruth maintained his federal claims.
The Court grants Plaintiffs' Howze and T.H.'s unopposed Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss [36] their federal claims. All 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims asserted by Plaintiffs Howze and T.H. are hereby dismissed without prejudice.
IntegraNet Physician Resource, Inc. v. Tex. Ind. Providers, LLC, 945 F.3d 232, 238 (5th Cir. 2019), overruled on other grounds, 951 F.3d 286, 298 (5th Cir. 2020). “Where two actions have been consolidated, [the Court] must examine each consolidated case separately to determine the jurisdictional premise upon which each stands.” Langley v. Jackson State Univ., 14 F.3d 1070, 1072 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Kuehne & Nagel v. Geosource, Inc., 874 F.2d 283, 287 (5th Cir. 1989)).
Here, Plaintiffs Carol Howze and T.H. voluntarily dismissed their federal claims. As a “general rule, ” the Court “should decline to exercise jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims when all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial” in federal-question cases. IntegraNet, 945 F.3d at 241. However, the Court may exercise pendent jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims, if the statutory factors related to supplemental jurisdiction and certain common-law factors weigh in favor of doing so. Enochs v. Lampasas County, 641 F.3d 155, 158-59 (5th Cir. 2011). The Court should consider “(1) whether the state claims raise novel or complex issues of state law; (2) whether the state claims substantially predominate over the federal claims; (3) whether the federal claims have been dismissed; and (4) whether there are exceptional circumstances or other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” Id. at 159 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)). The Court should also consider “judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Id.
The Court declines to exercise pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiffs Howze and T.H.'s state-law claims. Their federal claims have already been dismissed, and Plaintiffs Howze and T.H. asserted the same state-law claims in a parallel case in state court. For reasons of judicial economy and comity, the Court concludes that the state court is a better venue for the state-law claims. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the remainder of Plaintiffs Howze and T.H.'s claims - which all arise under state law - without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss [26] Plaintiffs' claims in the two consolidated cases. To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. LLC v. La. State, 624 F.3d 201, 210 (5th Cir. 2010). “To be plausible, the complaint's factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (punctuation omitted). The Court must “accept all well-pleaded facts as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. But the Court will not accept as true “conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.” Id. Likewise, “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 615 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2010) (punctuation omitted). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
First, the Court notes that Defendants Howze and T.H. voluntarily dismissed their federal claims, and the Court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over their state-law claims, as discussed above. Therefore, to the extent Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs Howze and T.H.'s claims, the motion is denied as moot.
Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss Carruth's equal protection claims. In response, Carruth did not address any equal protection claims. Therefore, the Court concludes that either 1) Carruth did not intend to assert any equal protection claim, 2) Carruth has abandoned any equal protection claim he asserted, or 3) Carruth concedes that he did not plead sufficient facts to state an equal protection claim.
Regardless, to state an equal protection claim, Carruth must allege facts demonstrating “that he received treatment different from that received by similarly situated individuals and that the unequal treatment stemmed from a discriminatory intent.” Taylor v. Johnson, 257 F.3d 470, 473 (5th Cir. 2001). He did not do so. Therefore, if he intended to plead an equal protection claim, he failed to allege sufficient facts to support it. The Court grants Defendants' motion as to any equal protection claim asserted by Plaintiff Tyler Carruth.
Next, Defendants argue that Carruth failed to allege facts to state a substantive due process claim. “Substantive due process bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” Lewis v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, 665 F.3d 625, 630 (5th Cir. 2011). The guarantee of substantive due process “does not . . . impos[e] liability whenever someone cloaked with state authority causes harm.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998). Thus, typical state-law torts, such as negligence, do not implicate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 849; Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 129, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992). Rather, the official's conduct must “be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense.” Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington County Sch. Dist., 675 F.3d 849, 867 (5th Cir. 2012).
The Fifth Circuit has described the type of conduct that gives rise to a substantive due process claim:
Conduct sufficient to shock the conscience for substantive due process purposes has been described in several different ways. It has been described as conduct that violates the decencies of civilized conduct; conduct that is so brutal and offensive that it [does] not comport with traditional ideas of fair play and decency; conduct that interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty; and conduct that is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may be fairly said to shock the contemporary conscience. Many cases that have applied the standard have involved the use of extreme force by police officers or other state actors . . . . [T]he burden to show state conduct that shocks the conscience is extremely high, requiring stunning evidence of arbitrariness and caprice that extends beyond mere violations of state law, even violations resulting from bad faith to something more egregious and more extreme.
Id. at 867-68 (citations and punctuation omitted).
Additionally a plaintiff asserting a due process claim must allege that he was deprived of a legitimate entitlement - a life, liberty, or property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Lewis, 665 F.3d at 630. Property...
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