Hoyos v. Davis
| Citation | 47 F.4th 1016 |
| Decision Date | 02 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 17-99009 |
| Parties | Jaime HOYOS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Ronald DAVIS, Warden, California State Prison at San Quentin, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) |
Mark F. Adams (argued), San Diego, California; Eric S. Multhaup, Mill Valley, California; for Petitioner-Appellant.
Anthony Da Silva (argued) and Lise S. Jacobson, Deputy Attorney General; James William Bilderback II, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Rob Bonta, Attorney General; Attorney General's Office, California Department of Justice, San Diego, California; for Respondent-Appellee.
Before: Sandra S. Ikuta, Morgan Christen, and Patrick J. Bumatay, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Christen ;
Jaime Hoyos was sentenced to death in 1994 after a state jury convicted him of first-degree murder and several other offenses. He appeals the district court's denial of his federal habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Hoyos raises several certified claims on appeal and also asks us to consider three uncertified claims. We affirm the district court's denial of Hoyos's petition based on his claim that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Hoyos's Batson argument reflects a misunderstanding of our prior caselaw that warrants additional discussion, and we address it in this published opinion. We address Hoyos's six other certified claims in a simultaneously filed memorandum disposition and affirm the district court's rulings on those claims. We decline to reach Hoyos's uncertified claims. See Ninth Cir. R. 22-1(e).
Hoyos and his brother-in-law and co-defendant Jorge Emilio Alvarado were found guilty of murdering Daniel and Mary Magoon in their San Diego County home in 1992. In a joint trial held in March 1994, Hoyos and Alvarado were each convicted of two counts of first-degree murder pursuant to section 187 of the California Penal Code. They were acquitted of attempted murder but convicted of assault with a firearm for injuring the Magoons's three-year-old son. The co-defendants were also convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery, first-degree robbery, burglary, grand theft of a firearm, and transporting over 28.5 grams of marijuana in violation of the California Health and Safety Code.
The jury returned a verdict of life without the possibility of parole for Hoyos's murder of Daniel Magoon, and death for the murder of Mary Magoon. The trial court denied Hoyos's motions for a new trial and to modify the penalty verdict, and imposed a death sentence.
Hoyos's Batson claim centers upon the prosecution's use of peremptory strikes against three Hispanic prospective jurors: Margaret A., Lisa H., and Yolanda M.1 During voir dire, the judge questioned Margaret A. about her English language skills, following up on her response to the juror questionnaire, which asked whether the case was one "on which [she] would like to serve as a juror." Margaret A. wrote, "Not enough English." Margaret A. also selected "Yes" for questions asking whether she had trouble understanding or speaking English and whether she spoke and understood Spanish. A subsequent question on the form asked whether Margaret A. would "be unable to set aside [her] interpretation [of testimony] and accept that of the Court translation." Margaret A. again answered, "Yes."
Margaret A. told the judge she understood the questionnaire, but "I don't speak English that well and I don't understand a lot of words that you are saying." In response to questions from Hoyos's counsel, she responded that Spanish was her primary language, and she said she could not describe the meaning of the words "aggravating," "mitigating," or "evidence," though she understood the meaning of those words. The judge asked Margaret A. whether she would be comfortable interrupting the proceedings to get clarification on the meaning of a word, to which Margaret A. responded: The trial judge later asked her if she would "be liable to just let it kind of pass" if she did not understand something, and Margaret A. said, "I probably will, yes." Hoyos's counsel challenged Margaret A. for cause based on her difficulty with understanding English, and the prosecutor joined defense counsel's challenge. The trial court declined to excuse Margaret A. for cause but told the parties that they could "deal with" Margaret A. using peremptory challenges.
Prospective juror Yolanda M. wrote on her questionnaire: "I don't feel I could be part of a jury, if they impose the death penalty." During voir dire she explained, "What it comes down to, I just have strong religious beliefs deep down inside." But she also told Alvarado's counsel during voir dire questioning that she thought she could put her views aside.
The prosecutor asked that Yolanda M. be removed for cause, explaining he did not believe she could impose a death sentence. Hoyos's counsel opposed the request and argued that Yolanda M. "did change her mind to some degree" about her ability to impose the death penalty. The trial court denied the challenge for cause, reasoning: "She wouldn't like it, but she will follow the instructions and if called upon can serve as a juror in this case."
Prospective juror Lisa H. wrote on her juror questionnaire that she "believe[d] in the death penalty (and the justice system) but only in certain instances." She also wrote that she was "not certain what benefit [the death penalty] does for society by executing someone." During voir dire she told the trial court that the companion of "a very very close friend, like family" was killed in a drive-by shooting less than a year before voir dire and disclosed that the experience had "affected" her.2 In response to this disclosure, the judge asked Lisa H. whether she had any quarrel with the principles or rules of law that he had described, and Lisa H. said: "Well, I tend to side with the [sic] life in prison as opposed to death penalty," but she also said she could "keep an open mind." The court followed up by asking Lisa H.:
Later the prosecutor questioned Lisa H.:
The record does not indicate whether Lisa H. was challenged for cause.
After the court's dismissals for hardship and for cause, it selected forty-two prospective jurors from a venire panel of seventy-nine.3 The prosecution was allowed thirty peremptory challenges, and Hoyos and Alvarado were allowed twenty joint peremptory strikes and five individual peremptory challenges each. The prosecutor used his fifth peremptory strike to remove Margaret A. Alvarado's counsel requested a side-bar, which the court postponed until a later time. The prosecution then used its sixth peremptory challenge to strike Lisa H. After the prosecution exercised two more strikes and the defense exercised one, the parties accepted the jury, and it was sworn in. The parties then selected six alternates. Both sides exercised one peremptory challenge, and Alvarado's counsel returned to his objection regarding the prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge to remove Margaret A.
Alvarado's counsel cited People v. Wheeler , 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748 (1978), and argued the prosecution's peremptory strike was racially discriminatory because Margaret A. was "of Mexican ancestry," like the defendants.4 Alvarado's counsel also asked to "put on the record" that he "was thinking of making the same objection" for the prosecution's strike of Lisa H. The court agreed to take up the motion "at a convenient time."
The court then brought in the remainder of the prospective jurors, and the parties jointly exercised another eighteen peremptory strikes. Eight of the eighteen prospective alternates excused on peremptory strikes were removed by the prosecution, including Yolanda M. The alternates were sworn in, and Alvarado's counsel moved to add Yolanda M. to the Wheeler / Batson motion. It appears from the trial court's transcript that the court granted Alvarado's motion to include Yolanda M. in the Batson challenge.
The trial court heard argument on the Wheeler / Batson motion after all the jurors and alternates had been selected. Alvarado's counsel presented a brief argument in support of the motion:
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