Hoyt v. Central Railroad

• Decision Date: 25 April 1957
• Docket Number: No. 12024.,12024.
• Citation: 243 F.2d 840
• Parties: Cyril F. HOYT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The CENTRAL RAILROAD.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

243 F.2d 840 (1957)

Cyril F. HOYT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The CENTRAL RAILROAD.

No. 12024.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Argued January 7, 1957.

Decided April 25, 1957.

Milford J. Meyer, Philadelphia, Pa. (Jerome L. Yesko, Paterson, N. J., Meyer, Lasch, Hankin & Poul, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellant.

Francis X. Crahay, Asbury Park, N. J. (Hanlon, Argeris, Crahay & Smock, Asbury Park, N. J., William F. Hanlon, Asbury Park, N. J., on the brief), for appellee.

Before GOODRICH, KALODNER and HASTIE, Circuit Judges.

KALODNER, Circuit Judge.

The plaintiff, having suffered judgment against him below on a jury's verdict and his motions to set aside the verdict or for a new trial having been denied,¹ has brought this appeal raising the issue as to whether the trial judge committed prejudicial error in his charge to the jury. The facts may be summarized as follows:

The plaintiff, Cyril F. Hoyt, a track laborer for the defendant railroad, in an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, sought recovery for a back injury sustained while pulling corroded spikes from track ties on December 26, 1952 in the vicinity of Grasselli, New Jersey. The plaintiff testified that he injured his back while pressing down on a claw bar to pull out a corroded spike. At trial he attempted to prove several concurrent acts on the part of the defendant which contributed to his injury: he and only one other laborer were pulling corroded spikes from the track ties and replacing them, an operation usually performed by four men; the defendant's foreman directed the plaintiff to continue the job without additional assistance and rushed him in his performance of the job despite his protest that the work was too difficult; a claw bar rather than the spring type crow bar, which allegedly is safer to use with corroded spikes, was being used by plaintiff. The defendant offered testimony that the job was one ordinarily performed by two men; that the plaintiff was not rushed in his performance of the job; and that the claw bar is generally used throughout the industry for the removal of spikes, corroded or not.

A review of the record discloses sufficient evidence upon which the cause should have been submitted to the jury in accordance with well-settled principles in these Federal Employers' Liability Act cases. Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 1957, 352 U.S. 500, 77 S. Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493; Ellis v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 1947, 329 U.S. 649, 67 S.Ct. 598, 91 L.Ed. 572; Lavender v. Kurn, 1946, 327 U.S. 645, 66 S.Ct. 740, 90 L.Ed. 916; Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Railway Co., 1944, 321 U.S. 29, 64 S.Ct. 409, 88 L.Ed. 520; Bailey v. Central Vermont Railway, 1943, 319 U. S. 350, 63 S.Ct. 1062, 87 L.Ed. 1444; Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 1943, 318 U.S. 54, 63 S.Ct. 444, 87 L.Ed. 610.

On this appeal the plaintiff contends that the trial judge erred in his charge to the jury in these respects: (1) the trial judge instructed the jury to find for the plaintiff only if the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the injury rather than a proximate contributing cause; (2) the trial judge instructed that evidence of the customary use of the claw bar in the industry could be overcome only by showing that "imperative precautions" or "averse disregard of imperative precautions" dictated the use of better tools; (3) while evidence of other negligence on the defendant's part existed, the jury's consideration of the defendant's negligence was, by the charge, limited to the question of the failure to furnish suitable tools.

The Federal Employers' Liability Act provides (45 U.S.C.A. § 51):

"Every common carrier by railroad * * * shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier * * * for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment." (Emphasis supplied.)

Under the Act proof of negligence on the part of the defendant railroad is, as in the common law, a prerequisite to liability. However, the common law concept of proximate cause has been adopted to a lesser extent. At common law the proximate cause of the accident was the efficient cause or a substantial factor in producing the injury. Cf. Restatement, Torts, secs. 431, 433 (1934). Since the Act provides that liability is incurred for injuries resulting "in part" from the defendant's negligence, liability exists where there are a plurality of causes including the negligence act of the defendant. See Eglsaer v. Scandrett, 7 Cir., 1945, 151 F.2d 562. As the Supreme Court observed in Carter v. Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay Railway Co., 1949, 338 U.S. 430, 434-435, 70 S.Ct. 226, 229, 94 L.Ed. 236:

"And Congress has directed liability if the injury resulted `in whole or in part\' from defendant\'s negligence or its violation of the Safety Appliance Act. We made clear in Coray v. Southern Pacific Co., supra, 335 U.S. at 523, that if the jury determines that the defendant\'s breach is a `contributory proximate cause\' of injury, it may find for the plaintiff."

Thus the situation must be viewed in light of the several factors which may have combined to cause the accident, and if any negligence on the part of the defendant is found among these factors, it would be liable for the resultant injuries. "Under this statute the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought." Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., supra, 352 U.S. at page 506, 77 S.Ct. at page 448. Any...