Hoyt v. Connecticut Co.

• Citation: 139 A. 647,107 Conn. 160
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Decision Date: 12 December 1927
• Parties: HOYT v. CONNECTICUT CO.

139 A. 647

107 Conn. 160

HOYT v. CONNECTICUT CO.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

December 12, 1927

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Fairfield County; William C Buckley, Acting Judge.

Action by Harrison Hoyt against the Connecticut Company to recover damages alleged to have been caused by negligence in the operation of defendant's trolley car, brought to the court of common pleas for Fairfield county, and tried to the jury before Buckley, acting judge. From a judgment of nonsuit and refusal of the trial court to set aside the nonsuit plaintiff appeals. Error, and a new trial ordered.

Trial court cannot substitute its judgment for that of jury.

Thomas R. Robinson and Daniel L. O'Neil, both of New Haven, for appellant.

Richard S. Swain and Bradford Boardman, both of Bridgeport for appellee.

Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and MALTBIE, HAINES, HINMAN, and BANKS, JJ.

HINMAN, J.

The plaintiff was entitled to have his case presented to the jury, and should not have been nonsuited, if, treating the testimony adduced by him in the most favorable aspect of which it was reasonably susceptible, and strengthened by every favorable inference of fact that might legitimately be drawn from it, it might reasonably have been found that the defendant's servant was negligent in any respect alleged in the complaint, that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury to plaintiff's car, and that plaintiff was free from contributory negligence. Colvin v. Delaney, 101 Conn. 73, 79, 124 A. 841; Fritz v. Gaudet, 101 Conn. 52, 124 A. 841.

The collision under inquiry occurred in the intersection of Iranistan and Fairfield avenues in Bridgeport. The plaintiff's wife, who was driving his car, testified that, after stopping a short block north of Fairfield avenue to take in a passenger, she drove southerly on the right-hand side of Iranistan avenue; that before crossing Fairfield avenue she looked to the right and left " a reasonable distance both ways," and, seeing no traffic approaching from either direction, proceeded at between 10 and 15 miles per hour; that, when she had progressed so far across the street that the front of the automobile had passed over both of two trolley tracks running east and west in Fairfield avenue, the rear of the automobile was struck by an east-bound trolley car, traveling on the southerly track, with such force that the automobile was pushed across to and against the curb at the southeasterly corner of the intersection. The body of the automobile was dented, the top smashed, all the windows broken, the rear wheels thrown out of line, and other damage inflicted. The witness stated that she had not seen the trolley car or heard any bell or other warning of its approach. On cross-examination as to the distance to the right and left which she looked before crossing, she replied, " What would be a margin of safety," was unable to state the distance in feet, but that it was more than the width of Fairfield avenue. Her testimony was in part corroborated by another occupant of plaintiff's automobile. There was no direct evidence as to the position or movements of the trolley car prior to the moment of its impact with the automobile.

The plaintiff claimed that the evidence established facts and a physical situation affording a basis for logical inferences supporting at least several of his allegations of negligence which of course, under the above-stated rule as to such inferences, would be sufficient at least to protect him from nonsuit. The defendant, on the other hand, maintains that the...